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In January, 1966, the civilian government of Nigeria fell to mili-
tary force. The following July, after barely six months in power, this 
military government was ousted in a second army-sponsored coup d'etat. 
The First Nigerian Republic had collapsed after less than two years of 
existence. 
These coups d'etat are significant for the Nigerian and African 
political scene for a number of reasons. First, Nigeria's geo-political 
qf~e is immense. This state contains nearly one-fourth of the combined 
populations of the nearly forty states of Sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to 
the military overthrows Nigeria was considered one of the most stable 
and promising members of the British Commonwealth in Africa. Second, a 
small segment of Nigeria's 8,000 man army, minute in proportion to the 
national population of 55 million, was able to take over the powers of 
the central government with relative ease, assassinating several top 
civilian leaders in the process. Third, in the context of events fol-
· 1owing the second coup d'etat in July, 1966, the role and composition 
of the armed forces further e~posed the deep ethnic cleavages .. :which 
underlay the Nigerian social and political order. Steadily escalating 
tribal conflict provided the setting for the disintegration of the Firs~ 
Republic and the eventual outbreak of civil war in 1967. Finally, fol-
lowing independence in 1960, Nigeria had been hailed as the model of a 
2 
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workable, competitive multi-party system. In retrospect, this seems 
to~ be .a classic case of political overestimation. The three tribal 
based political parties which had so overwhelmingly dominated the poli-
tics of the First Republic were bitterly condemned by both military re-
gimes. 
The Nigerian civil war followed many years of sporatic political 
tension, intertribal party struggle, and political violence. Periodic 
disorder and bloodshed, which reached peaks during election periods, be-
came a distinguishing characteristic of post-independence Nigerian pol-
itics. The political forces at work in Nigerian party evolution make 
the military overthrows of 1966 particularly significant and may well 
provide indication of the future role of both parties and armies in 
Nigeria and other Sub-Saharan political systems. 
Like many other states of Africa the international boundaries im-
posed by the colonial power consolidated a great number of disparate 
ethnic groups within the confines of the Nigerian federal state. The 
large number of tribal groupings in Nigeria exhibited extraordinary di-
versity in their traditional social order, political organization, and 
religious affili·~tions,.,. These deep contrasts to a large degree con-
ditioned the varying degrees of success of British colonial practices 
and policies. During the last two decades of the colonial period there 
emerged modern institutions--political parties--whose formative activi-
ties and later electoral struggles further enunciated Nigerian ethnic 
-diversity. Party growth took place in a political milieu which was 
1 For the purposes of this stuay these three parties include the 
Eastern based NCNC (National Council of Nigerian Citizens), the North-
ern based NPC (Northern People'' s Congress), and the Western based AG 
(Action Group). 
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characterized by dysrhythmic economic and political development between 
the Northern and Southern areas and by the deep rooted strength of tra-
ditional elites and attachments in all regions. These factors were to 
be of critical importance to the efforts being made to institutionalize 
national organizations--parties in particular--with support spanning 
all major tribal groupings. It was very obvious very early in Nigerian 
party development that whatever the potential viability of the Nigerian 
federation, traditional elites and tribal orientations would be formi-
dable obstacles to national integration and party institutionalization. 
This study focuses on some of the factors which prevented the in-
stitutionalization of Nigerian political parties at a regional or na-
tional level. Although there have been significant differences among 
scholars on the definition and nature of political development there 
has been consensus on the vital aggregative role of the political party. 
The party has been the predominant modern political form to have 
evolved in the developing states and, as in the case of Nigeria, is 
2 
fundamental to any analysis of political development. It is an as-
sumption of this study that the failure of Nigeria to institutionalize 
a strong national party system has contributed significantly to the 
difficulty of maintaining a viable national political order. 
There has been a great deal of attention by observers of African 
politics devoted to the three largest tribes which were included in the 
2For this study the author found Samuel Huntington's work, "Polit-
ical Development and Political Decaly, 11 (World Politics, March, 1965) 
very useful for the purposes of definition and methodology used in this 
study. The author accepts Huntington's definition of political de-
velopment as the "'.Lnstitutionalization of organizations and procedures." 
Institutionalization is defined as "• •• the process by which organi-
zations and procedures acquire value and stability." 
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colony of Nigeria. These tribes were the Fulani-Hausa of the North, 
the Ibo of the East, and the Yoruba of the West. Though Nigeria i& a 
composite of nearly 200 tribal groupings, these three tribes are central 
to any analysis of Nigerian political evolution and party development. 
An extremely critical stage in Nigerian political evolution oc-
curred during the time of British indirect rule in areas of the Fulani-
Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo. Early in the century Nigeria was divided into 
three regions administered by the traditional tribal elites (or ones 
which were appointed) and supervised by a small cadre of British of-
ficials. This was indirect rule. It was not surprising that during 
the nationalist period political parties which were formed largely re-
fleeted these same regional-tribal divisions. Traditional forces and 
attachments underlay the administrative infrastructure of indirect rule. 
These same forces and attachments were mobilized in party development 
at the outset by the emerging: regional political classes. These classes 
struggled to build bases of political support within their home regions 
and in some cases in other regions. This study is an analysis of these 
efforts and their consequences to the Nigerian First Republic. 
The basic hypothesis of this study is that tribal orientations and 
the traditional political order have not decayed sufficiently to permit 
the development of national political parties oriented toward the de-
velopment of modern political forms. Other hypotheses which flow from 
this include: 
(1) The British policy of indirect rule contributed sub-
stantially to the dominant role of traditional forces 
in the Nigerian political system; 
(2) The strength of regional political organizations 
based on tribal forces and loyalties prevented the 
development of national political parties. 
(3) The aspiring nationalist leadership was never able 
to develop either the ideological appeal or the 
political organization necessary to overcome the 
strength of traditional forces and loyalties. 
This study utilizes Huntington's criteria for assessing institu-
5 
tionalization which he sets forth in "Political Development and Politi-
cal Decay'' and which have been refined and expanded in his latest work, 
Political. Order in Changing Soci.eties. These criteria are very useful 
in analyzing institutional development in general and Nigerian politi\ 
cal party development in particular. In his initial work Huntington 
argued: 
The level of institutionalization of any political 
system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, 
autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and pro-
cedures. So also, the level of institutionalization of 
any particular organization or procedure can be measured 
by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. 
If these criteria can be identified and measured, politi-
cal systems can be compared in terms of the levels of 
institutionalization. Furthermore, it will be possible 
to measure increases and decreases in the institution-
alization of particular organizations and procedures 
within a political system.3 
The definition and applicability of each of these criteria for African 
and Nigerian politics are examined in more detail in Chapter II. 
In analyzing the autonomy of the Nigerian political parties the 
spectrum of ethnic and elite group support for each of the three par-
ties have been examined. In the case of Nigeria, analyses of electoral 
bloc group support provide some yardsticks for gauging the autonomy of 
each of the parties. An overview of the composition and social back-
grounds of the party hierarchies and government employees provides a 
further index of autonomy of the parties and indicates the deliberate 
3Ibid., p. 394. 
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infusion of traditional attachments into all levels of Nigerian poli-
tics. 
In comparing the parties in terms of the other criteria of adapta-
bility and coherence, subjective analysis has been used. The justifi-
cation for this has as much to do with the age of the parties as with 
the lack of in-depth field studies in the specific area of party de-
velopment. It must be noted that the study of political development in 
terms of institutionalization is a good deal more difficult than in 
terms of mobilization and participation. Statistics for urbanization, 
literacy, and mass media exposure are readily available but there is no 
neatly compiled statistical yearbook for political institutionaliza-
tion. However, by the use of available statistical data and the sys-
tematic analysis of available materials on political leadership, elec-
tions, ethnic groups, and party histories, meaningful comparisons of 
party institutionalization can be made. Thus, the remaining criteria 
which will be utilized in assessing the level of party institutionali-
zation will include: 
Adaptability. Adaptability is an acquired character-
istic of chronological age (how old is the organization?), 
generational age (has there been a succession of leaders?), 
and functional transition (has the organization adapted 
itself to changes in functions?). The transition from 
primarily colonial groupings to electoral competitors at-
tempting to appeal to regional and national constituencies 
pointed up the contrasts in orientation and leadership be-
tween the parties of the North and South. 
Coherence. The more unified or coherent an organiza-
tion is the more highly institutionalized it is. The in-
ternal cohesion and unity of these three Nigerian parties 
was continually being threatened even before independence. 
There was constant party jockeying for the allegiance of 
the minority tribal groupings, persistent turmoil within 
the Southern parties, and inevitable interparty and inter-
ethnic violence and bloodshed at election periods. 
To avoid repetition the criterion of complexity has not been dealt with 
specifically but its basic tenets have been incorporated in the analy-
ses of party coherence. 
7 
The second chapter of this study is devoted to a detailed analysis 
of Huntington's criteria on institutionalization, the usefulness of 
these criteria for the Nigerian political environment, and the manner 
in which Huntington's work compares with others in the field of politi-
cal development. 
The study of party institutionalization in Nigeria would be incom-
plete without an analysis of the general role of British indirect rule 
on the evolution of Nigerian political institutions. In chapter three 
the focus will be on the legacy and differential impact of British 
colonial policy on each main tribal grouping. The impetus given to 
traditional forces and the non-integrative unity imposed on Nigeria by 
colonial policies were determinative influences on the regionalization 
of political parties. Again, stress will be placed on the critical im-
portance of ethnicity, the diversity of tribal political culture, and 
the peculiar manner in which the British adapted indirect rule to each 
tribal culture. 
The period following World War I was an important incubation 
period for nationalism and political organization in Nigeria. In the 
fourth chapter the evolution of political forces in the interwar years 
will be examined. This period was crucial for future party activity 
in that constitutional changes, rapid urbanization, and expanded poli-
tical participation were all occurring simultaneously. During this 
critical period tribalism became an increasingly serious obstacle in 
the growth of national political forms. 
In the fifth chapter attention will be given to the development of 
8 
the three political parties during the nationalist period following the 
Second World War. This was the elimactic phase of party evolution and 
the greatest bulk of my study will emphasize this period. Huntington's 
criteria will be used to show how the varying levels of party autonomy, 
coherence, and adaptability resulted from a complex set of factors 
which were rooted in the resilience of traditional elites and loyalties 
and the manner in which the political classes in the various regions 
attempted to build party apparatus to secure political power. 
In the concluding chapter to this study the factors which pre-
vented the institutionalization of these parties on a national scale 
will be analyzed. 
CHAPTER II 
MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVJn,OP~NT: 
A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
:.·Few .political phe.nomena in this century concern social scientists 
l 
as much as the rapid expansion of the nation state system. Since World 
War II the emergence of over seventy new states in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America has dramatically altered the former numerical superiority 
held by the Western states. Old societies and new states have been 
thrust into the international community, many with artificial boundar-
ies demarcated a century or more earlier over European conference 
~ables. Telescoped into barely more than two decades, this dramatic 
expansion has found both statesmen and social scientists with inadequate 
empirical knowledge about customs, traditions and institutions of the 
societies which comprise the new states. 
Descriptive terminology, typologies, and models abound with at-
tempts 'to describe".i:he ... new ·states .and·:their .. paliti.cs;. such·.terms as 
"emergent", "backward", "underdeveloped", or "transitional" are often 
used. The complexity in arriving at workable definitions, much less 
analytic schemes, was posed in one ~uthor's concern that: 
The dilemmas of political' scientists who focus on what 
once were the exotic areas of the world are doubly com-
pounded. They encounter nominally political structures 
that do not perform the functions they are supposed to and 
sense rather than see processes that pursue devious and 
untraceable paths of their own~ As if the problems in 
9 
trying to locate and depict the political system in action 
were not sufficient they are called upon to observe and 
map changes in it.l 
10 
Out of this definitional debate perhaps the most often used terms 
which have emerged to describe the social and political consequences of 
the nation state proliferation have been "modernization" or "develop-
ment". Writers generally accepted sine gua .!!£!!:. tha't all these new 
states would strive to become. "modern" (generally with the Western in-
dustrial states used as prototypes) or to "develop" (to achieve some 
semblance of economic growth and political "maturity"). The precise 
meanings of all these terms and the requisite conditions which must be 
present in the process of "development" or "modernization", however, 
have been areas of intense debate. 
"Modernization" is the most inclusive and frequently used of the 
two concepts. A broad definition considers "modernization" as a pro-
cess based upon the rational utilization of resources, characterized by 
a core belief in the application of technology and scientific control, 
and aimed at the establishment of a "modern" society, i.e. , a society 
which is noted for its urbanization, literacy, social mobility and 
interdependence and a host of other factors. 2 This belief in scien~ 
tific control and adaptability is fundamental in modernization studies 
of both old and new states. Robert Ward views modernization as a move 
toward a modern society which is "a massive and new type of social de-
velopment characterized by its ability to control or influence the 
1Ann Ruth Willner, "The Underdeveloped Study of Political Develop-
ment," World Politics, XVI ( 1964), p. 469. 
2 . 
Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., Political Moderniz~tion (Belmont, 
California, 1967), p. 2. 
physical and social circumstances of its environment and by a value 
system which fundamentally is optimistic about the desirability and 
consequences of this ability. 113 In this same behavioral vein David 
Apter has stressed that "modernization" as a non-economic process 
originates where a culture embodies an attitude of inquiry and ques-
tioning about how men make choices--moral (or normative), social (or 
structural), and personal (or behavioral). To be modern means to see 
1 . f lt t . f d h . 4 i e as a erna ives, pre erences, an c oices. 
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Lucian Pye looks on modernization as a "process of profound social 
change in which tradition-bound villages or tribal based societies are 
compelled to react to the pressures and demands of the modern, indus-
5 
trialized and urban-centered world." This process of change to Pye is 
largely determined by the diffusion of "world culture"--a culture based 
on advanced technology and the spirit of science, a secular approach to 
social relations, a feeling for justice in public affairs, and above 
all else, on the acceptance in the political realm of the belief that 
the prime unit of the polity should be the nation. Pye stresses not 
only the inexorability of societies being forced to react but that they 
will react to a "world culture" which apparently closely parallels the 
standards and fashions of the West. The all pervasive nature of modern-
ization and the priority on change implicit in its definitions has 
prompted Manfred Halpern to describe modernization as a "revolution"· 
3Robert E. Ward, "Political Modernization and Political Culture in 
Modern Japan," World Politics, XV (1963), p. 570. 
· 4navid Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965), pp. 
9-10. 
5Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development,s (Boston, 1965), p. 
8. 
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which involves "the transformation of all systems by which man organi-
zes his society--the political, social, economic, intellectual, re-
6 ligious, and psychological systems." This "revolution" Halpern claims 
is the first revolution in history to set a new price upon stability in 
any system of society, namely an intrinsic capacity to absorb continu-
7 ing transformation in a world of unintended, incoherent change. 
The sweeping scope of the modernization process and the conceptual 
schemes which attempt to systematically analyze it have caused concern 
among many theorists about potential loss of focus. Dankwart Rustow 
notes that this wide interdisciplinary approach has of ten tended to re-
legate politics to the position of an ever dependent variable. This 
denial of the primacy of politics to Rustow is tantamount to "throwing 
the political baby out with the institutional bathwater. 118 For pur-
poses of modernization Rustow emphasizes political factors such as the 
growth of authority, formation of national indentity, a quest for po-
litical equality and participation, and political leadership. 9 Sharing 
this view of the centrality of politics Halpern argues that: 
Of all systems drawn into the revolution of moderniza-
tion none has more potential capacity than the political for 
rapidly and decisively mustering coercive and material re-
sources, mobilizing masses and developing an ideology. The 
political system tends to retain its primacy because it 
6Manfred .Halpern, "The Revolution of Modernization," Comparative 
Politics, eds. Roy Macridis and Bernard E. Brown. (Homewood, Illinois, 
1968), p. 512; Manfred Halpern, "Toward Further Modernization of the 
Study of New Nations," World Politics, XVII (1964), p. 173. 
7Manfred Halpern, "A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation," 
(Unpublished paper, Princeton University, 1968), pp. 2-6. 
8Dankwart Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics," Com-
parative Politics, 1 (1968), pp. 38-39. 
9Ibid., p. 40. 
possesses greater and more immediate power than any system 
for maintaining or altering society's capacity to generate 
and absorb transformation.10 
13 
Most authors show their primary concern with the political aspects 
of the modernization process by using the term "political moderniza-
tion" interchangably with "political development"• However, just as 
there is disagreement on what constitutes the broader processes of 
modernization, so too is there a diversity of definitions and semantic 
11 debate as to what constitutes political development. Following the 
lead of economists, political development theorists have devised lists 
of indices or prerequisites to define and measure political develop-
ment. For example, Karl Deutsch links political development with so~ 
ciAl mobilization or "• •• the process in which major clusters of old 
social, psychological, economic commitments are eroded and broken and 
people become available for new patterns of socialization and beha-
vior.1112 This weakening of old traditions and norms is also basic to 
Se N. Eisenstadt's contention that: 
The central problem of political modernization is the 
ability of any system to adapt itself to changing demands, 
to absorb them in terms of policy making, and to assure 
its continuity in the face of continuous demands and new 
forms of political organization. In other words political 
lOHalpern, "The Revolution," p. 516. Halpern defines transforma-
tion as "that kind of alteration of a system which re.sults in the ex-
clusion of some existing elements and linkages and the entrance of some 
new elements and linkages sufficient to be recognized at a given level 
of abstraction as a new system." 
11Lucian Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," Annals of 
~_American Academy .2[ Political ~Social Sciences, 358 (1965), pp. 
i-13. 
1 ~arl Deutsch, "Sqcial Mobilization and Political Development," 
American Political Science Review, LXV (September, 1961), p. 494. 
development and modernization creates in its wake problems 
of sustained political growth which becomes its central 
concern.13 
14 
In Eisenstadt's analysis the capacity of any system to absorb continuous 
growth and change varies greatly from one society to another. To con-
tain and channel this change, however, creates need for structures and 
institutions which can permeate all spheres and regions of society. 14 
Four conceptual approaches which occur repeatedly in the analyses 
of political development have been noted by Samuel Huntington to be 
those of rationalization, national integration, democratization, and 
mobilization or participation. 15 The following brief overview of some 
representative works which deal with political development gives ~mple 
evidence of both the differences in frameworks of reference and the 
often pronounced Western bias and ideological predilections in many 
writings~ 
For purposes of political development the concept of rationaliza~ 
tion emphasizes movement from ascription to achievement, particularism 
to universality and functional differentiation. On the latter point, 
Fred Riggs in examining the role of public bureaucracies in political 
development noted that: "The phenomenon of development involves a 
gradual separation of institutionally distinct spheres, the differen-
tiation of separate structures for the wide variety of functions that 
13s. N. Eisenstadt, "Modernization and Conditions of Sustained 
Growth," World Politics, 16 (1964), p. 578. 
141bid., p. 577. 
15samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 
World Politics, 17 (1965), p. 387 ff. 
b f d . . ,,16 must e per orme in any society. The manner in which public 
bureaucracies interact with other political. and social institutions, 
particularly the political party, will be referred to later in this 
study. 
National integration and nationalism has been a second popular 
area of emphasis for many developmental theorists. This concept em-
braces a vast range of human relationships and attitudes but is basi-
cally concerned with what holds a society and political system to-
17 
gether. In focusing on concepts of integration, however, most 
15 
writers have given greatest attention to national integration ("nation 
building") or the subordination of diverse cultural loyalties to a com-
mon sense of nationality. 18 Coleman and Rosberg in their studies on 
political parties in Africa divide national integration between politi-
cal integration (bridging vertical elite-mass gaps) on the one hand and 
horizontal integration (alleviating cultural and regional tensions in 
. h . . 1 . ) 19 c ld creating a omogeneous territoria comm.unity • ontemporary wor 
history is replete with unpleasant but cogent facts; few states have 
successfully separated political loyalties from cultural loyalties and 
national disintegration has been far more frequent than successful 
16Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development," Bui-eauc-
racy !lli!, Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton, 
1963), pp. 122-123. 
17Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," 
Political Modernization, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, California, 
1967)' p. 152. 
18Ibid., pp. 150-151. 
19 James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties !lli!, 
National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, 1964), pp.· 8-9. 
16 
integration. In surveying the possibilities for achieving political 
unity, taking into account the cultural diversities of the new states, 
Myron Weiner noted India and Nigeria as promising prospects to overcome 
20 
integrative problems. : In the.four year period since Weiner made his 
study Nigeria has experienced a prolonged civil war and India has had 
increasingly disruptive regional-ethnic discord and violence. 
A third conceptual approach focuses on democratization, pluralism, 
i . l" . f d . ·1 l" . 21 compet tiveness, equa 1zat1on o power an s1m1 ar qua 1t1es. Most 
authors who subscribe to this approach stress the values and normative 
standards traditionally associated with Western democracies. Edward 
Shils makes "democratic"·pl;'actices such as civ.ilian rule, representa-
tive institutions and public liberties a precondition for a state to be 
classified as developed. Shils insists that in spite of the almost 
universal lack of these preconditions (or "gaps") in most new states, 
democracy still has the best chance for survival as a developmental 
22 
model. More unequivocally, Millikan and Blackmer in studying the im-
plications of the developing areas for United States foreign policy 
claimed: 
Clearly the problem of political development is not 
to realize replicas of Western institutions, ••• it is 
rather to realize the functional equivalents of the es-
sence of democratic government and politics. The central 
test is the degree of competitiveness of the overlapping 
interests of free groups composed of free men (which) in 
20Myron We.iner, "Political Integration," p. 162. 
21Huntington, Political Order, p. 388. 
22Edward Shils, Political Development in the ~ States 
(s'Gravenhage, 1962), pp. 48 and 90. 
the process of modernization sets the stage for a 
struggle between the alternatives of freedom and 
totalitarianism.23 
17 
Other authors, too, stress prerequisites for democracy which they find 
largely absent. This propensity to stress deviations from "ideal"·pat-
terns of Europe and American democratic practice are arguments which 
American author Willner finds both tautological and ethnocentric. 24 
One of the most popular concepts used to analyze political develop-
ment is social mobilization. Karl Deutsch noted that mobilization is 
not identical with the process of modernization as a whole but deals 
25 
with a recurrent cluster among its consequences. These "recurrent 
clusters" or constituent processes of social mobilization are purported-
ly associated, tend to reinforce one another, and most importantly may 
be quantitatively analyzed. To Deutsch such indices or processes which 
all bring exposure to aspects of modern life, e. g. access to mass 
media, changes in per capita income, and trends towards urbanization 
may be correlated with one another to give a reasonably accurate pic-
26 
ture of political development. The cumulative effect of many of the 
facets of social mobilization would be greatly expanded political par-
ticipation and a notable shift of emphasis away from parochialism. 
However, Deutsch allows that the abrupt inclusion of new groups into 
active political participation might bring a variety of unforeseen 
consequences. Rapid removal of colonial authority in many states would 
23Max F. Millikan and Donald L.M. Blackmer, The Emerging Nations 
and United States Policy (Boston, 1961), pp. 88-90. 
24w·1 1 ner, The Underdeveloped Study," pp. 471 and 480. 
25 Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," p. 582. 
26Ibid., p. 586. 
18 
throw disparate societies into political confrontation and competition 
with one another. This competition would put enormous strains on both 
the political stability and institutions of that state. Deutsch infers 
that during such a period: 
Other things assumed equal, the stage of rapid mobili-
zation may be expected • • • to promote the consolidation 
of states whose peoples already share the same language, 
culture, and major social institutions; while the same 
process may tend to destroy the unity of states whose popu-
lation is already divided into several groups with differ-
ent languages or cultures basic to life.27 
The events of the past decade in many states of Africa leads one 
to the almost inescapable conclusion that very few if any states are in 
fact characterized by shared languages, culture, or social institu-
tions. Extreme cultural pluralism is in most new states the rule and 
not the exception. Moreover, even in states where these shared traits 
occur experience has shown they are no guarantee of either stability or 
unity. On the contrary, in rapidly mobilizing states more often than 
not there is: 
• • • development of continuous warfare and conflict be-
tween different groups within society, extreme antagonism 
and cleavages without possibility of finding any viable 
modus vivendi between them • • • • There is a lack of 
any strong leadership which can enforce legitimate au-
thority and regulate these conflicts and problems, ac-
companied by growing corruption and inefficiency. Thus, 
unresolved, unregulated conflict spirals in continuous 
vicious circles.28 
Empirical research and slowly growing numbers of micropolitical 
field studies, many in the African area, have caused significant re-
evaluation of theories and models concerning p~litical development. 
27Ibid., p. 586. 
28Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns," pp. 349-351. 
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These studies have shown that breakdowns in modernization--whatever the 
definition used--have been recurrent and will undoubtedly become more 
frequent. Retrogression in the area of African political development--
whichever series of indices or prerequisites are favored--has been 
brought into sharper focus by the recent series of military interven-
tions, incidents of institutional collapse, economic stagnation, and 
civil war. Indicative of the new mood of writers in the current stage 
of political upheaval, Aristide Zolberg claims that the most salient 
characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an 
almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most 
. f 29 prominent eatures. 
After a decade of very rapid expansion of the nation-state system, 
it would appear there are numerous shortcomings with many approaches 
used to analyze political development. Willner has pointed out the 
latent normative ethnocentric bias which pictures political develop-
30 
ment as a latter-day episode of Euro-American development. Normative 
bias is often reinforced by the near empirical vacuum in which sweeping 
generalizations concerning political development are often made. This 
vacuum, created in large part by the critical shortage of political 
microstudies of the new states, puts added force to David Easton's 
contention: 
Typical demands that will find their way into the 
political process will concern matters in conflict that 
are labeled important by the (specific) culture. For 
29Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the 
New States of Africa," American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), 
p e 70. 
30willner, "The Underdeveloped Study," p. 480. 
this reason we cannot hope to understand the nature of the 
demands presenting themselves for political settlement un-
less we are ready to explore systematically and intensively 
their connection with the culture •••• 31 
In emphasizing the critical need to examine societies and political 
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systems from different perspectives as a means to arrive at fresh con-
ceptual approaches Rustow has metaphorically suggested that what the 
study of political modernization needs is a set of intermediate con-
cepts that will bring the stratospheric omnipresence down to the tree-
32 top level of middle range theory. 
Political Development as Institutionalization 
In this study the author proposes to utilize an intermediate con-
cept--defining political development in terms of institutionalization--
in analyzing Nigerian political party evolution and development. The 
concept of institutionalization was explored by Samuel Huntington in 
his article "Political Development and Political Decay."· Huntington is 
critical of many approaches to political development theory in contend-
ing: · 
(1) The close identification of political development with 
modernization drastically limits the applicability of 
the concept in both time and place to the parochial 
and immediate needs of the modern nation state; 
(2) Obversely, political development is broadened to in-
clude all politically relevant aspects of the modern-
ization process, acquiring comprehensiveness at the 
cost of precision; 
(3) Definitions fail to distinguish clearly the empirical 
relevance of the components going into the definition, 
31navid Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Sys-
tems," World Politics, IX (1957}, p. 388. 
32R.ustow, ''Modernization," p. 480. 
causing things which are in fact occurring in the 
'developing' areas to become hopelessly intertwined 
with things which the theorist thinks should be 
there; 
(4) Little provision is made for the reversibility of 
political development. Instead of structural 
differentiation and national integration occurring 
structural homogenization and national disintegra-
tion may actually be taking place. A theory of 
political development needs to be mated to a theory 
of political decay.33 
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In defining political development in terms of institutionalization, 
Huntington has attempted to liberate the concept of development from 
modernization. Institutions are considered stable, valued recurring 
patterns of behavior, while institutionalization is defined as the 
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and sta-
b ·1· 34 i ity. Stability is a factor which Huntington finds conspicuously 
absent among the new states. During the two decades after World War II 
the political evolution of new states was characterized by increasing 
ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent 
military coups d'etat, widespread corruption among civil servants, de-
clining standards of bureaucratic efficiency, and at times complete 
disintegration of broadly based political parties. 35 This persistent 
upheaval is due in large part to the rapid increases in social mobili-
zation and po\itical participation coupled with the slow development of j 
I 
political institutions. In spite of the broad-based analytic schemes 
of many theorists, it is apparent that in the complex and heterogeneous 
33Huntington, "Political Development," pp. 389-393. 
34Ibid., p. 394. 
35 
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New 
Haven, 1968), p. 411. 
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societies of the new states viable communities will be produced by po-
litical action but maintained only viable political institutions. 36 
Huntington is by no means the only theorist emphasizing institu-
tional needs of the new states. s. N. Eisenstadt, a sociologist, 
criticizes the focus of contemporary analyses of development in arguing 
that the crucial problem of these societies has not been the relatively 
s~all amount of modernization but the lack of institutional settings, 
1 t . h . d . . . . 37 regu a 1ve mec an1sms, an normative inJunct1ons. There are numerous 
examples of governmental incapacity to develop integrative institutions 
and inadequacy of older traditional organizations to cope with the 
problems posed by modernization. Thus, Eisenstadt like Huntington 
underscores the basic dilemma of the "developing" states in contending 
that not only is there a low level of development and shortage of ·capi-
tal and skills but there is also a discrepancy between a push towards 
modernization and the institutional ability for sustained growth, be-
tween continuous disruption of traditional frameworks and the impossi-
bility of finding adequate outlets in new frameworks. 38 
In the works of both Eisenstadt and Huntington there is agreement 
then that it is not the inevitability or scope of social mobilization 
and political participation which has caused widespread violence and 
instability in the new states. Rather, the implicit argument is that 
even if the new states were to hypothetically experience economic boom, 
increase literacy to optimum levels, or maximize the exposure of the 
36Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
37Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns," p. 357. 
3&Ibid., pp~ 352~353~ 
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masses to the media, there would be no assurance that violence and in-
stability would not still be endemic. In the absence of viable institu-
tional forms to aggregate and control the new demands unleashed during 
modernization, any state faces recurring violence, civil disorder, and 
political decay. 
Institutionalization in the African Setting 
With over forty independent states, Africa is a continent which 
defies political stereotyping and generalization. Most of the new 
states in this area, however, have been beset by the same problems 
which Huntington and Eisenstadt examine in their writings--rapid social 
mobilization, expanded political participation, and accompanying vio-
lence and political instability. The high degree ot ethnic pluralism 
and heterogeneity characteristic of nearly all these states provide the 
societal backdrop for the concurrent problems of political institution-
alization, national integration, and economic growth. 
// ~ It is obvious that most Sub-Saharan political systems have a very 
~/ limited capacity to institutionally absorb the new social forces and 
simultaneously maintain political stability. These polities lack large 
scale political institutions which have the aggregative capacity to 
cope with the rapid inclusion of various social groups into the politi-
cal system. In a state with few if any institutional mechanisms to 
deal with such groups and assimilate them into the political system, 
there is a very high potential for political instability and violence. 
This is precisely the situation which confronts the majority of the 
states of Africa. 
Many writers have claimed that the only modern political 
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institution which can become a source of authority and which can ef- Ji 
fectively be institutionalized is the political party. The role of the 
political party in Africa is so basic that Coleman and Rosberg assert 
that at this stage of Africa's development, political parties not only 
illuminate most clearly the nature of African politics but also are 
prime determinants of the unfolding African political scene. 39 ln the 
absence of modern political institutions some societies have highly de-
veloped traditional institutions and might conceivably adapt these in-
stitutions to the demands of higher levels of political participation. 
Many Afro-Asian states in this category such as Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, 
and Kuwait have either no parties or as in the case of Jordan, Iran, 
and Thailand parties are now either illegal or severely restricted. 40 
The enigmatic surface quiescence of many such systems often blurs the 
day to day struggle by traditional forces to contain political pres-
sures created by modernization. These systems in some cases display 
all signs of contemporary stability, but the efforts of their govern-
ments to prevent the development of political parties makes them pre-
sumptively unstable; the longer the organizational vacuum is maintaine~, 
h 1 . . b 41 t e more exp osive it ecomes. 
On another extreme is the state which is characterized by the 
39Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties, pp. 1-2. Further, Cole-
man and Rosberg define political party as associations formally organ-
ized with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and/or main-
taining legal control, either singly or in coalition or in electoral 
competition with other similar associations over the personnel and 
policy of the government of an actual or prospective sovereign state. 
40Huntington, Political Order, p. 398. 
41Ibid., p. 406. 
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the strong one-party regime. In the past decade many political scien-
tists were caught up with comparing the origins and advantages of the 
1 · . Af ' 42 I 11 one-party versus mu ti-party systems in rica. t was genera y 
agreed that the single most striking trend of the political structures 
of the new African states prior to the rash of military interventions 
was the establishment of one-party or one-party dominant systems. For 
instance, Coleman and Rosberg differentiated between two varieties of 
African one-party rule--the pragmatic-pluralistic pattern typified by 
Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sierre Leone and Cameroun and the revolutionary-
centralizing variety typical of Ghana, Mali, and Guinea. 43 Although 
there were differences in ideology, popular participation and organi-
zational patterns of these two dominant types of one-party rule, most 
analysts were very optimistic that it was only through such a strongly 
centralized dominant party that modernization or political development 
could take place. 
The one-party devotees argued that the existence of a single 
strong party inevitably led to more stability than either no party or 
44 
multi-party systems. This is noted in the study by von der Mehden: 
4~artin Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single Party Tendencies in 
Africa Politics," World Politics, XV (1963), pp. 262-294; Ruth Schacter, 
"Single Party Systems in West Africa," American Political Science Re-
~' LV (1961), pp. 294-307; Thomas Hodgkin, African J>olitical Parties, 
(London, 1961). 
43 Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties, pp. 4-7. 
44Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations 
(Englewood, N.J., 1964), p. 65. 
TABLE I 
COUPS AND COUP ATTEMPTS IN MODERNIZING 
COUNTRIES SINCE WORLD WAR II 
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Party System Number of Countries Countries with Coups 
No effective parties 17 14 (83%) 
Proletariat 3 0 ( 0%) 
One-Party 18 2 (11%) 
One-Party dominant 12 4 (33%) 
Two-Party dictatorial 4 2 (50%) 
Two-Party democratic 7 3 (43%) 
Multi,party 22 15 (68%) 
Following von der Mehden's statistical survey noted in the above table, 
there occurred the series of military takeovers in the period 1965-1968. 
Huntington attempted to update this table by focusing on only the sue-
cessful coups as a manifestation of political instability and dis-
. 45 unity: 
TABLE II 
SUCCESSFUL COUPS IN MODERNIZING COUNTRIES----
1945 OR DATE OF INDEPENDENGE THROUGH 1966 
Party System Number of Countries Countries 
Number 
One-party systems 26 6 
Dominant one-party systems 18 6 
Two-party systems 16 7 







Both von der Mehden and Huntington's studies attempt to illuminate 
the close correlation between state-party stability and party number. 
There was significant change in the interim between von der Mehden's 
study where only 11% of the one-party systems experienced coups or at-
tempted coups and Huntington's later study in which 25% of the one-
party systems had been toppled by military forces. Concurrently, there 
45Huntington, Political Order, pp. 422-423. 
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was also a quantitative jump in the number of coups in states with 
multiparty systems. It is it'literesting to note that in spite of the em-
phasis placed on the greater control which a single party may exert 
over social mobilization and political participation, many military 
interventions in ,Africa have come at the expense of the more noted one-
party or one-party dominant regimes. 
Using the one-party typology set forth by von der Mehden in 1964, 
nearly half of the eighteen one-party African states have experienced 
·1· h 46 mi 1tary overt row. In addition states with exclusive or dominant 
single•party systems such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have barely 
survived revolts which could have easily upset the civilian political 
order. At this juncture one-party systems--at least statistically in 
the African case--seem little more insultated than any other type of 
party system in surviving political instability or military coup d'etat. 
The numerous multiparty systems in Latin America have been the 
most chronically unstable with their histories of recurrent military 
intervention. In the case of Africa the two most noted multiparty re-
gimes, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, both experienced multiple military 
coups d'etat in 1966 and 1967. 47 Subsequent events in both these multi-
46von der Mehden, Politics, pp. 56-61. These states included Al-
geria, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Dahomey, Ghana, 
Mali, Togo, Upper Volta, and Burundi; s. E. Finer, ''The One-Party Re-
gimes in Africa: Reconsiderations," Government.and Opposition, II 
(1967), pp. 506-507. Further, Finer argues persua·sively that''• •• the 
first great line of argument in defence of the single party state is 
that it provides ••• for economic advance, for national representation, 
for nation building, for stability. No one of these claims is true for 
every African state; all four are untrue for one African state; and 
most of them are untrue for most African states." 
47Helen Kitchen, "The Forty-two Independent States of Africa," 
Africa Report, 14 (1969), pp. 48-51. 
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party states, particularly Nigeria, point up a very crucial issue pe-
culiar to such party systems in the new states. In a competitive party 
system, as in pre-1966 Nigeria, strong incentives existed for each party_. 
to appeal to a particular group, ethnic and religious an.imositi.es were 
fanned by the mobilization of the masses, and the competition of the 
parties deepened and reinforced preexisting social cleavages. 48 Thus, 
in spite of rapid mobilization and increased participation in the new 
states--both fundamental rubrics of democratization--party breakdown and 
political upheaval have now become commonplace. 
Parties in most African states, their number or ideological lean~. 
ing, vary less and less in their respective capacity to effectively 
deal with social mobilization and political participation. It might be 
easily argued that after the events of the past decade the no-party re-
gimes are certainly more vulnerable and perhaps equally unstable. In 
~hort, the number of parties or their ideological orientation are very 
uncertain guides to the level of political development of a particular 
state; it is critical that the party's origins and levels of institu-
tionalization be examined in the context of the political culture of 
that state. In terms of political development what is critical is not 
the number of parties but rather the institutionalization of the party 
49 
system. 
The regional party groupings of Nigeria, once considered the arch-
example of a democratic-competitive party system in Africa, must be 
analyzed in the general political environment of Nigeria to understand 
48Huntington, Political Order, pp. 425-426. 
49 
Ibid., P• 420. 
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the integral role which the parties played in the breakdown of the 
First Republic. In retrospect, it seems obvious that the three major 
parties were not the organizational democratic juggernauts pictured by 
many Western analysts. Instead, the parties' origin, organization, and 
operations were reflective of the artificiality of the original amalgam 
of ethnic groups into the state of Nigeria. The interaction of the Ni-
gerian parties, the tribes on which they depended, and a grossly un-
balanced federal political structure distinguished by extreme levels of 
ethnic pluralism made it difficult if not impossible for these parties 
to ever escape their regional confines to become institutionalized na-
tional entities. In this regard, Huntington's contention is particular-
ly applicable to Nigeria: 
ln a multiparty system party competition tends to be 
less prevalent. In a weak multiparty system in which 
parties are just emerging from factions, the large number 
of groupings precludes any effective mobilizing appeal. 
In multiparty systems where the parties are solidly rooted 
in social forces, each party normally has its own consti-
tuency and makes intensive efforts to mobilize that consti-
tuency, but party competition for the support of the same 
groups is less than in the two party or dominant party 
system. Each party tends to have fixed blocks who support 
it regularly, are firmly identified with the party, and 
are generally impervious to t.he appeals of other parties 
• • • • The party system fuirrors society only too well 
and its component parties possess little autonomy from the 
social forces with which they are affiliated. 
In few new states did a multiparty system mirror a society so well 
as in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In viewing the integral role of 
the three large tribal-based parties it is not surprising that the Ni-
gerian First ~epublic disintegrated but that it was able to survive as 
long as it did. 
SOibid., PP• 428-429. 
CHAPTER III 
THE POLITICS OF INDIRECT RULE 
British colonial authorities in Nigeria created one of the most 
heterogeneous states in Africa. Piecemeal colonial a.cquisition ac"" 
counts in.part for the extreme unevenness in the degree of social 
change and modernization among the various regions and ethnic groups of 
Nigeria. However, the chronology of British conquest would be incom-
plete unless placed in the context of pre-colonial diversity of the 
tribal institutions. An analysis of the contrasting traditional polit-
ical organization and institutions of the three major regional ethnic 
groups encountered by British authority point out the importance of se-
quential colonial acquisition to future Nigerian political development. 
In this chapter the operation of British indirect rule in the 
socio-political settings of the three major Nigerian ethnic groups--
t.he Fulani .. Hausa of the North, the Yoruba of the West, and the lbo of 
the East--will be examined. It is argued that this era of Nigerian po-
litical development is integral to any analysis of modern Nigerian po-
litical institutions--particularly political parties. Colonia1 poli-
cies in each of the regions and nationalist political associations 
examin~d in the next chapter had formative influence on later efforts 
by the political parties to become institutionalized as national po-
litical fontis. The major political parties, each largely dependent on 
one of the three major ethnic groups, evolved o.ut of earlier extra-
'ln 
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parliamentary social and cultural organizations. These predecessor or-
ganizations were deeply influenced by the parent tribal group and con-
currently reflected the impact of British colonial policy on tribal po-
litical institutions. The interplay between British colonial authori-
ties, traditional elites, and Western-educated nationalist groups 
during the period of indirect rule provided a framework within which 
modern political forms evolved. 
Contrary to many general studies on the influence of modernization 
on traditional institutions, traditional authority and tribal orienta-
tions in Nigeria did not become extinct under the impact of nationalism 
or British rule. 1 On the contrary, traditional orientations and elites 
not only survived but were often reinforced by British colonial author-
ities and nationalist leadership. Thus, the formative influence and 
composite effects of the slave trade, European economic penetration, 
and indirect rule left a deep imprint on the development of political 
parties. 
The image of slavery and the sparseness of accurate historic 
records which extend beyond the past century has tended to distort the 
fact that great African kingdoms evolved complex systems of government 
lon~ before the rise of European nation-states. For instance, within 
the frontiers of the present state of Nigeria there existed the kingdom 
of Bornu, with a history of more than a thousand years; the Fulani em-
pire which for a hundred years before its conquest by Britain had ruled 
1see for example Marion J. Levy, "Patterns of Modernization and 
Political Development," Annals££~ American Academy££ Political~ 
Social Science, 358 (1965); Fred W. Riggs, Administration.!£. Developing 
Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston, 1964); Amitai and 
Eva Etzioni, Social Change (New York, 1964). 
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the savannah of the North; the kingdoms of Ife and Benin which had pro-
duced art recognized as amongst the most accomplished in the world; the 
Yoruba Empire of Oyo, which had once been the most powerful of the 
states of the Guinea Coast; as well as the loosely organized Ibo peo-
1 f h E . 2 p es o t e astern region. It is known remnants of these political 
empires and ethnic groupings confronted the Europeans during the period 
of the slave trade. However, extensive study of the scope and influence 
of these pre-colonial political developments in West Africa on modern 
political forms has only begun. 
Nigeria, known as the "Slave Coast" until the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury bore the brunt of demands for slaves from the West Indies and 
America. The total effect of the slave trade upon Nigerian society, 
institutions, and peoples will perhaps never be known. The general ef-
fects, however, included the disorganization of the tribal institutions 
and the devastating internecine warfare which prevailed in southern Ni-
geria during the decades of the trade. The disruption of institutions 
and breakdown of tribal groupings pales in comparison, however, to the 
sheer loss of manpower resulting from the withdrawal of many of the 
strongest members of those societies along the West Coast. Basil 
Davidson has claimed that even by conservative estimates the Atlantic 
slave trade, in one way or another, before and after embarcation cost 
Africa at least fifty million souls, or about one-fourth of Black 
3 
Africa's approximate population today. The abolition of British 
~ichael Crowder,! Short History of Nigeria (New York, 1962), P• 
13. 
3 
Basil Davidson, Black Mother--The Years of the African Slave 
Trade (Boston, 1961), pp. 80-81; J. D.Fage, An I;tt;oduction !£the 
History of.~ Africa (Cambridge, 1962), pp •.. ,82-84. Fage would doubt 
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participation in the slave trade by Parliament in 1807 ironically 
liquidated the first Nigerian middle class which had developed a vested 
4 
interest in this operation. 
Following British abolition of external slave trade, the demand 
for Nigerian products by private European traders and companies grew at 
a rapid rate. At this stage British connnercial interests far out-
weighed aims of territorial aggrandizement. Connnerce centered on palm 
oil, and British presence--and interference--in local affairs grew ac-
cordingly. 5 By 1851, a British consul John Beechcroft was instrumental 
in deposing Kosoko, ruler of Lagos, and during the next decade the 
British consulate became the center of power as "protector" of this im-
6 
portant port area. If the period 1850-1865 proved nothing else it 
showed that if the Nigerian interior were to be opened up to legitimate 
7 
trade with Britain, the British authority would have to be paramount. 
Until the 1870's trade in the interior and the Niger Delta had 
been dominated by British merchants. In this period, though, Yoruba 
internecine warfare and expansion by French and German connnercial 
interests threatened British paramouncy. A palm oil entrepreneur who 
the propriety of a figure as high as fifty million, putting the figure 
somewhere between eighteen and twenty-four million. His analysis does 
not account, however, for the high pre-shipment mortality which ac-
companied the slave raiding among the tribal groups. 
4onwuka Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1850 
(Oxford, 1956), p. 11 ff. 
5 
Robert Rotberg, A Political History .2f Tropical Africa (New York, 
1965), p. 223 ff.; G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Q!!. Rivers 
(Oxford, 1963), pp. 74-78. 
6Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 88-92. 
7 
Crowder, ! Short History, pp. 169-170. 
34 
recognized and dealt with both these threats was George Dashwood Goldie 
Taubman. During a visit to the Niger area in 1877, Goldie made contact 
with many of the larger British trading interests operating in the del-
ta and river region. By November, 1879, Goldie (who was knighted in 
1889 as Sir George Taubman Goldie) had welded all the major companies 
trading on the Niger into the United Africa Company after persuading 
9 
their directors that the only cure for overcompetition was monopoly. 
Within five years Goldie was locked in a full fledged trade war with 
10 the French. 
The scramble for territory in Africa and the potential for power 
confrontations in this area spurred fourteen European nations and the 
United States to convene the Berlin Conference in 1884. Over confer-
ence tables in Berlin attempts were made to demarcate African lands for 
European acquisition. On the seeming inconclusiveness but enormous 
consequences of this international conference D..,K. Fieldhouse noted: 
There was no attempt to solve the • • • controversial 
West African question, for there only two major powers 
were involved. Germany's protectorates were taken for 
granted, but British and French claims to predominance 
were recognized and they were left to thrash out their 
differences, provided that freedom of navigation on the 
river Niger was preserved. • • • Conventions such as 
'effective occupation', responsibility, and freedom of 
trade were to be preserved but these principles had little 
practical importance. tEffective occupation' was required 
for full colonies, not for protectorates or spheres of in-
fluence and it related only to coasts--most of which were 
8Ibid., pp. 152-154. 
9Ibid., p. 166. Subsequently the United Africa Company was re-
named the National Africa Company and finally the Royal Niger Company. 
10 c. w. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers (Oxford, 
1961), pp. 108-110. 
claimed. The conference settled nothing but was an im-
mense stimulus to colonial expansion. By drawing up rules 
it declared the game in progress. During the next five 
years there was feverish colonizing activity throughout 
the non-European world.11 
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The Berlin Conference marked a turning point for African partition 
by European powers. The conference failed in precisely demarcating 
territorial divisions or spheres of influence and consequently the race 
to claim territories resulted in a maze of colonial "crazy quilt" ter-
ritorial boundaries. These boundaries were normally demarcated across 
buffer zones where a great power "stand-off" had occurred. The arbi-
trary nature of the boundaries left a dual legacy of tribal units di-
vided between territories and other instances where sharply disparate 
groupings were thrown together within the confines of one territory. 
Nigeria is a classic example of the latter. Thus, the Berlin Confer-
ence marked the advent of the partition of tropical Africa, that in 
time, divided tribes indiscriminately, disrupted traditional patterns 
of migratory drift, and resulted in fragmenting tropical Africa into 
12 
arbitrary, untidy, colonial aggregates of heterogeneous peoples. 
In the years following the Berlin Conference the British concen-
trated on exploiting the economic potential of the Niger basin. 13 The 
National Africa Company on July 10, 1886, received the Great Seal of the 
Privy Council to exercise the Queen's jurisdiction over a large area of 
11n. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires (New York, 1967), pp. 
212-213. 
12 Rotberg, A Political History, p. 246. 
13w. B. Hamilton, "The Evolution of British Policy toward Nigeria," 
The Nigerian Political Scene, eds. Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole 
(Durham, 1962), pp. 27 ff. 
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h N. . 14 sout ern igeria. The chartering of Goldie's company was by proxy, 
the easiest expedient to avoid governmental responsibility and expense. 
His empire was the river and behind its banks his influence diminished 
rapidly. As early as 1886 Goldie began laying the groundwork for later 
colonial administrative dogma--indirect rule. 
From the outset Goldie's efforts on the middle Niger were threaten-
15 
ed by the French. The manner in which British and French imperial 
interests collided created both an international furor and a British 
national hero. Frederick Dealtry Lugard emerged as victor in the land 
acquisition race with the French and he became Colonial High Commis-
sioner and in time prime architect of British indirect rule in Nigeria. 
Under Lugard's leadership the British soon asserted military force 
to maintain their economic footholds. Without armed hostilities boun-
daries were gradually demarcated between French and British protector-
ates. By the termp of the Niger Convention of 1899 the approximate 
b d f d h N. . d . d 16 or ers o western an nort ern igeria were etermine • With boun-
daries settled, Parliament revoked the charter of the Royal Niger Com-
pany which was rapidly losing control of an area that had become a fo-
17 
cal point for confrontation between colonizing powers. Northern Ni-
geria now became a protectorate of the Crown. 
Thus, at the turn of the century Britain had three Nigerian 
14John E. Flint, Sir Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London, 
1965), pp. 84-87! 
15 Margery Perham, Lugard--~ Years of Adventure (London, 1956), 
pp. 495-500. 
16Ibid,, pp. 8-9. 
17Flint, Sir George Goldie, pp. 307-308. 
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possessions; the new Protectorate of Northern Nigeria placed under 
Lugard as High Commissioner, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and 
the Colony of Lagos. The latter two were combined in 1906 under the 
title of Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Finally, in 
1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated to form 
the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Of this territorial consolida-
tion, Elias argued that modern Nigeria like most of the British colonial 
dependencies, was acquired by the British almost in a fit of absent 
mindedness as there had never been from the beginning any conscious ad-
ministrative policy to establish British rule over the whole territory; 
18 
rather acquisition was piecemeal, hesitant, and planless. 
With the flag following trade, the British acquired political con-
trol over an area containing some of the most sharply contrasting tribal 
cultures in Africa. It fell to the British colonial authorities to 
adopt a system of administration to cheaply but effectively control Ni-
geria. This system was indirect rule through pre-existing traditional 
institutions and the pattern was established in the Fulani-Hausa area 
of the North. 
The North--Fulani-Hausa Culture and the Coming of 
Indirect Rule 
In northern Nigeria the Fulani-Hausa culture and remnants of the 
old Bornu Empire near Lake Chad were initially unaffected by the ar-
rival of the Europeans on the coast. For over a millinium Hausa city 
states such as Kano and Katsina had been primarily involved with the 
18T. o. Elias, Nigeria, The Development of Its Laws ~ Constitu-
~ (London, 1967), p. 4. 
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trans-Sahara trade routes to the north. Not until the latter half of 
the fifteenth century did the Fulani peoples, a lighter-skipned, es-
sentially pastoral group begin immigrating into the Hausa area in large 
numbers. Fulani diaspora over West Africa took them to the Hausa 
cities where they gained a reputation as the principal inheritors of 
h I 1 . d" . 19 t e s amic tra 1t1on. In the courts of the Muslim Hausas, the Fu-
lani played important roles as administrators much as the clerics did 
in the courts of kings of medieval Europe. 
By the eighteenth century the Fulani minority had achieved a no-
toriety for their growing economic power and political influence but 
also for their open criticism of the religious laxity and decadent 
standards of learning among Hausa royalty and citizenry. The general 
unrest among the Fulani in the city states was led by a famous Muslim 
scholar, Usuman dan Fodio, who preached radical reform and openly at-
tacked what he considered the reversion to paganism among the leading 
Hausa monarchs. In lectures, books, and papers Usuman distinguished 
. 20 himself as a reformist zealot. In 1804, Usuman rallied the country-
side in rebellion, taking the title Sarkin Musulmi which in Hausa trans-
lation means "Commander of the Faithful. 1121 The Fulani jihad had 
19Mervyn Hiskett, "Aspects of !slam: Northern Nigeria," Islam.!!!, 
Africa, eds, James Kritzeck and William H. Lewis (New York, 1969), p. 
291. 
20H.A.s. Johnson, ~Fulani Emph:·e . !!!. Sokoto (London, 1967), pp. 
30-34. Johnson notes that Usuman dan Fodio, his brother Abdullahi, and 
son Muhammedu Bello were all prolific writers producing over 250 works 
among them. This era is one of the best documented periods in Nigerian 
history to this date. 
21Ibid., P• 42. 
22 begun. 
Within a few years the Fulani jihad swept most Hausa kings off 
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their thrones and established Fulani hegemony throughout most of north-
ern Nigerta. Typical of the evangelical religious zeal which pervaded 
the jihad was Usuman's insistence on Islamic traditions of close ties 
between the faith and government. This practice was retained in north-
ern Nigeria and later institutionalized by the British during the 
colonial period. British policy reinforced Islam as a potent source of 
socio-political cohesion which successive northern theocratic leaders 
exploited. As dan Fodio ordered: 
The government of a country is the governments of its 
King without question. If the King is a Muslim, his land 
is Muslim; if he is an unbeliever his land is a land of 
unbelievers. In these circumstances it is lawful for any-
one to leave it for another country. • • • There is no 
dispute that the Hausa kings worshipped many places of 
idols and trees, and such was the condition of the Hausa 
peoples as we found them before the jihad. Since then we 
have fought them and put them to flight and killed some 
and driven them from this land by the power of God 
(Exalted he be) 
We have appointed Muslim Governors over the land and 
it has become a land of Islam, without doubt. Praise be 
to God •••• 23 
For the first time in two hundred years all the major Hausa kingdoms 
were united under one rule. The old kingdoms were transformed into 
emirates with their rulers owing both political and religious alleg-
iance to the Connn.ander of the Faithful at Sokoto. The unity of the em-
pire did not depend so much on force as on religious obedience to Soko-
to. This deference to Sokoto was to become a prime unifying factor in 
22A jihad is a holy war in the Islamic sense. 
23 Usuman dan Fodio, "The Origins of the Fulani Jihad," Nigerian 
Perspectives, ed. Thomas Hodgkin (London, 1960), p. 192. 
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Northern politics in the twentieth century. 
The first large scale contact between the British and the Fulani-
Hausa came through the Royal Niger Company. With the company's admin-
istrative organization based in the lower Niger and Benue, contact was 
24 
made with the southern-most emirates of Nupe, Ilorin, and Adamawa. 
Agents of the company concluded treaties with several of the emirs. Of 
the binding nature of these treaties to both signatories, Johnson noted 
that whatever Goldie and later Lugard chose to read into the agreements 
neither the Sultan of Sokoto nor the Emir of Gwandu supposed for a 
moment that they had bargained away any of their own sovereignty or 
25 
their inherited authority over their vassals, 
During the period 1901-1909 Lugard with his West African Frontier 
Force extended British control from the Niger northwards by forcing the 
installation of new, more amenable emirs. In choosing to exert in-
fluence through the existing native institutions, leaving them intact, 
Lugard was following British imperial practice already used in Fiji and 
India and propounded by his old friend Goldie as suitable for Nigeria. 
In Lugard's first annual report he noted: 
The Fulani rule has been maintained as an experiment, 
for I am anxious to prove to these people that we have no 
hostility to them, and only insist on good government and 
justice, and I am anxious to utilize, if possible, their 
wonderful intelligence for they are born rulers, and in-
comparably above the Negroid tribes in ability.26 
Sokoto made little effort to counter the British expansion and the far 
24Sidney Hogben, Muhammedan Emirates of Nigeria (London, 1930), P• 
211~ 
25Ibid., p. 213. 
26Perham, Years .2£. Authority, P• 47. 
northern emirates maintained control of the major trade routes to the 
south. Thus, in his second report Lugard complained that trade could 
not be established on a satisfactory basis until the northern Hausa 
27 
states were included in the "Provinces" of the Protectorate. 
When the Sultan of Sokoto finally acknowledged British presence 
Lugard considered the Sultan's actions as tantamount to a declaration 
of war. In March, 1908, local troops and European officers under Lu-
gard attacked and defeated the army of Kano, the main trading city in 
41 
the North. In all fallen Fulani emirate capitals Lugard declared as a 
fait accompli the end of the conquest empire of Usuman dan Fodio. In a 
candid statement outlining indirect rule Lugard's terms for the new po-
litical order were set forth: 
Now these are the words which I, the High Cormnissioner 
have to say for the future. The Fulani in old times under 
dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to 
rule over it, to levy taxes, to. depose kings and to create 
kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule to the 
British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by 
conquest took the right to do now pass to the British. 
Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of the 
State will be appointed by the High Cormnissioner through-
out all this country. The High Cormnissioner will be guided 
by the usual laws of the succession and the wishes of the 
people as of old time and take such taxes as are appointed 
by the High Cormnissioner, but they will obey the laws of the 
Governor and will act in accordance with the advice of the 
Resident. • • • You need have no fear regarding British 
rule as it is our wish to learn your customs and fashions, 
just as you must learn ours •••• 28 
The quest for mutual admiration between the British administrators 
and the Fulani elite developed far beyond Lugard's expectations. Lugard 
27 
Crowder, .! Short History, pp. 223-224. 
28 Edward Lugard, "1903: The Speech at Sokoto," The Principles of 
Native Administration in Nigeria--Select Documents, ed~ A.H.M. Kirk-
Greene (London, 1965), pp. 43-44. 
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stressed imperial munificence but legitimized British sovereignty by 
right of conquest. To placate the theocratic Fulani elite, Lugard made 
a promise in return not to interfere with the Mohammedan religion. This 
promise was later used by the emirs as a rationale to exclude Christian 
missionary activity (and education) from the Muslim areas and to block 
the more secular Westernized elites who attempted to build political 
institutions overarching all regions. 
The emphasis on reciprocity in Anglo-Nigerian indirect rule re-
lationships permeates all of Lugard's writings. Indeed, the benefits 
and practicality of these reciprocal relationships formed the very core 
of both the idea and structure of Lugard's adaptation of indirect rule 
to the Nigerian setting. In his magnum opus on indirect rule, The Dual 
Mandate in British Africa published in 1922, he asserted: 
Let it be admitted at the outset that European brains, 
capital, and energy have not been, and never will be, ex-
pended in developing the resources of Africa from motives 
of pure philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the 
mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the 
native races in their progress to a higher plane, that the 
benefit can be reciprocal, and that it is the aim and de-
sire of civilized nations to fulfill this dual mandate. 29 
This statement encompasses all the complex motives and methods behind 
the British presence and policy--humanitarian altruism, economic im-
perialism, and administrative practicality. To Lugard, indirect rule 
·through native authorities was both philosophically preferable and, in 
terms of the budget limitations imposed by the colonial office, the 
only feasible means to achieve the dual mandate without societal dis-
ruption. Perham noted the dual British aims of retention and adaptation 
29 Edward Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa (Hamden, 
Connecticut, 1965), p.""'"'617-:---
of native institutions in claiming: 
In northern Nigeria, British sovereignty having been 
uncompromisingly declared was fitted gradually and se-
lectively over native institutions, here weakening or 
destroying, there retaining and reforming. Allowance 
had also to be made for differences and in the personali-
ties, black and white, in each province, and also for a 
continuous process of change, planned and involuntary.30 
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Of vast importance during the first formative years of indirect 
rule in northern Nigeria was the quality and quantity of colonial ad-
ministrators (residents) Lugard recruited to supervise the Fulani 
governing elite. The number of political officers employed by Lugard 
was amazingly small given the large size of the region and the sprawl~ 
ing nature of the emirates. A comparison of staff in various British 






NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATORS ON DUTY IN A SAMPLE 
SELECTION OF COLONIES BY YEARS 
1909 1919 1929 1939 
261 297 488 411 
(Ghana) 47 86 142 144 
109 177 179 
82 118 125 121 
Northern Rhodesia 102 109 








The caliber of men Lugard demanded to fill staff positions in his 
30Perham, Years of Authority, p. 151. 
31Robert Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers--The Making of the British 
Colonial Service (Syracuse, 1963), p. 13. 
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colonial administration is another point of interest. In Northern Ni-
geria the typical political officer was most often an educated and 
wealthy member of the British gentry whose interest was to lay not··in 
innovative social engineering but only in discovering, accepting, and 
. . h d l" d . h. h . d 32 improving t e ecentra ize native governments w ic existe • In se-
curing an amenable efficient parochialism, the status quo needed only 
minor adjustment; otherwise, the political officer was to assiduously 
maintain the traditional structure. Lugard summed up his ideal colo-
nial administrative officer as an English gentleman with an almost 
passionate conception of fair play, of the weak and of "playing the 
33 
game~" Though Lugard never defined the somewhat cryptic "playing the 
game," it became apparent later that whatever the "rules" were for the 
northern emirates, these "rules" did not fit the "game" elsewhere in 
Nigeria. 
The political consequences of the empathetic relationship which 
developed between the Fulani elite and aristocratic elements in the 
colonial service has recently come under closer scrutiny. It is 
32:erosser Gifford, "Indirect Rule: Touchstone or Tombstone for 
Colonial Policy? ;11 Britain and Germany in Africa, eds. Prosser Gifford 
and Alison Smith (New Haven, 1967), p. 356. In one African colony Gif-
ford noted that of eighty-three members of the Colonial Service re~ 
cruited from 1899 to 1914, thirty-six were graduates of Oxford, twenty 
from Cambridge, nine from Sandhurst and six from Trinity College, Dub-
lin. 
33 
Lugard, ~Mandate, p. 132. During a personal visit by the 
author to all the regions of Nigeria in 1965 it was obvious that there 
was widespread antagonism between the retired members.of the British 
Colonial Service of the North and the South. The regional bureaucratic 
divisiveness bore striking similarity to the suspicion and contempt 
which the regional ethnic leadership held for each other. An often 
heard joke among Nigerians held that if all Nigerians would have been 
evacuated from their home regions the colonial bureaucracies of the 
North and South would have gone to war with each other. 
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apparent the decades of colonial administration provided the Fulani 
elite insulation from modernizing forces and the political power base 
to eventually dominate the politics of the entire federation following 
independence. Gifford noted the mutuality of Anglo-Nigerian social 
backgrounds which underlay indirect rule: 
It would be difficult to find better political officers 
than these heirs of the English gentry with their country-
seat notions of liberty curbed by character-training. They 
were often intelligent, seldom intellectual. They accepted 
the naturalness of rule and understood the position of in-
diginous elites by analogy with their own. • • • It is 
hardly surprising that Lugard's administrative cadre in 
Northern Nigeria which numbered seventy-five in 1906 took 
to the decentralizing tendencies of Indirect Rule with en-
thusiasm. 34 
Thus, throughout the colonial period the British Colonial Service 
in the North resisted attempts by more radical political forces to di-
lute the power of the traditional elites. This policy was especially 
obvious in the British toleration of the emirs' obduracy towards West-
ern education and missionary activity. This policy retarded for dee-
ades the growth of an education system in the North to parallel ad-
vances being made in the South. 
The vast difference in the timing and scope of Western education 
among the regions of Nigeria had far reaching political consequences. 
The Muslim areas of northern Nigeria provided the British colonial au-
thorities with a unique opportunity for controlling the rate and di-
rection of acculturation. The promises Lugard made at the turn of the 
century expressly forbade any outside interference in the religious 
area and from 1900 to 1909 the basic theme of Lugard's reports stressed 
the inappropriateness of Western mission education in the North and 
34Gifford, "Indirect Rule," p. 358. 
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sufficiency of the 20,000 Koranic schools then in existence. 35 In ad-
dition, the inescapable colonial budget limitations meant that for 
several decades the resources did not permit any general scheme of 
bl . d . 36 pu ic e ucation. Allocation for education ranked very low in the 
colonial budget until the 1950's. 
Lugard discovered the Christian missions' virtual monopoly of 
schooling in southern Nigeria provided an education inseparable from 
evangelization. In many areas of the South the mission education pre-
ceded formal colonial acquisition and had given tremendous impetus to 
the growth of a new semi-educated Westernized class. To Lugard there 
was administrative inconsistency in exerting British suzerainty over 
local institutions and permitting mission autonomy over an educational 
process which stressed egalitarian concepts at variance with the phi-
losophy of indirect rule. Lugard's conception of education emphasized 
its role in creating support for the "natural rulers." As Lugard ar-
gued, education's function should be to fit the ordinary individual to 
fill a useful part in his environment and to insure that the exception-
al individual would use his abilities for the advancement of the 
35Coleman, Nigeria, p. 133. Coleman noted that at the time of the 
imposition of British control over the North, various areas of the 
South had already been under the influence of Christianity and Western 
education for fifty years. British officials lamented the products of 
these schools but needed them in the administration. In contrast, the 
North by 1937 had only one secondary school, barely one-percent liter-
acy in the Muslim areas, and was extremely underrepresented in the 
colonial bureaucracy as a result. By 1951, the North could point to 
only one college graduate out of a total population of approximately 16 
million. 
36Ibid 0 , p. 137. 
. 37 community and not to the subversion of constituted authority. 
Lugard repeatedly argued that the indiscriminate diffusion of 
European education and civilization had a tendency to undermine and 
disrupt the respect for authority which was the crux of social order. 
No group better epitomized the results of such exposure than the 
47 
mission-educated (and evangelized} non-Muslim Southerners. Because of 
their education, this group was heavily represented as Native Court 
clerks or scribes in the North. Instead of religion being used solely 
as an auxiliary to the British directed formation of high "moral 
character", mission education in the South instead produced a pool of 
transient clerical subordinates for colonial offices. Moreover, these 
educated Southerners (particularly Ibos} were migrating to the North in 
growing numbers. 
Western education spawned a mobile, potentially nettlesome class 
which was neither attracted nor particularly acquiescent to the British 
legitimized "natural institutions and rulers." In turn, Lugard and the 
emirs considered the typical semi-educated Southern clerk as the very 
antithesis of deferential propriety expected of a subject in such a 
traditional-administrative structure. The Southerner was considered at 
best a necessary administrative evil and a foreign agent of social 
change incapable of understanding the "natural institutions." The con-
tempt and suspicion held for this new class was symptomatic of the 
British administrator's aversion for the "southern, semi-Anglicized, 
ill-educated, and denationalized bureaucrat prone to condemn old native 
37 
Perham, Years of Authority, p. 491. 
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power and customs." This attitude was tempered only by the nearly 
total dependence on the Southern educated class to staff the subaltern 
ranks of the colonial administration. 
The rapid spread of education and the systematic exclusion of the 
growing educated class from positions of political authority provided 
the environment for nationalist agitation. The struggle was basically 
polarized between the native authorities and the British colonial su-
perstructure on the one hand and the nationalist Western-educated class 
on the other. The impact of education was fundamental to Coleman's 
assertion that: 
Western education did not merely facilitate the 
emergence of a separate class; it endowed individuals 
in that class with knowledge and skills, the ambitions 
and aspirations that enabled them to challenge the 
Nigerial colonial government, ••• wrest control over 
central political power and by so doing place themselves 
above the traditional African authorities in the new 
Nigerian political system. Within a short span of two 
generations, Western education made possible a nearly 
complete reversal in the status of political leaders. 
The rapidity of upward mobility and status reversal 
in this revolutionary transformation is possibly un-
paralleled in history.39 
Status reversal between the classes was never fully complete and 
the British support of traditional authorities in the North and other 
areas made the devolution of political power extraordinarily complex. 
Indirect rule, aimed at cultivating "love of tribe" and deference to 
38Gifford, "Indirect Rule," p. 359. As the author observed, these 
Southerners working in the North normally lived in ghettos or sabon 
garis (outsiders quarters) in the larger cities. Southerners were pro-
hibited from owning land in the North. These sabon garis became the 
focus for both intense political activity during the nationalist period 
and growing antagonism on the part of the Fulani for these outsiders 
living in their midst. 
39 
Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 115-116. 
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traditional authority became near dogma at the same time a growing 
cadre of young educated Southerners began to consider the maintainence 
and extension of such authority an anachronism. When transplanted out-
side the North, indirect rule was much less capable of meeting the 
needs of dissimilar tribal institutions or the aspirations of new po-
litical groupings. In effect, however, the preservation of an efficient 
parochialism insured the political dominance of Northern traditional 
elites not only within the geographically dominant North but in time 
over the entire colony. As Feit argued, the complementary relationships 
peculiar to Northern indirect rule reinforced one of Nigeria's most 
conservative elites: 
Colonial officers and tribal rulers alike wanted to 
preserve for different reasons a mutually beneficial 
status quo ••• each providing something the other could 
not ••• always an ideal basis for cooperation •• 
The administrators protected traditional systems from 
change and made their preservation acceptable to the 
governments at home. The traditional rulers in turn, 
helped to make colonial practices institutional among 
their followers. • They served to legitimize each 
other and thus, we term it administrative-traditional 
rule.40 
The extension of indirect rule to the South presented infinitely 
greater problems as the British encountered tribal institutions which 
were in sharp contrast to the hierarchical, autocratic emirates of the 
North. Lugard's successors' attempts to impose the Northern admini-
strative traditional mold on the Yoruba and Ibo political cultures were 
to have serious repercussions for future Nigerian political develop-
ment. In the North, indirect rule achieved its greatest success. In 
the South, it suffered its most portentious failure. 
40Edward Feit, "Military Coups and Political Development," World 
Politics, XX (1968), pp. 180-181. 
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.. Indirect Rule and the Yoruba Kingdoms 
The Yoruba peoples of southwestern Nigeria might rightly claim to 
be the largest cultural aggregation in West Africa with a history of 
1 . t. 1 . t d h. . 1 d. . 41 po i ica uni y an a common istorica tra ition. In addition to 
this common historic matrix a notable characteristic of the Yoruba has 
been their level of urbanization. Out of the eleven largest cities in 
Nigeria in 1931, nine were almost entirely Yoruba and Lagos which was 
two-thirds Yoruba was fairly ranked as the tenth. 42 By the 1952 census 
thirty-six per cent of the Yoruba lived in twenty-five homogeneous, 
densely populated cities of over 25,00o. 43 In terms of general levels 
of urbanization the Yoruba pattern is analogous to that of Western 
Europe or the Un~ted States. Yoruba cities, however, were based on 
agriculture rather than on industrialization with the urban pattern 
being traditional rather than an outgrowth of acculturation. 44 
Despite the absence of industrialization, ethnic heterogeneity and 
the continued importance of kinship units, the Yoruba had cities long 
b f E . 45 e ore uropean penetration, The historic permanency of Yoruba 
cities is confirmed from at least two sources. As early as the 
eighteenth century Portuguese explorers reported that both Benin and 
41 
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43william Bascom, "Some Aspects- of Yoruba Urbanism," American 
Anthropologist, LXIV (1962), p. 699. 
44G. J. Afolabi Ojo, Yoruba Culture (London, 1966), pp. 118-120. 
45William Bascom, "Urbanization Among the Yorubas," American 
Journal of Sociology, LX (1955}, p. 453. 
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Dahomey were subject to control by Yoruba cities and the British noted 
Oyo as the most powerful city state along the West African coast. 46 
With extensive British exploration efforts in the nineteenth century 
several large Yoruba cities were identified but during this period 
Yoruba inte~necine warfare was depopulating large areas. 
A second feature of the Yoruba social system is the patrilineage, 
an exogamous descent group whose members venerate a founding ancestor 
d d 1 . l' . 11 . f. d 47 an ten to c uster into po itica y uni ie towns. Tribal legend 
attributes origin of the Yoruba to a deity, Oduduwa who reigned at lfe. 
Royal dynasties and lineages are purported to have been founded by the 
grandsons of Oduduwa with the result that numerous obas (kings) reign 
throughout Yorubaland, many taking kingship titles distinctive to their 
k . d 48 ing oms. 
Just as the Oni of lfe historically exercised spiritual influence 
in the Yoruba kingdoms, the Alafin of Oyo was noted for his secular po-
litical poW:er;. A century before the Fulani conquests of the Hausa 
kingdoms, Oyo suzerainty extended from the middle Niger to Benin and 
49 
included parts of Dahomey. Fragmentation of the empire iater occur-
red and was continuing at the time of the British rise to power in 
50 
Lagos. A comparatively strong Yoruba-consciousness persisted in 
46Ibid., p. 448. 
47 
Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker Jr., "The Federation of Ni-
geria," National Unity and Regionalism in Eight Africc;in States, ed. 
Gwendolyn Carter (Ithaca, 1966), p. 13. 
48P h N ' Ad . · ' 163 165 S 1 J h Th er am, ative ministration, pp. - ; amue o nson, e 
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spite of this disintegration. Too, this consciousness was vastly rein-
forced through the more intensive Westernization of Yoruba areas during 
the colonial period. 
A third distinguishing feature of the Yoruba culture is the com-
paratively large scale of pre-colonial political organization and tra-
51 
dition of constitutional monarchy. As Lloyd noted in his study of 
Yoruba political culture, sacred kingship among the Yoruba was an 
ancient institution; each town had its own royal or non-royal descent 
groups but the Yoruba had no ruling clan or aristocratic group, such as 
the Fulani of the emirates of northern Nigeria. 52 
The ancient Oyo kingdom was a good example of Yoruba monarchical 
political organization. The Alafin of Oyo, king of this city state, by 
all appearances was an absolute monarch wielding unrestricted power. 
In fact, the selection of the Alafin and his exercise of power was 
based on an intricate interplay between overlapping lineage and clan 
units. 53 In contrast to the pyramidal structure of the Fulani North 
where the contest for power lay between segments of a narrow royal 
lineage, in Oyo non-royal lineage town chiefs held ultimate power over 
the selection of the Alafin. Candidates for the throne were nominated 
by elders from particular royal descent groups, but senior chiefs per-
formed a power balancing function on the final choice and policy of the 
otherwise semi-divine king. Lloyd noted the political importance of 
51 
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S3 
the balance of power and the level of sophistication of the Yoruba po-
litical system: 
There is a clear distinction between the royal lineage 
and the non-royal descent groups of the town. But while the 
candidates for the throne are proposed by the elders of royal 
lineage groups, it is the chiefs, representing the non-royal 
lineages who make the final selection. Although the oba is 
at the head of the government of his town and kingdom he may 
act only on the advice of his chiefs. The balance of power 
between oba and chiefs depends ultimately on personalities.S4 
A council of Oya senior chiefs acted as "kingmakers." The Alafin 
was considered semi-divine and enjoyed enormous prestige, but a delicate 
balance of power was maintained between these chiefs (who received a 
popular mandate) and the king.SS An interesting aspect of the effec-
tively applied de jure limitations on the exercise of power were the 
sanctions taken against a despotic Yoruba king who acted contrary to 
accepted norms. Though rare, deposition of a king by the chiefs was 
their constitutional prerogative. This deposition had an element of 
finality in that: 
Ultimately the chiefs might ask their oba to 
die. • • • Deposition could only be affected by death 
and never by exile or abdication, for only by the 
death of one oba could his successor perform the con-
secration rituals necessary to validate his own rule. 
The demands of the chiefs were usually conveyed sym-
bolically; in Oyo the Alafin was sent a gift of parrqt 
eggs. The Alafin was then expected to take poison and 
commit suicide.S6 
S4 
Lloyd, "Sacred Kingship," p. 236. 
SSElias, Nigeria, Development of Its ~' p. 11. Elias noted 
that in Yorubaland the political views of the mass of people were of-
ten expressed in their lineage meetings; these views were carried by 
the chiefs sitting in these meetings as ordinary members of their own 
assemblies. 
S6Lloyd, "Sacred Kingship," pp. 232-233; Johnson, The History .£f 
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One of the significant consequences of the amalgamation of the 
Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 was the de-
liberate extension of indirect rule to the South. The Royal Niger Com-
pany had in the 1890 1 s suppressed the slave trade through the more im-
portant Yoruba chiefs, thus recognizing them as the indiginous authori-
ty. ~t this stage there was little attempt by the British to find a 
57 place for them within its organization of rule. This was accom-
plished in the Native Authority Ordinance of 1916, which extended in-
58 
direct rule to Yoruba areas. 
Governor-General Lugard was confronted with a number of indepen-
dent Yoruba monarchical states. As Perham noted in her biography, Lu-
gard 1 s background in the North and the enigmatic character of the 
Yoruba kingship led to a number of misconceptions on the part of the 
British. Oyo, Ife, Abeokuta, and Lagos seemed to Lugard to be closely 
comparable to a cross section of the larger and smaller Northern emi-
rates. As Lugard had declared that indirect.rule was applicable to the 
smallest pagan groups, it was natural that he should regard the Yoruba 
states, especially Oyo, as promising areas in which to impose a proven 
d . . . 59 a min1strat1ve system. 
All the political characteristics of the North--centralized au-
thori.ty, administrative machinery, a judiciary, and a system of revenue 
based on direct taxation--were often lacking in the South. Not dis-
uaded by these sharp contrasts, Lugard insisted that if Southern 
57Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London, 1956), P• 460. 
58Ibid., p. 454. 
59 
Perham, Years of Authority, pp. 439-440. 
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political institutions were not as explicit as in the North then the 
British should create them. The first step was to find a man of in-
fluence as chief, group under him as many villages or districts as pos-
sible and then te&ch him to delegate powers and to take an interest in 
his Native Treasury. The British would support his authority and in-
t "ll • h" II f "b"l" 1160 s i in im a sense o responsi i ity. · In retrospect, "finding" 
leadership to fit the administrative scheme was not only simplistic 
but, as a solution for exerting imperial control, caused tremendous dis-
array among traditional political systems in the South. 
In universalizing indirect rule to the point of creating tribal 
leadership, Lugard failed to discern the sharp distinction between Fu-
lani emir and Yoruba oba. Nevertheless, in 1916 Lugard introduced his 
system of native administration with taxation to Oyo which by all out-
ward appearances resembled the political organization of an emirate. 
Two costly miscalculations stennned from overestimating the powers of 
the Alafin: 
1. The highly ritualized and semi-sacred behavior 
of the Alaf in was considered by Lugard to be reflective 
of the amount of power wielded by paramount emirs of the 
north. In this case Lugard misinterpreted pomp as power. 
2. In terms of control over his dominions, the 
Alafin was not an emir. For instance, the Alafin ex-
erted only the most tenuous spiritual influence over the 
independent city of Ibadan which had long had poor re-
lations with Oyo. These relations were certainly not as 
a vassal state.61 
Lugard failed to recognize the power nuances and limitations 
60 Edward Lugard, "1914: The Amalgamation Report," Principles of 
Native Administration, ed. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (London, 1965), p. 46. 
61 Perham, Years of Authority, pp. 443-446. 
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inherent in the office of the Alafin or the practical political primacy 
of Oyo's main Yoruba rival, lbadan. 62 The British colonial authorities 
were consequently faced with the ignominy of contributing to the po-
litical-cormnercial ascendency of Ibadan over Oya in the 1880's and 
within a few decades reversing the process by placing Ibadan under the 
auspices of the Alafin of Oya. Thus, Oya had become a facsimile of 
Sokoto in the South. Ibadan's inclusion in the native authority of the 
Alaf in marked the beginning of years of acute political tension between 
these two Yoruba cities. This tension was only partly eased in 1934 
when Ibadan was made independent of Oya. 
In Abeokuta, another large Yoruba city, the imposition of native 
authority provoked violence. A disturbance in 1914 requiring British 
troops gave Lugard pretext to abrogate a treaty guaranteeing Abeokuta's 
authority over its internal affairs. Tension finally came to a head in 
early 1918 when Lugard felt secure enough to introduce taxation. 63 
Again, Lugard assumed the Alake of Abeokuta enjoyed sufficient saver-
eignty to impose such an innovation as central taxation. In fact, the 
Alake was merely primus inter pares among the chiefs of Abeokuta and 
any such arbitrary move was considered a gross misuse of traditional 
authority. Perham noted British bureaucratic naivite and dogmatism in 
extending emirate-style indirect rule to Abeokuta: 
As with Oya it was clear that the simple pattern of 
a single dominant ruler with District Heads under the 
king to conduct the administration and to collect the 
new tax simply did not fit the Abeokuta system which was 
62Bolanle Awe, "Ibadan, Its Early Beginnings," The City of Ibadan, 
eds. P. Co Lloyd and A. Lo Mabogunje (Cambridge, 1967), p. 24. 
63 Crowder, A Short History, p. 249. 
at once looser and more complex. 
not, by origin, comparable to an 
among the four heads of the four 
city.64 
The Alake himself, was 
emir, but was the chief 
component groups of the 
Thus, as the Western oba was no prototype of the emir the tra-
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ditional power locus among the Ibo proved even more difficult to locate. 
Imposition of indirect rule on the dispersed Ibo political system was 
to be an even greater failure than in the West • 
. ·. T.he_·,Eas.t--.IndireC:t Rule and Ibo S.egmented Culture 
For many centuries before the arrival of the Europeans the Ibo 
peoples had been settled in their present home in eastern Nigeria. 
Their early origins are unknown but it appears that when they moved in-
to this area their pressure pushed other groups such as the Ijaw and 
Ekoi to the less hospitable delta and swamp regions. 65 With few out-
side invasions or mass migrations into this region of heavy rain forest 
to cause large scale ethnic intermixing, the Ibo never developed highly 
centralized pyramidal political structures as did the Fulani-Hausa in 
the North. Although the present Ibo population is estimated to be 
nearly eight million, it is divided into 30 subtribes, 69 clans, and 
66 
some 500 autonomous villages and village groups. There is overlap-
ping among all these groups. 
The political system of the Ibo is unique in Nigeria in its strong 
emphasis on the independence of the village. Hailey claims: 
64 
Perham, Years of Authority, p. 453. 
65Je Co Anene, Southern Nigeria .!,g Transition (Cambridge, 1966), 
p. 12. 
66 
Coleman, Nigeria, p. 30. 
Nowhere is there to be found any close analogy to the 
centralized organizations of the Northern Emirates, nor 
indeed to the less highly centralized but nevertheless 
authoritative organizations of the Yoruba and the 
Egba. • • • The large Ibo community presents perhaps the 
most outstanding example in the British African colonies 
of an indiginous structure in which it is difficult to 
find any definite seat of executive authority.67 
The village group was not subject to any outside authority and had 
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little basis for cooperation with other villages. The closest approxi-
mation to any external integrating element were the Arochukwu, a sub-
68 tribe of the Ibo peoples. The Arochukwu dominated a shrine area of 
the supreme god of the Ibo, Chuku, and exerted influence from the Cross 
River westwards to the Niger. The mystical-political influence of this 
group was noted by Mabogunje: 
In the hands of the Arochukwu, this system, built 
around the Chuku oracle provided a means of exerting 
considerable political influence over most of Iboland. 
The Aros, in fact, divided the whole of Iboland up into 
spheres of influence, each place under the management 
of a certain 'quarter' in Arochukwu. ·Representatives 
from these 'quarters' formed colonies in all the 
principle places in their area of influence and by 
having all cases of importance referred through them 
to the oracle, managed to attract to themselves con-
siderable power and prestige.69 
Thus, the Aro oracles not only filled a judicial role as a court of ap-
peals in the segmented Ibo society but more importantly forged links 
through the communities in Iboland. Unfortunately, the British were 
hardly able to discern much less exploit the influence of this group 
67L. Gray Cowan, Local Government in~ Africa (New York, 1958), 
p. 9. 
68victor C. Uchendu, The Ibo of Southeast Nigeria (New York, 1965), 
pp. 101-102. 
69Akin L. Mabogunje, "Land, People, and Tradition in Nigeria," 
The Politics ~Administration in Nigerian Government, ed. Franklin 
Blitz (New York, 1965), p. 68. 
for purposes of indirect rule. 
In all Ibo conununities the principal legislative or rule-making 
power was the council of elders. This body included all the heads of 
the lineage groups, rich influential men, certain title holders, and 
priests of important cults. 70 Ottenberg, in studying the Afikpo Ibo, 
noted that the main factor in determining political leadership in a 
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village was age but that younger men of ability were sometimes found in 
high positions and quite often participated actively in village meet-
71 ings. The subtle underlying factors responsible for cohesion. and ·· 
order within Ibo society, in spite of the lack of strong, centralized 
political institutions, were emphasized by an Ibo anthropologist; 
, 
The picture of the Igbo (Ibo) political community 
which emerges from these settings is one that is terri-
torially small enough to make direct democracy possible 
at the village level; a goverrunent in which the principle 
of equality is respected; and in which there are leaders 
rather than rulers and political cohension is achieved by 
rulers rather than by laws and by consensus rather than 
by dictation. In general, the Igbo have not achieved any 
political structure which can be called a federation, a 
confederacy, or a state.72 
In the religious sphere, just as in the judicial and legislative 
areas, there were also integrative mechanisms indicating a basic co-
hension which compensated for the political fragmentation of the Ibo. 
Among the Ibo, mythical values and common sacred places combined with 
trade and intermarriage to provide some modicum of unity. As Anene has 
claimed: 
7Cli<enneth S. Carlston, Social Theory. and Tribal Organization (Ur-
hana, Illinois, 1968), p. 18. . 
71simon Ottenberg, 11Improvement Associations Among the Afikpo 
Ibo,'' Africa, XXV (January, 1955), P,P• 2-4. 
7'2uchendu, ~!E.2., P• 112. 
The pervasive factor of religion among the Ibo •• 
provided a basis for the important role of priests who 
mediated between god and man. Religion had another 
significance in the sphere of inter-group relations •• 
The ritual power exercised by the (theocratic) king of 
Nri (in the Awka district) was an integrative force 
uniting perhaps loosely a large part of Iboland.73 
. . 
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In general, government was the business of the whole Ibo community. 
The fragmentation and dispersal of Ibo political authority baffled the 
British colonial authorities, who, for several decades after the amal-
gamation of the North and South, attempted to institute native author-
ity patterned on the emirate system of the North. These efforts proved 
to be an administrative exercise in frustration. If Lugard had diffi-
culties in applying indirect rule to the Yoruba he found it almost i~-
possible to introduce to the Ibo. An administrative system which de-
pended ultimately on a fulcrum of authority had little application in 
so loosely an organized society. As one of his more dispassionate bio-
graphers concluded, ''Lugard had a strong, though not quite constant, 
74 
awareness of African sociology." With inadequate staffing and little 
information on the political organization of the Ibo, nowhere did the 
practice of indirect rule fail so utterly as in the East. Perhaps, as 
N. u. Akpan has contended, the commonest mistake committed by the early 
apostles of the indirect rule system was their frequent over-hasty as-
sumption that hardly any indiginous authorities worthy of reckoning 
with existed, where they failed to see such institutions as the 
73 
Anene, Southern Nigeria, p. 15; Dike, Trade ~Politics, PP• 
43-45. 
74 Perham, Years of Authority, p. 462. 
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. t f N h N" . 75 em1ra es o ort ern 1ger1a. 
Following the Native Courts Proclamation of 1900, Iboland was ar-
bitrarily carved into Native Court areas formed by grouping together a 
number of contiguous village groups which were traditionally sovereign 
units. 76 The court areas bore little relation to the natural social 
units and were supervised by British District Officers having little 
knowledge about Ibo traditional institutions they ostensibly were try-
ing to preserve. ln the absence of accurate information identifying 
indiginous leaders, "chiefs" were appointed by the court. These "war-
rant chiefs" as they were to be known, were not representative of the 
village groups they were appointed to serve and quite often these ar-
tificial "chiefs" proved to be notoriously corrupt. 77 The warrant 
chief owed his position to the external authority and was generally 
free to disregard tradition and custom, factors which often antagonized 
both illiterate and educated classes. Sir Donald Cameron, Governor of 
Nigeria in 1931, described the ludicrous attempt through the warrant 
chief to "· •• make, as it were, a crown or king at the top and then 
try to find something underneath on which.it might--perhaps--approxi-
78 
mately be placed." Less than two decades after this remark the 
75 . Nt1eyong U. Akpan, Epitaph.!£, Indirect Rule (London, 1967), p. 
33. 
76 
Uchendu, ~ .!.£2_, pp. 46-47. 
77Dilim Okafar-Omali, ~Nigerian Villager in~ Worlds (London, 
1965), p. 76. Okafar-Omali gives an interesting account of how the 
village council was often usurped by the warrant chiefs literally 
short-circuiting the traditional dispersed system of authority and in 
the process creating intense resentment at all levels of Ibo society. 
78 Akpan, Epitaph, p. 34. 
62 
British had become so discouraged that a modified form of English local 
79 government supplanted indirect rule in the East. 
One of the incidents which pointed up the cohesiveness and soli-
darity of the Ibo peoples were the Aha riots of 1929. In this period 
of violence the surprisingly rapid mobilization of Ibo women across two 
provinces was matched by the incapacity of British political officers 
to fathom the impact of their use of warrant chiefs on Ibo social or-
ganization. During the 1920's dispite repeated criticism of the native 
courts and the warrant chief system, few reform measures had been taken 
by the British. In 1927 the belated decision to take up Lugard's re-
jected policy was made to extend taxation to adult males in the Eastern 
region. Because it lacked a traditional base, the assessment procedure 
used for the new tax was misunderstood by many people. Disturbances 
80 erupted in the Warri and Kwale areas but were quickly quelled. This 
was but the beginning. 
In.late .1929 in Ibo Owerri province a warrant chief, under in-
structions of the District Officer instituted a reassessment of tax-
able property--this time to include women, children and domestic ani-
mals. Anger at this assessment of themselves quickly spread among the 
women of two of the most populous provinces of Iboland. What followed 
exhibited an amazing capacity for organization and united action which 
cut across clan and tribal boundaries. Perham noted the general tar-
gets for this anger: 
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Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite 
(Stanford, 1960), p. 21. 
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Crowder, A Short History, p. 259. 
The trouble spread in the second week in December to 
Aha, an important trading centre on the railway •••• 
Here converged some ten thousand women. Singing songs 
against the chiefs and court messengers, the women at-
tacked European trading stores and the Barclays Bank. • • 
but were more interested in destroying Native Courts and 
mobbing the Warrant Chiefs than in looting. • • • The 
movement spread from Owerri and Aha to Ukan, Opobo, and 
finally beyond the Ibo area to heavily populated Ibibio 
Calabar. • • • The disturbed area covered six thousand 
square miles and contained two million people. Native 
Courts and sixteen Native Administration centres were at-
tacked and burned. Fifty women were killed.Bl 
An important result of the Aha riots were the Commissions of In-
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quiry which urged administrative reform in the East. One of these com-
missions called upon trained anthropologists to conduct investigations 
to discover the real seat of traditional authority. By 1935 nearly 200 
reports had been written outlining both the variety of political units 
d h . f · 11 · 1 82 an t e existence o vi age counci s. In spite of these valuable 
reports administrative reorganization of the East was never fully 
achieved before the beginning of World War II. 
By the late 1950 1 s it had become very apparent that Native Author-
ities in the South could not become effective local government agencies. 
The growth of a new educated class following the war made their de-
ficiencies even more obvious. Normally this class was denied effective 
voice in Native Authority affairs and often openly criticized tribal 
authority. Thus, a class which could have aided in adapting tradition-
al institutions to modern needs was restrained by an administrative 
theory which sought to preserve and reinforce the traditional elites. 
In the South agitation by the educated class was always more 
81 Perham, Native Administration, pp. 206-211. 
82ttailey, An African Survey, p. 466; Crowder, A Short History, PP• 
260-261. 
pronounced because of the larger size of this group and the existence 
of a native authority structure which lacked legitimacy and often any 
sense of popular responsibility. 
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In the authoritative North the generation-class cleavage was muted 
and the insulation and isolation from the forces sweeping the South 
lasted well into the post-World War II period. Northern traditional 
elites were to be finally galvanized into response mainly through the 
formation and agitation across Nigeria by nationalist Southern-based 
political organizations. Organizational efforts among the tribal 
groups paralleled in reverse chronological order the three sharply con-
trasting tribal societies which have been examined in this chapter. 
Growing interaction among these three main tribal groups was an im-
portant result of the activities of these early organizations. Most 
critically, the pace and scope of organizational effort reflected the 
extreme disparity of regional development during the period of indirect 
rule. The legacies of the colonial period had, thus, a formative di-
rect influence on the later development of Nigerian nationalist organi-
zations and political parties. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 
IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 
The intimate working relationship which developed between the 
small British colonial service and the Fulani traditional elite proved 
to be extremely difficult to transfer to the South. Conceivably, by 
longer reinforcement of traditional structures ("natural institutions") 
and leaders ("natural rulers"), the political environment Lugard en-
visioned might have evolved whereby these traditional institutions and 
elites would have been capable of exerting control over the whole of 
Nigeria. However, Nigeria did not exist in a historic vacuum and new 
forces were interjecting themselves into the Nigerian political set-
ting. A new Western educated class began to question not only the in-
adequacies of indirect rule but the injustices and even the legitimacy 
i 
of colonial rule. In this new political environment Hamilton noted the 
adaptive potential of indirect rule: 
He [Lugard] turned a necessity of cheap and practical 
governing into a theory of indirect rule as a positive good, 
which grew into a dogma slavishly followed by his successo~s 
and held out as a pattern for the slow development of all 
the 'backward' empire. Before it could be instalied on 
thorough lines, indirect rule was out of date. The British 
were of course too slow in occupying, too slow in governing, 
too slow in welfare and developmental activity, too slow in 
training for independence; but, when they faced up to this 
last, they were perhaps superb in their timing.1 
1Hamilton, "The Evolution of British Policy," p~ 40. 
66 
The spread of Western education in mission schools stimulated new 
political activity and contact among the ethnic groups. The emergence 
of new political activism challenged the existing order legitimized by 
the British. 2 In Nigeria the initial activity was heavily concentrated 
in the South with political organizing most widespread among Yoruba and 
Ibo educated elements. In time these efforts not only challenged the 
efficiency of indirect rule but demanded for Nigeria self-determination 
as an independent state. 
The nationalist struggle, the rise of Nigerian political organi-
zations and the attempts made by these organizations to permeate all 
levels of Nigerian society will be the general focus of this chapter. 
It is my contention that the interwar efforts to organize nationalist 
groups into a cohesive political force were crucial in determining the 
future structure, activities, and difficulties of the major political 
parties. As was true of all other efforts at territorial organization, 
these political parties were strongly influenced by the contrasting 
tempo of regional development during the period of indirect rule. In 
the interaction between the British colonial administration, traditional 
elites, and nationalist forces in the emerging federal framework of Ni-
geria a power struggle developed. This struggle had wide ramifications 
for later efforts by political parties to become institutionalized on a 
national scale. Thus, the formative attempts by nationalist forces to 
build and sustain viable political organizations against a backdrop of 
indirect rule provides insight into problems which later plagued the 
~artin L. Kilson, "Social Forces in West African Political De-
velopment," Twentieth Century Africa, ed. P.J.M. McEwan (London, 1968), 
P• 9. 
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Southern parties in their efforts to escape the basic regional-tribal 
orientation and become truly national political institutions. In this 
chapter the early efforts to build indiginous nationalist political or-
ganizations will be examined. The evolution of these early political 
forms in the context of colonial disrhythmic development among the re-
gions had a fundamental influence on the development of the Nigerian 
multiparty political system. 
The Nigerian Council and the Politics of Lagos 
A major result of the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria 
in 1914 was the establishment of the Nigerian Council by Sir Frederick 
Lugard, the Governor-General. This body which nominally represented the 
whole of Nigeria--Colony and Protectorate--had been preceded by a small 
nominated Legislative Council which advised and assisted the Governor. 3 
The purview of the original council was confined to the colony and it 
served as a valuable politicizing instrument in Lagos. The Nigerian 
Council was composed of thirty-six members: the Governor, the members 
of the Executive Council, six unofficial European members representing 
the chambers of cormnerce, shipping, banking and mining and six African 
unofficials (chiefs) nominated to represent as "far as may be" both the 
4 
coastal districts and the interior. The purely advisory role of the 
Nigerian Council was explicitly stated in section 17 of the Order in 
Council: "No resolution shall have any legislative or executive au-
thority, and the Governor shall not be required to give effect to any 
3Sir Alan Burns, History of Nigeria (London, 1963), p. 138. 
4Elias, Nigeria, ~Development of Its ~' p. 24. 
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such resolution unless he thinks fit and is authorized to do so. 115 
The chiefs rarely attended the annual Council meetings and in ef-
feet this body's main business was largely confined to a desultory dis-
cussion of the Governor-General's annual address. The meetings of this 
first territory-wide Anglo-Nigerian political body were later described 
by the Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford: 
Some of you will recollect the dreary and apathetic 
meetings of the so-called Nigerian Council which always 
seemed to me to be a debating society in which nobody 
would enter into a debate. And those of you who can 
remember the proceedings of that Council ••• will agree 
with me what an extraordinary contrast it is between the 
interest of the debate to which we have listened today 
and the work you have done during the past week and those 
feeble, faint, colourless meetings that used to weary us 
all so intensely in the past.6 
The lethargy of the Council Clifford found so disappointing and tedious 
should hardly have been surprising. A diverse membership which in-
eluded a Northern emir, a Yoruba chief, and the local representative of 
Barclay's Bank was hardly equipped for debating (in English) questions 
of colonial policy which, in any event, were clearly beyond its con-
trol. The powerlessness of the Council was reflected in a 1919 motion 
to the effect that the Council be either reconstructed so as to make it 
7 
a serious factor in the governing of the Colony, or else be abolished. 
5Ibid., pp. 24-25; Crowder, ! Short History, pp. 215-216. Crowder 
noted the unwieldly nature of the Council and the fact that Lugard only 
centralized departments that he felt necessary for control of overall 
policy. At every turn Lugard avoided the acquisition of a large ad-
ministration, so that the administration was effectively regionalized 
under the Lieutenant-Governors, a process which only exacerbated the 
growing differences between the two regions. 
6 
Joan Wheare, The Nigerian Legislature Council (London, 1949), pp. 
30-31. 
7 . 
Elias, Nigeria, ~ Development of .!!2, ~' p. 25. 
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Though the motion failed, the point was well taken and three years 
later the Council was reconstituted. 
Frustration with the Nigerian Council was part of a growing demand 
in all West Africa for basic reform in colonial rule. During World War 
I the idea for concerted action in this area among West African intel-
lectuals lay dormant. With the end of hostilities in Europe, this dor-
mancy ended with the first Congress of British West Africa held in 
Accra in 1920. Caseley Hayford, Gold Coast Barrister and early nation-
alist leader, headed this conference which included representatives 
from Nigeria, the Gold Coast (later renamed Ghana), Sierre Leone and 
Gambia. 8 The outlines and aims of this conference were explicit but: 
Leading all the rest was the demand for basic reform 
.which would give Africans effective parity in the 
Legislative Council, create new houses of assembly with 
elected majorities and power over taxation and the colonial 
budgets, and establish self-government at the municipal 
level. The tone of the conference was clear--it was high 
time that such reforms were affected. West Africans had 
long-lived traditions of self-government and they now had 
a growing number of educated leaders, so that Wilsonian 
self-determination had relevance for West Africa at least 
as much as for other parts of the world.9 
The idea of united political action was very compelling on paper 
8 
Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York, 1957), 
pp. 139-141. Hodgkin noted that any discussion of Africa~ political 
parties must involve predecessor organizations from which they sprung, 
i.e., the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society of the Gold Coast 
(1897), the National Congress of British West Africa (1920), and the Ni-
gerian National Democratic Party (1923). Hodgkin further noted these 
political associations had common characteristics: (1) control was ex-
erted by a professional elite, generally lawyers; (2) influence of these 
associations was effectively limited to a few main towns--Lagos, Free-
town, and Accra, etc.; and (3) these groups tended to be exclusive 
clubs for the professional and prosperous business classes which were 
emerging. 
9 . 
Robert W. July, The Origins of Modern African Thought (London, 
1968), pp. 444-445. 
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and it received a good deal of popular support throughout West Africa; 
yet, it had two practical limitations. First, the internal struggles 
among the African intelligentsia, especially in Nigeria and the Gold 
10 Coast, crippled the Congress movement at the outset. Infighting 
among factions in Lagos had already become a dominant theme of Nigerian 
politics and Nigerian support for any concerted interterritorial 
initiatives was badly splintered. Secondly, the British authorities 
were from the outset suspicious and contemptuous of the aims of the 
Congress. Lord Milner, British Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, 
rejected the demands of the Congress outright. Sir Hugh Clifford, 
Governor of Nigeria, expressed open hostility to the demands of the 
Congress for the elective representation of Africans. In one of the 
most scathing and denunciatory addresses in Nigerian colonial history 
Clifford attacked the largely southern Nigerian delegation to the Con-
gress: 
There had during the last few months been a great deal 
of loose and gaseous talk on the subject of popular election 
--talk which has for the most part emanated from a self-
selected and self-appointed congregation of educated African 
gentlemen who collectively style themselves the 'West Afri-
can National Conference' •••• For it can only be described 
as farcical to suppose that ••• continental Nigeria can be 
represented by a handful of gentlemen drawn from a half-
dozen coast towns, men born and bred in British-administered 
towns situated on the seashore who, in the safety of British 
protection have peacefully pursued their studies under Bri-
tish teachers, in British schools, in order to enable them 
to become ministers of the Christian religion or learned in 
the laws of England, whose eyes are fixed, not upon African 
native history or tradition or policy, nor upon their own 
tribal obligations and duties to their Natural Rulers which 
immemorable custom should bestow on political theories 
lOibid., p. 446. 
evolved by Europeans to fit a wholly different environ-
ment, for the government of peoples who have arrived at 
a wholly different stage of civilization.11 
Governor Clifford dismissed as an absurdity the idea of a West 
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African "nation" or a "nationality" in the Nigerian context. The most 
far reaching attack was reserved for the idea--anathema to the rubrics 
of indirect rule--that there could ever be a Nigerian nation .E!:.!.~· 
As Clifford noted, Nigeria had been and would continue to be governed 
in accordance with the diversity of its ethnic fragments: 
Assuming the impossible were feasible ••• that this 
collection of self-contained and mutually independent 
Native States separated from one another ••• by great 
distances, by differences of history and tradition and 
ethnological, racial, tribal, politicai social, and re-
ligious barriers were indeed capable of being welded 
into a single homogeneous nation ••• a deadly blow would 
thereby be struck at the root of national self-development 
in Nigeria, which secures to each separate people the 
right to maintain its identity, its individuality and its 
nationality, its own chosen form of government, and the 
peculiar political and social institutions which have been 
evolved for it by the wisdom and accumulated experience 
of generations of its forebears.12 
Clifford revealed the dogmatic side of indirect rule and the co-
lonial government's antipathy toward the most basic resolutions of the 
Congress on the concepts of nation, nationality, and self-government. 
It is ironic that the author of this attack on early African demands 
for greater self-determination authored the next constitution. The 
1922 Clifford Constitution provided for elected African members of a 
Legislative Council for the first time in British West Africa. 13 Thus, 
an official outlet was provided for the very class Clifford had just 
11 Ezera, Constitutional Development, pp. 24-25. 
12Ibid., p. 26. 
13 
Crowder, A Short History, p. 228. 
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repudiated. 
The West African Congress must be recognized as a milestone in the 
gradual but impressive awareness of the intellectual elite for legis-
lative and administrative reforms in their respective colonial terri-
tories .14 A consistent theme of British criticism of Nigerian Congress 
participants was their alleged unrepresentativeness to either speak for 
the masses or to conceivably replace the "natural rulers." This alle-
gation was used ten years later to deride nationalist activities of 
Herbert Macauley and Nnamdi Azikiwe in Nigeria. Such agitation for re-
form confronted the British with the quandary of whether to continue 
dealing exclusively with the traditional elite of Lugard's era or 
whether to respond to the grievances posed by the new vocal nationalist 
minority. July posited the importance of this basic turmoil in power 
relationships in a series of questions: 
Who indeed were the peoples representatives? Was it 
the chiefs whose rule was sanctioned by tradition but 
whose ability to rule was increasingly called into ques-
tion by the exigencies of a modern world? Was it self-
appointed parvenus who had no authority in the community 
based on custom, but ~hose knowledge of the West and of 
contemporary legal or technical questions qualified them 
to advise their people? The issue was whether the old 
Africa or the new was going to act as a liason between 
the administration and the people, and in the long view 
whether the traditional authorities or the new leadership 15 
would eventually become the government of emergent Africa. 
It became increasingly apparent that the traditional authorities 
and the nationalist elites were engaged in a power struggle with far 
reaching consequences for Nigerian political development. The initial 
14Eyo B. Ndem, "Changing Political Structure Due to Changing Force 
in Nigeria," International Journal Ef Sociology, VII (1966), PP• 160-
1961. 
15July, Origins of Thought, p. 451. 
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incredulity of the British towards the "educated African gentlemen"· 
soon gave way to a recognition that the nationalist elites were indeed 
a force to be reckoned with. Nationalist agitation and British response 
g~eatly influenced the evolution and contour of future political insti-
tutions and the constitutional structure of the Nigerian state. 
The Clifford Constitution and the Birth of Party Activity 
In the 1922 Clifford Constitution there was provision for a Legis-
lative Council of 46 members of which 27 were officials and 19 were un-
officials. In the unofficial minority fifteen were to be nominated by 
16 
the governor and for the first time four were to be elected. Two 
critical features of this Constitution were the near exemption of the 
North from the competence of the Legislative Council and the inclusion 
of the elective principle which was unique for British West Africa at 
the time. Out of the four elected African members three were to come 
17 
from Lagos and one from Calabar. 
The elective principle imbedded in the Clifford Constitution 
created an immediate upsurge in political activity in Lagos. The Ni-
18 
gerian National Democratic Party led by Herbert Macauley emerged as 
one of the most powerful political organizations of the period. The 
NNDP won all three Lagos seats in the Legislative Council in the 
16 Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 27. 
17Wheare, Nigerian Legislative Council, p. 33; Crowder, ! Short 
History~ p. 228. Crowder noted that electoral requirements enfran-
chised only adult males in Lagos with a residence of 12 months and 
gross income of oC.100 per annum. 
18Hereafter referred to as the NNDP. 
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19 consecutive elections of 1923, 1928, and 1933. Macauley's forty year 
career as the gadfly of the British administration is ironic in view of 
his aristocratic background. The grandson of the revered Bishop Crow-
ther and the product of a Victorian mission education, Macauley was a 
typical example of the breed of assimilated nationalists who dominated 
this early period of party developmrnt. His bitter harangues against 
British colonial authorities, however, seem mild and circumspect com-
pared to nationalist and tribal oriented publications of two decades 
later. July analyzed the role of Macauley in the evolution of nation-
alist thought thus: 
A deep sense of outrage never seemed to leave Macauley 
throughout his long life and it constantly characterized 
his tireless efforts to check, to circumscribe, to erode, 
and to replace the power of British colonial administration 
in Lagos. Yet he was in no sense a revolutionary. He has 
been described as a typical nineteenth century liberal of 
moderate old-fashioned views, and not once did the slightest 
hint of Nigerian separatism from Britain ever intrude itself 
into his writing. If his creed was liberalism, however, it 
included as well the idea of a democratic local self-
government, a concept which fitted not at all with contem-
porary European doctrines of colonial government and white 
supremacy.20 
Macauley's NNDP did not fulfill its early promise as a vehicle of 
militant nationalism. Though the party's name and platform indicated a 
national orientation, its leadership and actual policies were often 
neither Nigerian nor national. Led by a cosmopolitan elite (many non-
Nigerian), the NNDP interests stressed vague inter-territorial programs 
of nationalist action but reflected more a parochial preoccupation with 
19Ezera, Constitutional Development, pp. 30-31. 
20 July, Origins of Thought, p. 379. 
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L . 1 l' . 21 agos interna po itics. Branches were established in other cities 
but these quickly withered as most activity focused on Lagos. During 
the period 1923-1951, Lagos and Calabar alone in Nigeria could directly 
elect legislative representatives. In short, the system of indirect 
rule and the effects of indiginous parochial politics resulted in the 
suffocation of a territorial political party orientation. 22 
Another phase of organizational activity began with the founding 
of the West African Student Union (WASU). Founded in London in 1925 by 
a Yoruba law student, Ladipo Solanke, WASU became the principal center 
for the growing number of Nigerian students in the United Kingdom and a 
hotbed of student politics. 23 A primary objective of this student-led 
organization was to foster a spirit of national consciousness and ra-
cial pride among its members. Between 1929 and 1932 Solanke establish-
ed branches throughout West Africa and Nigeria. With these local bran-
ches Solanke and WASU influenced a critical segment of the generation 
from which many of Nigeria's most militant post-war leaders emerged. 
However, WASU was mainly oriented towards the awakening of racial not 
. . 1 . 24 territoria consciousness. Solanke, though a Nigerian, tended to 
think in terms of either his home Yoruba area or ''West Africa" and 
avoided any particularization of thought or organization along Nigerian 
territorial lines. In short, tribe and race were the transcendent 
21 Oluwole Idowu Odomosu, The Nigerian Constitution: History and 
Development (London, 1963), p. 28. 
22 
Coleman, Nigeria, p. 206. 




criteria of nationality. In spite of the preoccupation by WASU with 
racial consciousness and pride, the awakening of a Nigerian national 
consciousness was not long to remain out of sight and out of mind. 
Nationalism and Tribalism in an Urban Setting 
During the 1930 1 s there was a high degree of correlation between 
the migration to the cities in Nigeria and the concurrent development 
of the mass media, educational facilities, and ethnic-group associa-
tions. Migration had far reaching effects on the development of polit-
. 1 . . 25 ica organizations. During the colonial era migration to the cities 
made possible the contacts through which horizons were broadened and 
administrations were subverted. Migration led to new economic possi-
bilities and exposure to a new multi-tribal environment. These factors 
in turn caused traditional systems of authority to be called into ques-
tion. Migration was, thus, a phenomenon congruent with both moderni-
. d . l" 26 zation an nationa ism. 
One of the political consequences of rapid urbanization· in Nigeria 
was the founding of interest and ethnic group associations in many of 
the larger cities. A proliferation of labor unions, professional 
groups and tribal unions occurred in the late 1920's and early 1930 1 s. 
In this period ethnicity persisted and permutated in urban settings. 
Most importantly, however, these new associations were of crucial 
25 
Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 210-211. 
26 
Immanuel Wallerstein, "Migration in West Africa--The Political 
Perspective," Urbanization and Migration in ~Africa, ed. Helda 
Kuper (Berkeley, 1965), p. 157; Kenneth Little, West African Urbani-
zation--~ Study of Voluntary Associations in Social Change (Cambridge, 
1966), p. 109. 
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importance to the nationalist movement because they enabled nationalist 
leaders to more easily mobilize and manipulate important segments of 
the population. 
The tribal associations were particularly important for (1) serv-
ing as communications links to the countryside, (2) establishing lower 
schools and funding over-seas university education for fellow tribesmen, 
and (3) influencing the operation of political parties. 27 The earliest 
all-tribal federation, the Ibibio Welfare Union was organized in 1928. 
However, the Ibo State Union formed in 1944 and the Egbe Omo Oduduwa 
(Yoruba} established in 1945 were to become the most influential 
unions. 28 Later these cultural associations were to be closely tied as 
auxiliary units of the Ibo and Yoruba dominated political parties. The 
agitation by the educated minority among the Yoruba was noted by Gari-
gue: 
A new stage was reached in the late 1920 1 s with the 
formation in practically every large Yoruba town of asso-
ciations led by European-educated Yoruba. Each town de-
veloped its own pattern with different attitudes to the 
Native Authority. • • • Abeokuta acquired a reputation 
of having more radical literate leaders than towns like 
Oyo and Ife where being a progressive meant nothing more 
than wanting a voice in the framing of local policies. 
Administrators ••• frequently brought pressure to bear 
on the local councils to co-opt literate members as 
councillors. • • • The earlier cleavages between Euro-
pean educated Yoruba and illiterate chiefs was gradually 
broken down, and an increasing number of new appointments 
as chiefs went to European-educated persons.29 
A new group to emerge in Lagos, critical of the parochial, 
27 
Awa, Federal Government, p. 91. 
28Ibid., p. 93. 
29P. Garigue, "Changing Patterns of Leadership,"-Twentieth Century 
Africa, ed. McEwan, pp. 17-18. 
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conservative bent of the NNDP was the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM). 
The founding members of this embryonic party were Dr. J. c. Vaughn, 
Ernest Ikoli, H. o. Davies and Samuel Akinsanya. 30 With the exception 
of Ikoli, who belonged to the !jaw tribe, the majority of this group 
were educated Yorubas. The NYM's structure and membership were impor-
tant for several reasons: (1) the NYM was the first genuine national-
ist organization; (2) like the NNDP all but two of the early founders 
we;re educated Yoruba Christians or non-Nigerian men of substance en-
gaged in business, law, journalism or medicine; (3) multi-tribalism was 
stressed in the branches which were set up in all regions of Nigeria; 
and (4) the NYM was the first effort in the political history of Ni-, 
. t . d l" 31 geria o organize a party on mo ern ines. 
By 1938 Youth Movement members.hip of 10, 000 was organized in 
twenty branches. In the Lagos Legislative Council election of 1938 the 
rtM captured all three seats from the NNDP which had dominated Lagos 
poiitics for fifteen years. Macauley 1 s "Lagos Dynasty" was badly shaken 
by the NYM•s effective mobilization of the non-indiginous Yoruba and 
lb k . 1 32 . o u:rpan wor ing c asses. The support of the urbanized Ibo was 
largely due to the charisma and dynamism of Nnamdi Azikiwe. 
The Nigerian Youth Movement had little patience with the restrained 
moderation of the NNDP. By contrast, in its charter of 1938 the NYM 
demanded complete autonomy for Nigeda within the British Commonwealth 
30sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 49. 
31odumosu, Nigerian Constitution, pp., 30-31. 
32:Richard L. Sklar and c. S., Whitaker, Jr., "Nigeria," Political 
Parties and National Integration, eds. James S. Coleman and Carl G. 
Rosberg,Jr. (Berkeley, 1964), pp- 598-.599, 
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d E . 33 an mp ire. By 1940 the NYM had begun agitating for the abolition or 
reform of indirect rule, higher appointments to the civil service, 
representation of the North in the Legislative Council, and improvement 
. th k. d. . f Af . 1 · · 1 f · 34 in e war ing con itions o rican emp oyees in mercanti e irms. 
Thus, the universalism of the Congress of West Africa and the non-
separatist, parochial focus of the NNDP had evolved into the militant 
nationalism of the Nigerian Youth Movement. 
Internal dissention in 1941 shattered the facade of tribal co-
operation in the NYM and crippled this organization as a national po-
litical force. This crucial period, the 11Akinsanya crisis," originated 
in the rivalry between two of the leading journalists within the move-
ment, Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ibo), editor of the West African Pilot, and 
Ernest Ikoli (!jaw), editor of the newly launched organ of the NYM, The 
Daily~Service. Shortly after the founding of the Service in 1938, 
Azikiwe resigned from the executive connnittee of the Movement, a de-
cision which his critics allege was made in a fit of pique over the 
business competition extended to his Pilot. Later Ikoli described 
Azikiwe in an editorial as a megalomaniac. 35 At this point a breach 
was opened in the organization which had far reaching consequences for 
Nigerian political party development. 
The much publicized rift in the NYM was opened wider in February, 
1941, when a Legislative Council seat fell open due to the resignation 
of Dr. K. A. Abayomi, past head of the Youth Movement. Ernest Ikoli 
33 
Awa, Federal Government, p. 95. 
34 
Coleman, Nigeria, p. 226. 
35ibid., p. 227. 
80 
and Samuel Akinsanya (Ijebu Yoruba), officers and symbols of the pan-
tribalism of the NYM, both sought the vacant post. Azikiwe and the 
Ibos supported Akinsanya who, even though he was an Ijebu Yoruba, lost 
36 the contest to Ikoli in spite of the board's domination by Yorubas. 
Azikiwe and Akinsanya interpreted this loss as a manifestation of tri-
bal prejudice against Ibos and Ijebu Yorbuas who together constituted 
the backbone of NYM electoral support in Lagos. 
A press war replete with name calling, tribal slurs, and shrill 
sensationalism ensued between the West African Pilot and the Daily 2.!:!,-
~· As these were two of the most widely circulated newspapers in 
Nigeria, the animosities within the Movement reached the reading public 
via the all too convenient scapegoat of tribal prejudice. 37 The Akin-
sanya episode wrecked the broad based character of the Nigerian Youth 
Movement and exhibited the latent tribal tension within this nominally 
pan-tribal, national movement. The willingness of leaders to exploit 
this latent animosity in the press for their own political ends in-
fluenced all future efforts to mobilize a viable pan-tribal working 
36Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 51-53; Coleman, Nigeria, 
p. 228. Coleman noted that the Ijebu Yoruba had acquired the reputa-
tion as the Jews of Yorubaland. The Ijebus, located mainly on the 
shores of the Lagos Lagoon, had controlled the trade routes to the in-
terior and had become widely known as middlemen in the slave trade. 
Yorubas from Oyo, Ibadan, Lagos and Abeokuta tended to look down on 
this subtribe in spite of the Ijebus reputation as enterprisers. 
37Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 49. Ezera noted that 
tendency to exploit tribal suspicion by party leaders found an ever 
the 
wider reading public in the diffusion of newspapers: 
YEAR LAGOS WESTERN REGION EASTERN REGION 
1890 1 0 0 
1910 4 0 0 
1930 12 1 3 







relationship in any national political organization. 
Appeals to tribal prejudice by NYM factions as well as in other 
organizations was often a convenient face-saving device during periods 
of competition among the tribes for leadership positions. Latent 
ethnic suspicion and animosity were always much easier to exploit than 
to sublimate. For instance, no leader utilized the mass media to con-
demn the evils of tribal prejudice more than Azikiwe. Yet, Azikiwe at 
the same time constantly extolled the Ibo to become more assertive--and 
by inference dominant. In his classic and widely publicized "chosen 
people" speech in 1949 Azikiwe asserted: 
It would appear that God has specially created the 
Ibo people to suffer persecution and be victimized be-
cause of their resolute will to live. Since suffering 
is the label of our tribe we can afford to be sacrificed 
for the ultimate redemption of the children of Africa. 
Is it not historically significant that throughout the 
glorious history of Africa, the Ibo is one of the select 
few to have escaped the humiliation of a conqueror's 
sword?. • • • Search through the records of African 
history and you will fail to find an occasion when, in 
any pitched battle, any African nation has either marched 
across Ibo territory or subjected the Ibo to a humiliat-
ing conquest. Instead, there is record to show that the 
martial prowess of the Ibo, at all stages of human history, 
has enabled them not only to survive persecution but also 
to adapt themselves to the role thrust upon them by his-
tory, of preserving all that is best and most noble in 
African culture and tradition. Placed in this high estate, 
the Ibo cannot shirk the responsibility conferred on it by 
its manifest destiny.38 
Nigerian newspapers and journals were filled with strident appeals 
to tribal destiny side by side with warnings that unfettered tribal 
prejudice was debilitating to Nigerian unity and played into the hands 
of the British. Wide coverage was given to increasingly frequent and 
38Nnamdi Azikiwe, Zik--! Selection of Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe 
(Cambridge, 1961), pp. 242-243. 
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often demagogic attempts by party leaders to use ethnic insult to build 
up their political power base. In explaining Yoruba dominance of the 
NYM Executive Committee and Azikiwe's alleged responsibility for the 
Akinsanya crisis, an Ijebu Yoruba leader, Obafemi Awolowo later wrote: 
The fact that in the leadership of the Nigerian Youth 
Movement there were more Yorubas than those belonging to 
other ethnic groups was an accident; and it was not noticed 
as a strange or undesirable phenomenon until 1941 •••• 
On polling day, I was extremely depressed ••• by the un-
abashed demonstrations of tribalism I witnessed. All the 
Easterners, particularly the Ibos, and all the Ijebus in 
Lagos, teamed up with Dr. Azikiwe and Oba Samuel Akinsanya; 
and .all those who dared to disagree with them were openly 
abused, jeered at, and condemned as traitors. For the 
first time in my life I was called a traitor and 1Uncle 
Tom' all because ••• I supported an Easterner against my 
own tribesman. But of course Ikoli is an Easterner with 
a dif ference--he has never stooped to worship at the shrine 
of Dr. Azikiwe.39 
For sheer quantity of inflammatory diatribe and bombast Nigerian 
newspapers of this period cannot be underestimated in the contribution 
which they made to tribal nationalism--and political violence. On the 
question of press responsibility Azikiwe asserted that the character of 
any country could be observed by a study of its newspapers and Ni-
gerians should insure that standards achieved and maintained in their 
b h . h "bl 40 country e as 1g as poss1 e. In retrospect it is probable that 
publicly extolling the "manifest destiny" of the Ibos or the "acciden-
tal leadership" of the Yorubas contributed to growing tribal chauvin-
ism. The practical political effect of these exchanges by the leader-
ship was to help transform hitherto latent tribal suspicion into open 
39obafemi Awolowo, Awo--The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo 
(Cambridge, 1960), p. 132. . 
40Awikiwe, Zik, p. 240. 
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violent confrontation--often spurred on by the parties in the cities. 
Tribal nationalism was, thus, alternately condemned and exploited in 
the evolution of the regional political parties. 
The Richards Constitution and the Politics of Nationalism 
By the end of the Second World War agitationist political activity 
was discernible in all parts of Nigeria, particularly in the South. 
The period after the Clifford Constitution of 1922 saw a steady growth 
of organizations of all types. Labor unions, ex-service men's organi-
zations, and professional groups emerged during the period of the war 
effort. These new socio-economic groups demanded constitutional and 
political reforms. The far reaching and controversial Richards Consti-
tution of 1946 attempted to deal with these emergent political forces. 
In planning Nigeria's postwar constitutional structure British of-
ficials wrestled with two interrelated problems: 
1. How would native authority systems be reconciled as the 
primary 'Units of self-government with a parliamentary 
system of government at the central territorial level? 
2o How were the centrally minded nationalists to be given 
a larger role in the government without relinquishing 
ultimate imperial authority?41 
The situation which confronted the British was how best to bring about 
systemic change and still preserve traditional structures and "national 
rulers" which they had legitimized through indirect rule. The balanc-
ing act of reconciling traditional leadership and nationalist demands 
was a central theme in all constitutional negotiations during this 
period. Governor Richards gave the three objectives of his 
41 
Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 271-272. 
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constitutional proposals as: (1) to promote the unity of Nigeria, (2) 
to provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which 
make up the country, and (3) to secure greater participation by Ni-
. . h . ff . 42 gerians in t eir own a airs. In short, the Richards Constitution 
aimed at creating Nigerian unity by perserving its diversity. This ap-
proach attempted to protect traditional authorities and placate the na-
tionalists. In the latter respect the attempt was a failure. This 
constitution, the first in twenty-five years, was immediately attacked 
by nationalists for both its content and the abrupt manner in which it 
was approved. 
Richard's "unity" was to be provided by a reconstituted Legisla-
tive Council composed of the Governor, sixteen official members and 
43 
twenty-eight unofficial members of which four continued to be elected. 
The competence and composition of this Council covered the whole of Ni-
geria, a change from the previous Council which represented the Eastern 
and Western regions. Until this change the Northern elite had been 
largely isolated from political contact with the more radical national-
ist leadership in the South. 
The second and unique feature of this constitution was the relation 
of the Central Legislative Council to the Regional Councils of the 
Eastern, Western, and Northern regions each of which was to be derived 
44 
from the local nativ.e authorities. The new advisory Regional Council 
for the North had two chambers in the House of Chiefs and a House of 
42E1ias, Nigeria, The Development of Its Laws, p. 35. 
43 
Wheare, Nigerian Legislative Council, p. 170. 
44Ibid., p. 171. 
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Assembly (both dominated by native authority traditional elites) while 
h E d W h b 45 t e astern an estern Regions were to ave only Houses of Assem ly. 
Ezera noted the advisory nature of these Regional Councils in that none 
. 46 
possessed any legislative powers or capacity to appropriate revenue. 
They were only deliberative and advisory bodies with the right to make 
reconnnendations regarding draft legislation. The Regional Houses of 
Assembly were to forge a link between the native authorities and the 
Central Legislative Council. Twenty of the twenty-four unofficial mem-
hers on this central body were to be chosen from the Houses of Assembly 
in the following pattern: 
9 from the Northern provinces 
4 from the House of Chiefs 
5 from the unofficial members of the Northern House of Assembly 
6 from the Western House of Assembly 
4 other unoff icials from the Western House 
5 from the Eastern House of Assembly.47 
The main group of unofficial members in each House of Assembly was 
selected by and from the native authorities of the region concerned, 
thus, giving weighted representation to the traditional elites. To the 
British, fitting the Native Administration system into the constitu-
tional structure was expedient in acknowledging the regional-ethnic di-
versity and the traditional elites legitimized by indirect rule. Mem-
bership allocation gave traditional authorities an inordinately strong 
voice (especially in the North) in the new quasi-federal regional po-
litical bodies. Utilizing the native authority structure was far more 
45Ibid., 
46 
Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 70. 
47 Odomosu, Nigerian Constitution, p. 45. 
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acceptable to British authorities than any direct election through con-
sistuency units by which radical nationalist leaders might capture all 
available seats. By using indiginous local authorities as a prime 
source of representation the principles underlying Richard's Constitu-
tion were derived not from Rousseau, Bentham, and Mill but from Lugard, 
Hailey, and Bourdillon. 48 
The Nigerian nationalist leadership--moderate and radical--bitter-
ly condemned most aspects of the proposed constitution. The emphasis 
on Nigerians "endlessly discussing" their own affairs prompted a strong 
reply by H.O. Davies: 
The word discussion seems the crux of the principle 
as there is neither intention nor the pretension to secure 
greater participation by the Africans in the direction, 
management, or control of their affairs. No attempt is 
made to democratise that bureaucratic rule or make it 
sensative to public opinion. • • • The head of department 
formulates policy, he legislates it, and afterwards ad-
ministers it; ••• as an executive, he is irresponsibly 
backed by the law and all its sanctions. 4~ 
Though the nationalist leaders all endorsed in substance the quasi-
federal regional structure set forth they vehemently condemned the un-
official majority in the regions and at the center as a deception of 
power and not truly unofficial.so To such leaders as Davies and 
Azikiwe the inclusion in the Councils of .. emirs and chiefs who owed 
their position to the government was clearly a conflict of roles. 
Wheare sunnnarized somewhat pessimistically the progress made towards 
responsible self-government in this Constitution: 
48 Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 84. 
49 
Odumosu, Nigerian Constitution, p. SO. 
so 
Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 278-279. 
The Council is no nearer than its predecessor to being 
an elective assembly. • • • The Executive Council was not 
altered (Africanized) •••• The Governor still governs ••• 
in a delicate and difficult relationship with the unofficials 
• • • • Nigeria is thus no nearer to responsible government 
than what it was.51 
Added to the multiplicity of grievances of the nationalists was 
87 
another more subtle factor which conceivably had immense repercussions 
at this very crucial stage in Nigerian political development. Coleman 
noted this factor which had so much bearing in the interrelationships 
between the British and nationalists: 
It is unfortunate in many respects that Sir Arthur 
Richards was governor of Nigeria during the delicate 
period 1943-1947. He came to Nigeria from Jamaica where 
his record reflected unfavorably on his capacity to deal 
effectively with colonial nationalists. His handling of 
constitutional reform and nationalism in Nigeria followed 
a sirililar pattern. He seemed to have a special knack 
for antagonizing the educated elements; in Nigeria, at 
leasts his name is at the bottom of their popularity 
list. 2 
In March, 1945, the Legislative Council hastily approved both 
Richard's constitutional proposals and a series of four ordinances. 
These ordinances, soon denounced by the nationalists as the "obnoxious 
ordinances," were not new but variously had been on the statute books 
f N. . 53 o igeriao However, the semantic and psychological impact of these 
ordinances at this particular juncture was enormous. Though the aim of 
three of the ordinances was protective and perfunctory in the vesting 
of mineral rights and public lands as Crown domain, the use of the term 
"Crown" triggered a storm of protest from the nationalists. The 
51 
Wheare, Nigerian Legislative Council, p. 180. 
52 
Coleman, Nigeria, p. 275. 
53 
Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 78. 
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fourth ordinance extended and systemized the Governor's power over the 
appointment and deposition of chiefs. For the two years following their 
passage these ordinances provided the pretext for intense agitation by 
Nigerian nationalist groups. Leaders such as Azikiwe made strong pub-
lic attacks on the alleged Crown "seizure" of Nigerian lands and miner-
als and the mockery of categorizing traditional leaders as "unoffi-
cials." For the moment cleavages within the nationalist movement and 
tribal animosities were shelved for a wide scale assault on the 
Richards Constitution. 
The colonial authorities had unwittingly chosen the two most liti-
gous issues in Nigeria--land and chieftancy--on which to pass the or-
dinances and at a time which could not have been more ill-chosen. In 
addition, the wording and legalistic jargon of the ordinances seemed to 
have come straight from the manuals of Lugard. Recently formed radical 
political groups, thus, had ready-made issues in the Constitution and 
ordinances to launch a nation-wide campaign to politicize the masses 
and discredit the British moves. This campaign and the general labor 
strike of 1945 brought international attention to a nationalist leader, 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, and a recently formed political party, the National 
Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons. 
The interwar years were a critically important period of incuba-
tion in the evolution of Nigerian political organizations. During this 
period, indirect rule, first applied in the North, was superimposed 
with little success on Southern ethnic groups. Under British tutelage 
the vastly larger Northern region was insulated from modernizing forces 
and never participated in an all-Nigerian political forum until 1947. 
Moreover, from the 1920 West African Congress until the nationalist 
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agitation surrounding the Richards Constitution of 1946, organizational 
activity was overwhelmingly dominated by educated Yoruba and Ibo 
elites. 
The dramatic shift from the non-separatism of Macauley's NNDP to 
the militant activism of the NYM was evidence that, although the tempo 
of constitutional change was largely determined by Southern nationalist 
agitation the actual substance of these changes continued to assure the 
domination of Northern traditional elements. More critically, the 
maintenance of three territorial divisions after 1914 and British quest 
for "unity through diversity" resulted in a devolution of power to the 
regions. For purposes of party development there was a parallel gravi-
tation towards regional tribal emphasis. Thus, the parties were forced 
to make simultaneous efforts to insure their survival by controlling 
at least one region as a means to control the institutions at the 
center. 
The collapse of the NYM due to factionalism served as an important 
precedent for future party efforts to establish viable pan-regional 
support. The unwillingness or the incapacity of the parties to become 
institutionalized on a national scale meant that party competition in 
effect became regional-ethnic group confrontation. This power struggle 
among the three major parties occurred in a territorially unbalanced 
federal structure devised by British colonial authority. In the next 
chapter party origin and efforts at institutionalization will be 
examined. 
CHAPTER V 
REGIONAL PARTIES AND THE QUEST FOR INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
The Origin of Nigerian Parties 
1 Under what conditions did African political parties emerge? 
Thomas Hodgkin posed this question in his work African Political Parties 
to point out the critical importance of party evolution in determining 
party leadership and policy in African political systems. In the pre-
vious chapter the organizational predecessors of Nigerian political 
parties were examined. In this chapter the origins and efforts towards 
institutionalization of the three major regional political parties shall 
be analyzed. These parties were each heavily dependent on the major 
tribal cultural organizations which provided the ethnic base and 
leadership in the formative period of party activity. Each of these 
cultural organizations reflected a composite of influences noted pre-
viously--the evolution of British indirect rule in each of the regions, 
the differential rates of exposure to Western institutions, and the 
interaction between traditional and more radical nationalist elements 
in each of the dominant ethnic groups. 
From diverse regional political settings emerged three tribal 
1Hodgkin, African Political Parties, p. 45. Hodgkin defines a 
political party similarly to James Coleman as an organization which 
competes with other similar organizations in periodic elections in 
order to participate in formal institutions and thereby influence and 
control the personnel and policy of government. 
an 
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based parties dominated by political classes which attempted to control 
both regional politics and later the government institutions at the 
center. It is contended that both the party origin and the abortive 
attempts of the Southern parties to become institutionalized political 
forms on a national scale must be analyzed in a historic context to 
understand the critical role of parties in recent Nigerian political 
development. The dominance of the conservative Northern People's Con-
gress (NPC} during the short-lived period of civilian rule was not an 
accident of political evolution. Rather, this party's regional co-
hesion and adaptability in achieving national power gives ample evi-
dence of the continued vitality of traditional elites and attachments 
in a contemporary political setting. The capacity of the Northern 
theocratic elite to respond to various competitive threats to its 
hegemony through a political party was a reflection of its coherence 
and adaptability as well as the impact of the British policy of in-
direct rule which reinforced this elite's control. The failure of the 
more radical Southern parties to break the NPC grip on the North po-
larized the Nigerian political system into essentially three one-party 
regions, thus allowing the conservative and more populous North to 
dominate the government at the center. This unique situation even-
tually created tensions so acute that violence and civil disorder be-
came conunon in party competition throughout Nigeria. 
In examining the evolution of modern Nigerian political forms, 
James Coleman has pointed out: 
The really decisive factor--the precipitant--in the 
formation of political parties has been the constitutional 
reform providing for (1) the devolution by the imperial 
government of a sufficiently meaningful and attractive 
measure of power to induce or to provoke nationalist 
leaders to convert their movements into political parties, 
and (2) the introduction or refinement of institutions and 
procedures such as an electoral system, which would make 
it technically possible for parties to seek power con-
stitutionally. 2 
In addition, the pace of constitutional change and political partici-
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pation after the Second World War was paralleled by two other develop-
ments which had determinative influences on the origin and activities 
of the parties. The first of these developments involved the prefer-
ence, eventually supported by all party leadership, for a federal 
structure of government with a rather weak center and powerful regional 
governments. Regional boundaries inherited from the British era, 
mostly on Northern insistence, were retained intact. The second de-
velopment was the increasingly virulent character of tribal national-
ism provoked mostly by party leaders from the three major ethnic 
groups--the Ibo of the East, the Yoruba of the West, and the Fulani-
Hausa of the North. 
Appeals to nationalism took two somewhat contradictory directions--
one unifying, the other disunifying. On the one hand, nationalist 
agitation was directed at gaining full political self-determination for 
Nigeria within the British Commonwealth. Simultaneously, party leaders 
appealed to tribal-regional nationalism to build secure partisan po-
litical bases in one or more regions in the three-region structure. 
The British presence for the most part held these two forces in 
balance. As the Crown's authority was slowly withdrawn, the main 
thrust of independence orienting nationalist appeal was deprived of 
2 James Coleman, "The Emergence of African Political Parties," 
Africa Today, ed. C. Grove Haines (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 230-231. 
93 
the unifying presence of an alien power. Once independence was gained, 
anti-colonial agitation lost much of its vitality and appeals to tribal 
nationalism became the primary pretext for political mobilization. 
The fragile nature of tribal political coexistence was best ob-
served in political party activity. The party struggle for regional 
and national power exposed the centrifugal forces present in the Ni-
gerian political system. In the case of Nigeria, ethnic based party 
struggle proved inimical to national integration and political sta-
bility. The Nigerian colonial period was characterized by extreme un-
evenness in social, political, and economic development among its core 
regional ethnic groups. As Ezera has claimed, an ideal setting for 
intertribal rivalry and disharmony existed because of the social and 
economic imbalance of the various tribes. 3 Thus, the consequences of 
such contrast and imbalance was manifest in the origins, leadership, 
and activities of the three regional political parties. 
As Hodgkin noted, African parties had an extra-parliamentary 
origin; they were constituted out of preexisting associations and 
4 
groups as instruments to achieve power. This is particularly true, 
though in varying degrees, of the three major Nigerian parties. An 
analysis of party origins indicates the peculiarities of the tribal 
bases and the difficulties which the Southern parties in particular 
faced in becoming institutionalized on a national scale. 
3Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 90. 
4Hodgkin, African Political Parties, p. 46. 
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The National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons 
Between 1944 and 1957 the National Council for Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC) was the best known all-Nigerian nationalist organiza-
tion. During its early years Hodgkin categorized the NCNC as a "con-
gress" embracing most--though not in fact all--of the politically con-
. 1 f N. . 5 scious e ements o igeria. In contrast to its predecessors, the Ni-
gerian Youth Movement (NYM) and the National Nigerian Democratic Party 
(NNDP), however, the NCNC had supporters throughout Nigeria. Heaviest 
support continued to be based in Lagos and the Eastern region, but the 
NCNC described itself--with some justification--as the only truly na-
tional political party in Nigeria. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe broke with the NYM in 1941 carrying with him the 
support of many non-indiginous Yoruba and Ibo settlers of Lagos. In 
early 1942 Azikiwe organized the National Reconstruction Group (NRG), a 
small personalized political study group which met periodically in 
Azikiwe's home. 6 This group, mainly non-Yoruba, deduced that the time 
had come for the formation of a national front to pursue nationalist 
objectives more vigorously. Upon invitation the NYM refused to take 
the initiative in heading up this front. However, in a series of 
student rallies organized in 1943 by the new militantly nationalist Ni~ 
gerian Union of Students (NUS), Azikiwe found both a platform to pro-
pose his new Front and a youthful ally equally interested in coordi-
nating the political endeavors of existing political parties, trade 
5Ibid. 
6 
Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 56. 
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unions, professional organizations, and tribal unions. 7 
In June, 1944, the NUS with the strong support of Azikiwe's press 
issued "a call from the youth" for all patriotic groups to meet in 
8 
Lagos. On August 26, 1944, the inaugural meetings of the conference 
were held and it was resolved: 
Believing our country is rightfully entitled to 
liberty and prosperous life ••• and determined to work 
in unity for the realization of our ultimate goal of 
self-government within the British Empire we hereby 
bind ourselves together forming the Nigeria National 
Council. 9 
The party began at this conference as an agglomeration of social group-
ings; membership was not open to individuals. By 1945 groups which 
joined included trade unions, small political parties, literary and 
social clubs, professional organizations, athletic groups and 101 tri-
b 1 . 10 a unions. An example of the latter was the new Ibo Federal Union 
which became the foremost supporter of the NCNC. Because of the lack 
of grassroots organization, party policy in the period between 1945 and 
1951 was determined by a small political class of influential members 
of the affiliated organizations. 11 These local party "barons" were 
constantly at odds with younger, more militant followers and internal 
jockeying for power threatened party unity from the beginning. Mani-
festations and consequences of this incoherence will be referred to 
7Ibid., p. 57. 
8Ibid. 
9Coleman, Nigeria, p. 264. The name of the party was to be 
changed when several Cameroonian groups affiliated with the NCNC. 
lOibid. 
11 Awa, Federal Government, p. 103. 
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later in this chapter. 
The NCNC enjoyed early success in its monopoly of national poli-
tics. However, it was never able to effectively organize as a national 
political organization. As Mackintosh maintained: 
Certainly only tpe NCNC had ever seemed likely to take 
its position firmly at the centre of Nigerian political 
life, as the Congress People's Party did in the Gold Coast 
in 1949-51. By 1957 however, it had become apparent that 
the NCNC had failed to develop a mass party capable of 
mobilizing country-wide support in sufficient strength to 
mark it as the obvious inheritor of power from the British 
when they handed over political control. The contrast 
with the CPP 1 s position in the Gold Coast by that date is 
marked. There, the party had succe~ded by early 1956 in 
beating off the challenge to its supremacy •••• 12 
By 1951, the NCNC was embroiled in electoral competition with two 
other major parties. The original broad based appeal of the party and 
its monopoly of the nationalist movement was eroded by its persistent 
internal rivalries and eventual competition from other parties for re-
gional and national dominance. The main Southern challenger to NCNC 
hegemony was the Yoruba based Action Group led by Obafemi Awolowo. 
The Action Group 
The Yoruba of Western Nigeria comprised a number of tribal sec-
tions that had a long history of conflict particularly acute during the 
pre-colonial slave trade examined earlier in this study. As a conse-
quence, associational activity during the nationalist period among the 
Yoruba, though widespread, tended to emphasize the formation of local 
sub-tribal unions. By the end of World War II efforts by educated 
Yoruba elites to merge these local groups met with success. A pan-
12 John F. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston, 
1966), p. 407. 
tribal cultural organization, established by overseas Nigerians in 
London, was called Egbe ~ Oduduwa (Society of the Descendents of 
13 
Oduduwa-..;the Yoruba cultural hero). Awolowo was among the student 
founders of the Egbe and many other members played key roles in later 
nationalist agitation and Action Group party activity. 
In Western Nigeria, Yoruba circles were becoming alarmed by the 
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meteoric rise of Azikiwe and the political awakening of the Ibo through 
tribal unions and the NCNC. Azikiwe had become the bete ~ of many 
conservative Yoruba leaders most of whom considered his towering po-
litical stature in the West a barrier to their own political ambi-
tions .14 In June, 1948, a conference of Yoruba notables met in Ife, 
"the cradle of all the Yorubas, 11 to inaugurate the founding of Egbe Omo 
Oduduwa on Nigerian soil. At the beginning, the Egbe's stated objec-
tives, ostensibly cultural, emphasized dual nationalisms. Some of the 
objectives were to: (1) foster the study of Yoruba language, culture, 
and history, (2) protect the monarchical institutions of Yorubaland, 
and (3) accelerate the emergence of a virile, modernized and efficient 
15 
Yoruba state within the Federal State of Nigeria. Sir Adeyemo Ala-
kija, president-elect of the Egbe, declared it was a "big tomorrow for 
all Western children," and that "Yorubas will not be relegated to the 
16 
background in the future." Azikiwe's Pilot attacked this organization 
almost immediately and the Pilot and Daily Service once again waged a 
13 
Skla;r, Nigerian Political.Parties, pp. 67-68. 
14 
Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 92. 
15Ibid. 
16Ibid., p. 93. 
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war of bombast in the press. In Lagos both Ibo and Yoruba residents 
declared at mass meetings that attacks or tribal slurs against their 
group by the other would cause bloodshed. A strident, unrestrained 
tone was typical of Azikiwe's widely read Pilot; 
Henceforth the cry must be one of battle against Egbe Omo 
Oduduwa, its leaders at home and abroad, up hill and down 
dale, in the streets of Nigeria and in the residence of 
its advocates. • • • It is the enemy of Nigeria; it must 
be crushed to the earth. • • • There is no going back, 
until the Fascist organization of Sir Adeyemo has been 
dismembered.17 
The tribal "cold war" immediately politicized the Egbe if it had 
not already been from the beginning. Awolowo, general secretary of the 
Egbe and a barrister in Ibadan, initiated discussions among Yoruba 
groups to counter the growing political strength of the NCNC in the 
18 West. He knew that for overt political action he had to unite the 
Yoruba traditional rulers with the monied commercial class and that he 
could best mobilize such a coalition within the Egbe. A passage from 
Awolowo 1 s autobiography candidly outlined the strength of traditional 
elements and the practical problems in party formation: 
When the idea of starting a new party occurred to me 
in 1949, and I began to make contacts, I had frequent 
contact ••• with leaders of the Egbe. • • • Many of them 
were tired of politics ••• as a 'dirty game'. • • • I 
persisted in lobbying them. If the new party was to make 
any showing at all during the regional elections it must 
make use of the organization and branches of the Egbe Omo 
Oduduwa throughout the Western Region. Besides, party 
organization does cost money; and the people to whom I 
looked for financial support were at the head of the Egbe. 
I was under no illusion. • .that if these leaders frowned 
17 
Coleman, Nigeria, p. 346. 
18 
Sklar and Whitaker, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," p. 39. 
on the new political project I would either have to abandon 
it, or to think again. It was when they gave their bless-
ing that I convened the first meeting at which the Action 
Group was founded.19 
Connnunal partisanship based on psychological connnitments to tra-
ditional values of t.ribal groups was openly exploited by Awolowo to 
mobilize mass support in rural areas and old towns. These appeals 
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were as blatant by the other parties in the other regions. After 1951, 
the Action Group and the Egbe became virtually inseparable in rural 
areas, where traditional chiefs blessed them bqth in the name of the 
20 people. The strong patronage of the Egbe by Yoruba traditional 
elites enabled the chiefs to influence party policy while extending 
legitimacy to party functions in the rural areas. Hodgkin noted the 
political relationships between ethnicity and party: 
There was certainly a parental relationship between 
the cultural association, Egbe Omo Oduduwa. • .and the 
Action Group publicly inaugurated in 1951. Indeed, the 
Action Group seems .to have had a period of embryonic, 
pre-natal existence as the Action Connnittee of the Egbe. 
From the first its founders took pains to prevent it 
from appearing to be a purely Yoruba ethnic party. None 
the less there was a strong family resemblance, as re-
gards leadership, basis of support, and political phi-
losophy between the Egbe and the Action Group in its 
initial phase.21 
The dominant theory of the AG leaders was that the only avenue to 
national power was a regional political party. Under this assumption, 
the party had to meet the NCNC head-on in the Western areas where the 
NCNC had established footholds while simultaneously expanding Action 
Group power into other regions. The NCNC retaliated by appealing to 
19 Awolowo, Awa, p. 220. 
20 Sklar, "Contributions of Tribalism;" p. 376. 
21Hodgkin, African Political Parties, p. 49. 
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the non-Yoruba peoples of the Western Region and their fear of Yoruba 
domination. Simultaneously, the AG used the same tactic in the East 
among the non-Ibo minority tribes. Thus, at a very early stage in 
party development, tribalism and regional nationalism became the most 
legitimate and effective means for party leaders to mobilize support. 22 
The results of the regional elections in 1951 under the new Macpherson 
Constitution was the triumph of this regional nationalism. After this 
point national political survival for each of the parties depended on 
political control of a region. 
Political developments in the South and the anticipated changes in 
the new constitution stirred reaction in the North. When faced with 
political encroachments of militant Southern parties and a small ar-
ticulate radical minority in their own midst, a coalition of Western-
educated Northern conservatives and emirs undertook organizational ac-
tivity to counter the "Southern" threat. This coalition's response 
was the formation of the Northern People's Congress (NPC)o 
Northern People's Congress 
Political societies in Northern Nigeria were first organized by 
educated youth in the public service (governmental and native admini-
stration). Many of these were born into privileged families and nearly 
all of them were exposed to nationalist thought from the South and 
abroad. As noted previously, the late introduction of Western educa-
tion caused the North to lag far behind the South in the development of 
a literate class. This disparity was especially acute in that the 
• 
22Colernan, Nigeria, pp. 350-351. 
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North had over twice the combined population of the other two regions 
but, by 1947, had only 2.5% of the total secondary enrollment of Ni-
. 23 geria, 
Among the small educated elite of the North, teachers were promi-
nent and teacher education was considered the most respectable kind of 
educational preparation. Just as the Onitsha schools in the East were 
the breeding ground for the Ibo political elite, the Katsina Teacher 
Training College had the same function in the North. This school pro-
duced so many of the first small group of Northern political leaders 
that Mackintosh noted that the NPC, far from being a political p~rty, 
more resembled a reunion platform for old boys of the Katsina College~4 
In 1943 the Bauchi Improvement Union was founded by three Nqrthern 
school teachers each of whom was to play a prominent role in the po-
litical history of the region. Of these, Mal lam Abubakar Tafewa 
Balewa, headmaster of the Bauchi Middle School, later became ~he first 
Prime Minister of the Nigerian First Republic and deputy-leader of the 
NPC. 25 Mallem Amenu Kano, founded the Northern Teachers Association 
and, after his disaffection from the conservative elements within th~ 
NFC, later formed the radical-reformist Northern Elements Progressive 
Union (NEPU). 26 Mallam Sa'ad Zunger, the third of the founders of the 
Bauchi Union, was the first Northern student to attend Yaba Higher 
College in the South, and later became a dedi~~ted follower of Azikiwe 
23Sklar, Nigeriah Political Parties, p. 88. 
24Mackintosh, Nigerian Government, p. 358. 
25Ibid. 
26Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 372. 
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27 
and General Secretary of the NCNC. The Bauchi Union soon became de-
funct because of the hostility of the emirs. The patronage of tra-
ditional authorities was indispensable for the survival of any Northern 
organization, especially where it involved the reformist-minded edu-
cated elements. 
By 1949, following a pattern similar to the political evolution in 
the South, a pan-Northern Nigerian cultural association known as ~ 
'iyyar Mutanen Arewa (Northern People's Congress) was formed under the 
leadership of Kano and Balewa. This organization sought to avoid the 
stigma of offending the emirs by declaring its close support of the 
ruling oligarchy. As Balewa asserted: 
Jam 'iyyar does not intend to usurp the authority of 
our natural rulers; on the contrary it is our ardent de-
sire to enhance such authority whenever and wherever 
possible. We want to help our natural rulers in the 
proper discharge of their duties. • • • We want to help 
them in the enlightening of the Talakawa.28 
With these social and cultural objectives, the Congress won the con-
ditional support of many important emirs and the Sultan of Sokoto. 
Most of the early moderate leadership favored reforms in certain ar-
chaic aspects of native authorities as well as efforts to insure that 
future self-government in the North would be led by moderate Northern-
ers rather than radical Southerners. However, radical elements within 
the NPC, led mainly by Kano and Zunger, soon split with the more con-
servative factions and founded the Northern Elements Progressive Union 
(NEPU), the first publicly announced political party in the North. 
27Ibid. 
28Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 96. Talakawa refers to 
the ordinary masses of the North. 
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The threat from the Southern parties and the early success of NEPU 
during the first stages of parliamentary elections. in 1951 compelled the 
NPG to assert itself actively in the electoral struggle. The Northern 
emirs were motivated to organize by a growing fear of encroachment by 
Southern "radical" elements who avowedly would destroy the emirate 
structure. In the midst of the 1951 nationwide elections, the Northern 
People's Congress with 65 branches and 6,000 members was converted into 
a political party. 29 The future President of the Congress, Alhaji 
Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, later noted the vast differences 
in party outlook and political orientation between leaders of the North 
and South: 
The Northern People's Congress grew out of a purely 
cultural society of that name. After the 1951 elections--
the electoral college ones--Balewa asked me to join this 
cultural party, later to become our own political 
party. • • • We called it Northern because we wanted to 
unite the Northern people and at that time were not look-
ing beyond our own border •••• 
Our aims are very simple, to develop the country to 
the fullest extent in the shortest time; to preserve the 
peace, good order, and friendly relations between all our 
different peoples; to conduct an efficient and impartial 
administration; ••• to do good to all men. You will see 
that we were never 'militant nationalists' as some were. 
We were sure that in God's good time we would get the 
power. The British had promised this frequently and we 
were content to rest on our promises; there was plenty 
of work ready at our hands for us to do.30 
Ahmadu Bello, the most powerful traditional ruler in Nigeria, was not 
engaging in political overstatement in his assurance that "we would get 
the power." With British acquiescence, Bello' s leadership of the 
powerful coalition of forces reinforcing traditional rule in the North 
29 
Sklar, Nigerian Parties, p. 96. 
30Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, MY Life (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 85-86. 
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insured that the NPC would be solidly welded into the social structure 
of that region. Most critically, the Federal Constitutional revisions 
after 1951 retained the three region arrangement. The North in popula-
tion and area became the overwhelmingly dominant partner in the federa-
tion. Thus, the NPC had only to capitalize on the potential electoral 
advantages within its own home region to extend its power to the center. 
The NPC was dominated by one of the most insulated political elites 
in British West Africa. The aristocratic Fulani, who, under the jihad 
of Usuman dan Fodio conquered the North and had continued to administer 
it under British tutelage, emerged in 1951 in a far different political 
role. Through the modern electoral process and political party compe-
tition, basically alien to Fulani-Hausa political custom, Usuman 1 s 
great-grandson, Alhaji Admadu Bello, led his Northern People's Congress 
to political power over the entire Federation of Nigeria. 
Prior to independence the NPG clashed with the other two large re-
gional parties in several elections. During this period powers de-
volved increasingly to regional governments at the expense of strong 
central authority. Thus, it became essential for each of the parties 
to dominate the politics in its home region as a springboard for domi-
nance of the central government in Lagos. The legacy of British in-
direct rule, the differential rates of regional development and the 
structural features of a federal constitution presented innnense initial 
problems for any single party to gain outright control over the central 
government. Moreover, for the two Southern parties, operating from 
smaller regional-demographic bases, it was expedient to attain signifi-
cant electoral support in one or both of the other regions if there was 
to be any hope to build a majority in the Federal House. The efforts 
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to develop such a broad electoral base--i.e. becoming institutionalized 
national parties--exposed the NCNC and AG to intense internal and ex-
ternal pressures. The incapacity of either of these parties to make 
sustained electoral inroads into the other regions and the frequent ap-
peals to tribal nationalism by party spokesmen and candidates caused 
periodic outbursts of tribal violence and bloodshed in the urban areas. 
The consequences of such confrontation on party institutionalization 
can be analyzed by utilizing three criteria set forth by Huntington--
autonomy, adaptability, and coherence. 
Autonomy, Adaptability, and Coherence as Factors 
in Nigerian Party Institutionalization 
The first criterion of party institutionalization, autonomy, fo-
cuses on the extent to which each of these parties existed independent-
ly of other social groups and methods of behavior. Huntington has ar-
gued: 
How well is the political sphere differentiated from 
other spheres? •••• At its most concrete level autonomy 
involves the relations between social forces, on the one 
hand, and political organizations on the other. Political 
institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy means the 
development of political organizations and procedures that 
are not simply expressions of the interests of particular 
social groups. A political organization that is the in-
strument of a social group--family, clan, class--lacks 
autonomy and institutionalization. A political party, for 
instance, that expresses the interests of only one group 
in society ••• is less autonomous than one that articulates 
and aggregates the interests of several social groups. 31 
Analyses of party autonomy are useful in comparing and contrasting 
the social bases of support for the three major Nigerian parties. 
31Huntington, Political Order, p. 20. 
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Contrasting traditional forms among the three major ethnic groups as 
they evolved in the era of differential colonial policy deeply affected 
party structure, leadership, and policy. Not surprisingly, significant 
contrast between the North and South existed in the role the different 
tribal elites played in the political process and party leadership. For 
instance, focusing only on the role of the so-called modernist elements 
is to overlook the critical importance of the chiefs and emirs in Ni-
gerian parties. As Ward and Rustow argue: 
No society is wholly modern; all represent a mixture 
of modern and traditional elements. It has often been 
thought these elements stood in basic opposition to each 
other, and that there was implicit in the social process 
some force which would ultimately lead to the purgation 
of'traditional 'survivals,' leaving as a residue the 
purely modern society. The preceding chapters amply docu-
ment the falsity of such a thesis, at least where Japan 
is concerned, showing that the role of traditional atti-
tudes and institutions in the modernization process has 
often been symbiotic· rather than antagonistic •••• We 
can, therefore, identify a quality of 'reinforcing 
dualism' within at. least some modernizing experiences.32 
An analysis of Nigerian political party autonomy similarly points out 
the fallacies in assumptions predicated on what Whitaker criticizes as 
"conceptualizing the encounter of modernity and traditionality in 
. . 33 
terms of mutually exclusive social qualities." 
Traditional forces and the basic tribal orientations among Ni-
gerian ethnic groups were not eclipsed by the impact of modernization 
or the introduction of modern political forms evolving out of consti.tu-
ti.anal changes. On the contrary, far from being destroyed, traditional 
influence and tribal orientations were i.n many cases enhanced through 
32ward and Rustow, "Political Modernization i.n Japan," pp. 94-95. 
33co s. Whitaker, "A Dysrhythmic Process of Politi.cal Change," 
World Politics, XIX (1967), p. 192. 
the policies and activities of party politics. On this point Norman 
Miller has observed: 
Whatever the basis, the political survival of tra-
ditional leaders is significant because they provide the 
vital linkage between the government and the people. 
They influence the success of specific modernization 
schemes by serving as translators, interpreters, and 
mediators of government goals. This form of leadership 
is basically syncretistic, a leadership pattern among 
chiefs and headmen which is a synthesis and conciliation 
of the opposing forces of traditionalism and modernism. 
The result is a form of leadership which is neither 
modern nor traditional but an incorporation of both. 
The process is one of accommodation and compromise. It 
is a reconciliation of demands from (a) the traditional 
custom bound elements of rural society, and (b) the 
modernising bureaucratic groups made up of local ad-
ministrators and political party leaders.34 
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The reconciliation and accommodation process between traditional 
and modernizing groups was often performed by the Nigerian regional 
parties. Each of these groups had something to gain from the other in 
spite of obvious contrasts which existed in educational levels and 
ideologies. However, each of these elites' political power was de-
pendent on the support of a core tribal group--the Ibo, Yoruba, and 
Fulani-Hausa. The influences of communal attachments were inescapable. 
Thus, a basic characteristic of Nigerian political evolution during the 
decade prior to independence was the growing tribal nationalism which 
was internalized and exploited by the party leadership. 
34Norman M. Miller, "The Politic.al Survival of Traditional Leader-
ship," Journal of Modern African Studies, LXII (1968), pp. 183-184; 
Hodgkin, Nationtlism in Colonial Africa, p. 171. Hodgkin further notes 
many nationalists' efforts to reconcile theories underlying traditional 
African institutions and the new imported democratic ideas. The latter 
were by no means antithetical to the former as essentially democratic 
forms were found in many parts of pre-European Africa; Zolberg, 
"Structu:t".e of Political Conflict,'' p. 72. Zolberg argues that "· •• 
it is generally evident that the most 'modern' institutions in Africa 
are governed by values and norms that stem from both the 'new' and the 
'residual' sets." 
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In spite of the emphasis by all parties on communal values, there 
was a variation in party roles of traditional forces which points up 
the interdependence of the criteria for guaging party institutionaliza-
tion. At best any one of these criteria provides an incomplete picture 
of party efforts to achieve preeminence in the Nigerian political 
scene. Only when party autonomy is analyzed alongside party coherence 
and adaptability does a more complete picture of the level of Nigerian 
party institutionalization begin to emerge. Thus, just as any society 
is neither wholly modern or traditional the criteria for measuring the 
institutionalization of any political organization are also not mu-
tually exclusive. For instance, the interrelationship between two of 
these criteria was noted by Huntington: 
In theory an organization can be autonomous without 
being coherent and coherent without being autonomous. In 
actuality, however, the two are often closely linked to-
gether. Autonomy becomes a means to coherence enabling 
the organization to develop an espirit and style that be-
come distinctive marks of its behavior. Autonomy also 
prevents the intrusion of disruptive external forces, 
although of course autonomy does not protect against 
disruption from internal sources.35 
Nigerian parties lacked autonomy in the sense that they were ul-
timately dependent on support from one of the three key ethnic groups. 
All three parties became inextricably linked to the electoral support 
which the Ibo, Yoruba, or Fulani-Hausa offered. Further, in a more re-
stricted but perhaps equally important sense all parties were also 
dominated in varying degrees by political classes or power elites. The 
vigorous initial efforts made by the two Southern parties' leadership 
to escape the confines of their regional-tribal base vividly exposed 
35Huntington, Political Order, p. 22. 
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both internal incoherence and lack of adaptability. Neither of these 
parties ever attracted sustained electoral support from other tribal 
groupings to substantially alter the power balance in the regions or at 
the center. During election periods the frequently violent and nearly 
always abrasive party appeals to tribal nationalism further exacerbated 
tribal animosities and cleavages. Thus, Nigerian parties more than any 
other political organization were in the pivotal position to provide 
acconnnodation or provoke confrontation among the major ethnic groups. 
In the struggle for regional and national political power party ac-
tivity provided little opportunity for acconnnodation. 
Political confrontation placed the Southern parties under parti-
cularly intense cross pressures to solidify control over their home 
power base while building an electoral coalition with minority groups 
in all other regions. Southern party success in building and sustain-
ing such coalitions influenced each party's adaptability. As Hunting-
ton argued: 
The more adaptable an organization or procedure is, 
the more highly institutionalized it is, the less adapt-
able and more rigid it is, the lower its le.vel of insti-
tutionalization. Adaptability is an acquired organiza-
tional characteristic. It is in a rough sense a function 
of environmental challenge and age.36 
The functional adaptability of the major Nigerian parties could be seen 
in the efforts of each party to shift its representation from one re-
gional or tribal constituency to another and to shift from opposition 
to control of government. Both transitions presupposed a capacity to 
gain electoral support in other regions which was an absolute necessity 
for the Southern parties to gain control of the central government. 
36Ibi"d., 13 15 pp. - • 
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For the NCNC and AG such attempts proved increasingly futi.le and these 
parties were thus deprived of nearly all coalition electoral support. 
Just as the degree of party autonomy is closely linked with party 
adaptability, so too is party coherence. As Huntington has contended~ 
The more unified and coherent an organization is, the 
more highly institutionalized it is; the greater the dis-
unity of the organization, the less it is institutionalized 
• • • • An effective organization requires at a minimum, 
substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the 
group and on the procedures for resolving disputes which 
come up within those boundaries. Discipline and de~ 
velopment go hand in hand.37 
The interdependence among the criteria for gauging institutionalization 
--autonomy, adaptability, and coherence--is best seen in the contrast-
ing manner the NPC and the Southern parties pursued regional and feder-
al political power. For example, the NCNC and AG were forced to com-
pete on three sharply contrasting regional fronts with party apparatus 
ill-equipped to organize campaigns outside their home regions much less 
attract sustained support and exert control over other tribal blocs. 
In contrast, the emir-dominated NPC made no attempt to extend direct 
party campaigning beyond the North and was primarily interested in con-
solidating its hold on the Northern minority tribal groups in which the 
AG and local parties had made early inroads. Considering the North's 
size, dispersion of the native authorities, and the capacity of the 
emirs to mobilize support, the NPC exhibited far greater adaptability 
and coherence in their home region than the Southern parties. Most 
critically, with the 1963 census any party which controlled the 
northern bloc of seats in effect cormnanded a clear majority in the 
Federal House. Thus, it became electorally irrelevent for the NPC to 
37Ib1°d., 22 24 pp. - • 
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extend activity beyond the North. 
An analysis of the dual level of party struggle exhibited the 
capacity of the NPC to grasp control of Northern and central institu-
tions by achieving nearly the total measure of its institutionaliza-
tion within the Northern region. These levels included: ( 1) intra-
party factional-leadership struggles which in varying degrees plagued 
all the parties and (2) interparty electoral struggles conducted to win 
sufficient support to insure political control of the respective re-
gional governments. These struggles invariably had much greater dis-
unifying effect on the Southern AG and NCNC than on the Northern NPC. 
These two dimensions of party struggle were most pronounced and bitter 
during regional and federal election periods. 
Southern parties were repeatedly thwarted in their attempts to 
build sustained electoral support outside their own regions. The de-
cision of the 1958 Constitutional Conference to base representation in 
the Federal House on total regional population tipped the balance of 
power at the center inexorably to the North and the NPC. By 1959 the 
three parties had largely consolidated control over the core ethnic 
groups. The outlying minority groups clustered around each of these 
blocs thus became focal areas of regional party competition. Tribal 
nationalism and the particular manner each party elite manipulated tri-
bal symbols and orientations greatly affected the success of each party 
in vying for the critical support of minority tribal constituencies. 
A brief examination of the dual level of power struggle within and 
among the Nigerian parties emphasizes the interrelationship of autonomy, 
coherence, and adaptability in the contrasting levels of Nigerian party 
institutionalization. 
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The Northern People's Congress--Party Autonomy, Adaptability, 
and Coherence in a Closed Society 
The Northern People's Congress was welded into the social struc-
ture and traditional political system of the North. A traditional 
social structure which had existed with amazing continuity in the Hausa 
areas since the fifteenth century retained its basic character despite 
Fulani conquest and British colonial policy. The Fulani emirs and the 
British colonial rulers helped assure continuity by adapting the ad-
ministrative techniques and political characteristics before them. 
During constitutional revision British authorities attempted to launch 
Nigeria as a democratically governed national entity while preventing 
abrupt discontinuity with British policy toward the autocratic emirate 
systemo Thus, for a half century the British preserved the Fulani 
autocracies as instruments of law and order and as vehicles of con-
11 d . . 1 d B . . h 1 . 38 tro . e 1nnovat1on a ong mo ern rit1.s. i.nes. 
The Northern political system proved to be surprisingly adaptable 
to the growth of party politics during the latter stages of colonial. 
rule. The emir, designated as the sole native authority, remained an 
autocrat subject only to British overrule. Modern bureaucratic ser-
vices, staffed for the most part by expatriate Southerners, were intro-
duced into the native authority system to make it more effective and 
efficient. In this manner, the dynastic continuity in the emirates re-
mained unchanged and the North continued to be a quiescent but politi-
c.ally static showpiece of British imperial policy. Lloyd outlined the 
sweeping powers of the Northern emirs which was typical at the time of 
38Whitaker, "Dys rhythmic Political Change," p. 206. 
the founding of the NPC: 
The native authorities, controlled by the emirs, 
were large and powerful bodies. Their scale is sug-
gested by the fact that the largest one, in Kano, today 
spends .C2 million annually. Services that are provided 
by the regional governme~ts in the Eastern and Western 
regions, with their smC}l~ fragmentary units, are, in the 
North, controlled by tlhe)hati ve authorities; they run 
hospitals, secondary schools, waterworks, prisons, and 
police forces. When the British administrators dreamed 
of a self-governing Nigeria as a federation of native 
authorities they were thinking of the emirates; the im-
possibility of creating them in Ibo country frustrated 
their hopes.39 
1.13 
Scholars who have studied Fulani rule have been most impressed by 
both its continuity and adaptability to modern political processes. 
~The relationships which developed between the NPC. and the traditional, 
social, and political structure of the North were so close that the NPC 
never bothered to develop party organizational structure until 1958. 
Until then it was virtually unnecessary. The traditional eli.te who so 
thoroughly dominated the native authority structure also dominated the 
NPCo Thus, the NPC was provided a dispersed powerful bureaucratic. 
structure which the Southern parties never possessed. The utilitarian 
motive of the traditional eli.te in grafting party structure to the pre-
existing native authorities was noted by Post: 
The men who took control of the Jam 1 iyyar Multanen Arewa 
in 1951 and turned it into a political party did not re-
gard the Northern People's Congress as a new means by 
which influence and power could be gained. To the ruling 
groups in the emirates it was a means by which to protect 
their already existing authority from a possible source 
of encroachment--the new Regional House of Assembly and 
the Council of Ministers. • • • The traditional interests 
39 Peter c. Lloyd, 11Traditional Rulers," p. 399. 
vested in the various Native Administrations gradually 
moulded the character of the party to suit themselves 
during the first two years of the party's existence.40 
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Above all, the NPC was founded to defend the ruling groups in the 
North from a perceived threat to their interests. Despite its non-
traditional functions (i.e., contesting elections and operation of a 
parliamentary system of government) the party was so fused with those 
interests that it was difficult to distinguish its functioning as a 
political party. This fusion of traditional political class interests 
and ethnic support made the NPC the least autonomous of all the major 
parties. The "party in power" was nearly synonomous with the tra-
ditional oligarchy which dominated the native authorities and to remain 
in regional power was considered basic to the survival of the existing 
order. It was not until 1959 that the NPC felt compelled to establish 
more than rudimentary party organization to muster mass support. By 
this juncture the NPC was well entrenched in the North and, unli.ke the 
Southern parties, exhibited little interest in extending its efforts 
into other regions. 
Two indices for assessing party autonomy were the close correla-
tion between the native authority bureaucracy, the composition of the 
National Executive Connnittee of the party, and the NPC slates fielded 
in federal or regional elections. For instance, in analyzing the com-
position of the NPC 1 s Executive Connnittee Sklar noted that fully 60 
per cent of the NEC was a present or past employee of the native ad-
ministration; likewise, the NEC was heavily dominated by 
40 Post, Nigerian Federal Election, pp. 50-51. 
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Parliamentarians from the regional or Federal House. 41 
Most analyses of NPC leadership verify the rigid control of the 
party by the traditional elite. Since education was acquired mainly 
by the sons of Northern aristocrats and their retainers, the transi-
ti.on from feudal government to colonial administration did not entail 
any considerable transfer of power and prestige from the traditional 
or ruling class. As one British governor noted: "If indirect rule is 
to be truly tribal (in Northern Nigeria) we must educate from the top 
42 
down, and not as in Southern Nigeria from the bottom upwards." Thus, 
the typical NPC Executive Conunittee member was most likely a Fulani or 
Hausa Muslim, educated to the middle school level, a Parliamentarian, 
and a functionary of the native administration. 
Control of the NPC passed to persons loyal to and dependent on the 
emirate bureaucracies. It took the emirs no time to realize that they 
either had to control the party or be controlled by it. 43 Party nomi-
nating procedure became crucial and further reflected the lack of party 
autonomy. As Mackintosh argued: 
Possibly no single fact brings out the general charac-
ter of a party more than its procedure for nomination of 
candidates to contest elections, and an analysis of the 
process adopted in the NPC reveals only too clearly how 
closely interrelated the party is to social structure.44 
Theoretically NPC parliamentary candidates were nominated by divisional 
41 
Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 324. 
42whitaker, "Dysrhytl:unic Political Change," p. 25. 
43Bo Jo Dudley, "The Nomination of Parliamentary Candidates in 
Northern Nigeria," Journal of Conunonwealth Political Studies, II (1963-
64), p. 51. 
44Mackintosh, Nigerian Government, p • .394. 
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or provincial executive committees subject to the approval of the Na-
tional Executive Committee. However, the major emirs, in practice, 
dominated the nominating process in their jurisdiction. Inevitably 
candidates were chosen mainly from the higher echelon positions in the 
native authority, i.e., Councillor, Alkadi (Judge), District or Village 
Head. In the Federal Parliament of 1959, 106 out of 111 Northern mem-
hers or 96 per cent of the total nominated were from native authority 
positi.ons. 45 Less than 4 per cent came from such occupations as busi-
ness and the independent professions. The effect of this nomination 
process on party autonomy was noted by Dudley: 
The control over the recruitment process placed those 
recruited in the status as appointees or agents of the 
emirs. • • • Moreover, this traditional leadership hier-
archy was dominated in practice by the Premier, Sir Ahmadu 
Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. Put negatively, one can 
best describe his control by saying that nothing can be 
done or carried out in the North of which he does not ap-
prove. 46 
After 1951 the informal coalition between traditionalists such as 
Ahmadu Bello, and low born, educated modernists such as Abubakar Tafewa 
Balewa, fused native authority and parliamentary leadership into an ex-
elusive and well-disciplined party machine. Though the party developed 
a formal structure, it tended to become self-perpetuating with native 
authority officials occupying dual roles as local administrative sub-
alterns in a traditional bureaucracy and poli.ticians in modern 
lf5 
Ibid., pp. 90 and 342. 
46 
Dudley, "Nomination of Parliamentary Candidates," pp. 54-55. 
Dudley claimed that Ahmadu Bello as the Premier of the North, President 
of the NPC and the preeminent leader of the traditional elite, wielded 
immense political power. As the single most powerful political leader 
and Hkingmaker" in the federation, Bello's behavior and speeches bear 
striking parallels to his great-grandfather Usuman clan Fodio, the 
founder of the Fulani empire. 
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elective legislative bodies. Both positions were bestowed by the emirs 
and the NPC legislator's political survival depended on absolute obedi-
ence in party manners. Party structure, nomination process and parlia-
mentary representation became the almost exclusive political preserve 
of the entrenched Fulani ruling class. 
Power struggles within the NPC were insignificant compared to the 
divisive factionalism endemic with the Southern parties. In the North 
the cohesive influence of Islam and the towering influence of the Sar-
dauna made the NPC an easily controlled instrumentality of the native 
authorities. Discipline cases and open discord among NPC leaders were 
comparatively rare. As Sklar noted of the NPC, after the election of 
the Sardauna of Sokoto as General President in 1954, there were no re-
hellions against the leadership and only one discipline case involving 
. 1 ff. 47 a nat1ona o 1cer. 
Social and political cohesion in the far North was due in no small 
part to the feudal aristocracy reinforced by British supervised native 
administrations. In this period of party growth the symbiosis and 
congeniality of Northern traditional and modern political forces was 
seen in the position of Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto. In the pre-
dominately Islamic North the Sardauna exploited at every opportunity 
the historical continuity of the emirate system and the religious sym-
bolism and sentiment inherent in his position. The secular promotion 
of Islam was a potent tool in the political arena as Whitaker has 
arguedg 
47 
Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 388. 
A persistent and highly inflanunatory NPC campaign theme 
has been the duty of true Muslims to follow Muslim politi-
cal leadership or to reject, in other words, that of non-
Muslim or 'nonorthodox' southern Nigerians. In the cause of 
this NPC doctrine of religious obligation to follow its lead 
as the great protector of traditional authority the conser-
vative mallami, or religious teachers, have been most ef-
fective. 48 
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Religious sanctions and discipline applied to the elite as well as 
the masses, were utilized in legitimizing native authorities and mobi-
lizing support for the NPCo Socially habituated and psychologically 
conditioned to thinking in terms of the native authority as represented 
by the emirs, the district and village heads, the councillors, and al-
kadis, it was normal to expect that the majority of the populace would 
49 
support the party identified with the native authority. For non-
Moslem elements of the North, the party leaders emphasized regionalism 
(as opposed to tribalism), an essentially pragmatic attitude stressing 
Northern unity while allowing for ethnic diversity. The motto of the 
NPC was indicative of this stance: "One North, One People, Irrespec-
. f R l' ' R k T · b "SO tive o e 1g1on, an , or ri e. 
A re.sult of NPC 1 s emphasis on regionalism was the northernization 
scheme undertaken after 1958 to replace public e.mployees from the 
South with persons of northern origin. The NPC extended this prefer-
ential treatment from the civil service into the economic sphere under 
intense lobbying pressure from merchants, contractors, and transport 
48Whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change," p. 212. 
49 . 
Mackintosh, Nigerian Government, p. 289. 
so 
Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 327-328. 
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f . 11 f 1 N h . 51 irms to contractura y avor on y ort ern interests. Favorable NPC 
response to these elements won the party the monetary support of the 
monied connnercial interests while permitting this group only a marginal 
representation in the party hierarchy and legislative delegations. 
The NPC's ideology emphasized regional unity and the party's role 
as mediator between various northern forces and the emirate bureau-
cracies. In this process, the maintenance of party coherence largely 
reflected the coherence exhibited in the intramural competition among 
the hereditary lineages and royal dynasties for central and regional 
bureaucratic offices. The balance, adjucation, maintenance, and pur-
suit of these rival corporate claims to office at all levels of the 
bureaucracy was the overwhelming political preoccupation of members of 
h 1 . 52 t e ru ing stratum. The cohesiveness and adaptability of the NPC re-
fleeted the extraordinary degree of emirate control prevelent in spite 
of the competitive process for hereditary office. In similar manner, 
the northern traditional elite proved to be most sensitive to pressure 
from modernist forces for participation and privilege in exchange for 
their support. As Whitaker asserted, with constant intramural jockey-
ing for position among elements of the Fulani aristocracy this system 
was at once theocratic but still cognizant of wealth and/or merit in 
51Kenneth Younger, The Public Service in the New States (London, 
1960), p. 5. Younger not;S° that the exclusion of southern Nigerians is 
indicated by the regional and national origins of 221 members of the 
Northern administrative class in 1959: 161 were expatriate officers, 
59 were Northern Nigerians, and one was a non-Northern Nigerian. Thus, 
a classic example of the nearly pathological fear of Southern admini-
strators was exemplified in the clear preference for British expatri-
ates whatever their cost. 
52 
Henry L. Bretton, Power and Stability in Nigeria (New York, 
1962), p. 123. 
choosing party leadership: 
Political offense, defined by the system as attach-
ment to the king's political rival was the principal 
ground for dismissal; and political solidarity with the 
king and opposition to his rivals was the principal 
ground for appointment. Apart from solidarity with su-
periors, the essential criterion of and precondition for 
success in this institutionalized system of competition, 
which in Hausa is called neman sarautau--the quest for 
offices and the prestigious formal titles that go along 
with them--was and is wealth and influence largely pur-
chased. 
Neman sarautau is very greatly responsible for two 
ostensibly contrasting sets of qualities in the system 
as a whole; on the one hand, political and administrative 
insecurity, uncertainty, instability, arbitrariness, 
domination, dogmatism, coercion, and restrictiveness; on 
the other hand competativeness, flexibility, mobility, 
calculation, inventiveness, and secular devotion to what-
ever the requirements and rewards of power might be.53 
1.20 
The political attributes that rendered traditional elites in the 
native authorities insecure and potentially disunified at the same time 
motivated the emirs to extend official partronage to educated commoners 
or the noveau riche who were powerless to threaten the traditional po-
sition of the emir but could help legitimize him in the area of party 
politics. In the South this situation was reversed with modernist ele~ 
ments patronizing the chiefs and elders for the same purpose but with 
far less electoral impact in determining ultimate control of the central 
53whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change," p. 204; See also 
Anthony H.Mo Kirk-Greene, "The Merit Principle in African Bureaucracy~ 
Northern Nigeria," Nations £y Design, ed., Arnold Rivkin (Garden City, 
NoY., 1968). Kirk-Greene notes the confrontation of two groups within 
the bureaucracy and political parties of the North. These were the 
"meritocrats" or the new generation of "achievementalist" university-
trained civil servants who insisted that higher education should be a 
~ qua E:£!!.. qualification for appointment and promotion. The "hi.era~ 
crats", on the other hand, were those who carried over into local 
government service and party politics unquestioning acceptance of the 
creed of ascriptive criteria and hereditary authority of traditional 
Fulani-Hausa society should confer equal rank and status in modern so-
ciety, pp. 257-258. 
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government. The inclusion of Northern commoner elements was often 
based on clientage, i.e., patronage, economic security, and protection 
in exchange for personal loyalty and obedience. The successful trans-
fer of this relationship to party politics largely accounted for the 
adaptability and cohesiveness of the NPC in the North. The non-
traditionalist promotion of traditional forces in such a coalition ar-
rangement was noted by Whitaker: 
While the composition of the central executive councils 
was generally liberalized to include representatives of non-
traditional ruling elements, in the great emirates (espec-
ially Sokoto, Kano, Bornu, and Zaria) such reforms went no 
further than a shift from autocracy to oligarchy. Thus, 
measures strengthening 'local government' in the North were 
in effect bolstering hereditary rule. 54 
The unique blend of hereditary and commoner elements in the NPC ex-
hibited the capacity of the Fulani autocracy to build strategic coali-
tions allowing for vertical mobility while maintaining tight control 
over both religious and political institutions. Thus, the unique, ab-
sorptive political syncretism in the NPC was an extension of the per-
vasive control of the emirate bureaucracies over nearly every aspect of 
Northern political, economic, and social life. 
In the absence of a large aggrieved educated class or claimant 
nationalist minded commercial class in the North, these forces were 
accorrnnodationist rather than revolutionary. Too, far from being an-
tagonistic or dichotomous these groups combined with the traditional 
elites to form a highly cohesive and adaptable regional party machine 
which was used to counter all electoral challenges by radical Northern 
splinter groups or the Southern parties. The coalition of forces was 
54Whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change," pp. 212-213. 
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epitomized in the leadership of Bello and Balewa. As Whitaker argued~ 
During the whole period of Northern Nigeria's advance-
ment to self-government (1959) the Sardauna and Tafewa 
Balewa operated independently of direct mass political sup-
port, and of any real popular accountability. In fact they 
were modern politicians only in the quite limited sense 
they were parliamentarians. As such they were free to 
formulate their own political roles--within the limits set 
by virtual dependence on the political s~onsorship of tra-
ditionally composed native authorities.5 
It was in the electoral arena of interparty struggle in which this 
coalition perhaps best exhibited the adaptability and cohesiveness of 
the NPC in Northern and Federation politics. 
The NPC after 1951 rejected any suggestion that it should extend 
direct activity and competitive efforts south. As long as it solidly 
controlled the North it was assured a majority at the center and there 
were no socio-political reasons to believe that NPC domination of the 
North would be undermined. As Dudley argued, all this meant in effect 
that, with political power shifting to the center, the real levers of 
power were actually to be found in the North; Federal superordination, 
to put it differently, in practice turned out to be Northern domi-
56 
nence. Within the North the rigid control by emirs over regional 
police, courts, administration, and patronage were critical powers 
which assisted the NPC in extending its control into minority tribal 
buffer areas around the periphery of the region. These levers of con-
trol made it virtually impossible for any party to gain a foothold much 
less survive and sustain an electoral base anywhere in the North. 
55co So Whitaker, "Three Perspectives on Hierarchy," Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, 3 (1965), p. 8. 
56Bo Jo Dudley, "Federalism and the Balance of Political Power in 
Nigeria," Journal of Corrnnonwealth Political Studies, 4 (1966), p. 21. 
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In most of the North the social structure was monolithic and there 
was no stable base in class, occupational, religious, or other source 
57 of differentiation for a viable alternative party. However, efforts 
to break the electoral hold of the deeply entrenched NPC were made by 
at least three different party groupings: (1) the radical, commoner-
oriented opposition parties within the emirates (e.g., the Northern 
Elements Progress Union or NEPU), (2) opposition based parties in the 
minority areas or the northern "middle belt," (e.g., The United Middle 
Belt Congress (UMBC), and (3) radical Southern parties which attempted 
to make inroads in both majority and minority areas. 58 Few minority 
parties in the North behaved like groups which had the remotest chance 
of forming an alternative government through the workings of the par-
liamentary system. To the political elite of the NPC, in Northern 
politics the NEPU adherents were held to be apostates while the NCNC 
and AG were interlopers. In this context, as Post cogently observed: 
"On the eve of independence in 1959 nowhere in Nigeria, particularly in 
the North, could a classical two-party system with the possibility of a 
59 
change of government by a true 'swing of the pendulum' be found." 
the Northern Elements Progressive Union was the oldest and most 
active of the local opposition parties in the North. NEPU was founded 
in Kano by young radical Northerners bitterly opposed to the conserva-
tive, traditional elites. The urban based NEPU derived its hard core 
57 J. P. Mackintosh, ''Elector~l Trends and the Tendency to a One 
Party System in Nigeria," Journal 'M, Commonwealth Political Studies, 1 
(1961-63), p. 205. 
58whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change,·" p. 210. 
59 Post, The Nigerian Federal Election, p. 70. 
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membership from such groups as petty trade.rs and small businessmen 
¢;1'ortherners who had adopted some non-traditional source of livelihood) 
and a small group of dissident traditional elements who saw NEPU as an 
lt . . . l" . 1 60 a ernative opportunity to gain po itica status. This combination, 
after initial success in Kano city elections in 1951, was swamped in 
successive elections by the conservative rural vote which overwhelmingly 
opted for the NPC. For example, the NPC rural vote in the 1959 Federal 
1 . 105 f h 110 N h · · 61 e ections swept o t e . upper ort constituencies. After 
1959 the NPC faced little meaningful opposition in the North. 
During the first Federal election by secret ballot in 1959, many 
Southern party leaders expected Northern voters to repudiate emirate 
rule. Awolowo was thoroughly confident the AG would make deep inroads 
into NPC strength in all areas, particularly in the non-Moslem and 
Yoruba areas of the Middle Belt region. The AG and the NCNC-NEPU 
coalition garnered 33.4 percent of the votes but barely 19 per cent of 
the Federal" seats. 62 Furthermore, by the 1961 elections most of these 
opposition members had crossed the floor to the NPC, and in the re-
gional balloting that year the NPC gained 94.1 per cent of regional 
seats, eliminating virtually all opposition from the minority areas 
60 
Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 335-337. 
61Ibid., p. 338; Huntington, Political Order, p. 444. Huntington 
noted that the extension of suffrage to the rural masses in a society 
which remains highly traditional strengthens and legitimizes the 
authority of the traditional elite. This seems to have be.en true in 
Northern Nigeria during the 1959 Federal Elections. The possibility of 
significant Northern support swinging to the AG or any other opposition 
party after this date was very slight. 
6 ~ackintosh, "Electoral Trends," p. 205. 
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outside of the far North: 63 
TABLE IV 
THREE ELECTIONS IN THE FAR NORTH 1959-1964 
December 1959 May 1961 December 1964 
89 • 2'7o polling 66% polling 57% polling 
'70 votes % seats '70 votes '70 seats % vote % seats 
NPC 60.8 77 69.2 94 82 97 
AG 17.3 14.3 14. 6 5.3 
ll 2.5 
NEPU-NCNC 16.1 4.6 14.2 .6 
Others 5.7 4 1.8 7 .5 
In the 1964 Federal election in the North the NPC-dominated Na-
tional Nigerian Alliance (NNA) won 162 of the 167 allotted seats for 
64 
the North in the Federal House. As the Federal House of Representa-
tives contained only 312 seats, the NPC held an absolute majority based 
on its near monopoly of the Northern regional bloc. This second and 
last Federal Election exposed the polarization of Nigerian regional 
parties into two powerful alliances--the NNA which was dominated by the 
conservative NPC and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) domi-
nated by more secular and radical coalition elements from the NCNC and 
AG. This stark North-South confrontation pointed up the awesome 
leverage of the NPC in a federal system dominated by one region and one 
party. Southern party disarray and extreme political instability 
63Ibid.;, Mackintosh, Nigerian Government., p. 589. 
64Richard Harris, "Nigeria: Crises and Compromise," Africa Re-
port, 10 (1965), p. 30. 
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resulted from the turbulent 1964 election. 
The party tension in the drastically unbalanced Nigerian federal 
system was continuously escalated by appeals to tribal nationalism. 
The persistent exploitation by party leaders of tribal attachments made 
violence between ethnic groups in urban centers nearly inevitable, 
particularly during election periods. The temporary party beneficiary 
of this party-instigated violence was the regionally entrenched and 
institutionalized NPC and the primary party victim was the Action 
Group. 
The Action Group--Institutional Decay with a Split Personality 
Just as the Fulani-Hausa provided primary ethnic group support and 
leadership for the Northern People's Congress, the Action Group was 
heavily dependent on the conununal support of the Yoruba. The following 
table provides information on core group domination of the National 
Executive Conunittees of the two largest parties in the North and 
65 
South. Statistically, the AG in the context of party leadership com-
position was the least autonomous of the three major parties. As in 
the North, elite occupational groups were instrumental in the founding 
and leadership of the AG. There were, however, vast dissimilarities 
between the Northern and Southern parties in the exact type of occupa.-
tional groups which were represented on the National Executive Conunit~ 
tees as the chart on page 128 shows. 66 
65Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration, 
p. 612. Discrepancies in percentage totals reflects the presence of 
minority elements not listed in the ethnic categories. 
66 . 
Ibid., p. 614. 
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TABLE V 




Other Other Other non-Nigerians 
Eastern Western Northern and 
Party Ibo Groups Yoruba Groups Groups Unknown 
NCNC 49.3 9.9 26.7 5.6 2.8 5.6 
Action 




Party Fulani Hausa Nupe Kanuri Groups Yoruba Unknown 
NPC 32.4 18.9 9.4 6.8 16.2 6.8 9o4 
NEPU 14.0 67.1 4.6 3.1 7.1 3.2 
TABLE VI 
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR PARTY LEADERS 
(In percentages) 
Business managers, 
Professionals tired senior civil 
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re-
(Law, medicine, Businessmen servants, & administra-
& the learned (finance & tors of the Northern 
Party professions) Educators Investors) native authorities 
NCNC 26.8 19.7 28.2 5.6 
AG 33.3 18.2 21.2 1.5 
NPC 1.4 6.7 25.7 63.5 
NEPU 3.1 3.1 17.2 20.3 
Although the native authority functionaries enjoyed an overwhelm-
ing majority of party and parliamentary posts in the NPC, this group 
had infinitesimal representation in the hierarchy of the Southern par-
ties. There was in the South no single entrenched hereditary clique 
such as the emirs who enjoyed an obvious monopoly of power. Instead, a 
coalition of professionals, businessmen, and educators provided the 
primary source of leadership for the Southern parties, indicative of 
the relevance of ascribed and achieved status in the contrasting pat-
terns of party leadership. Socially achieved leadership status was 
the rule in the Action Group and the NCNC while socially ascribed 
leadership status was the dominant pattern in the NPC. 
The contrasting roles played by business-professional elements in 
the ranks of the NPC, the Action Group and the NCNC reflected in micro-
cosm the differential development patterns among the regions and the 
role of traditional elites in each society. The "new men" of the 
South, wealthy business elements and a highly educated professional 
class, controlled the NCNC and Action Group after 1951. The parties 
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were used as instruments to mould the new economic, social, and politi-
cal developments in these regions to their own advantage and these 
67 
groups asserted this was to the advantage of all. In contrast, the 
leaders of the Northern People's Congress derived their influence from 
the traditional forms of government which their class had managed to 
accommodate to British rule with as little modification as possible and 
no change in the real balance of power. 
Business and banking interests lent crucial financial support to 
the Southern parties. Sklar noted: 
In 1958 there were three African banks in close asso-
ciation with the Action Group. The most important was the 
National Bank of Nigeria Limited, the oldest existing 
African bank with the greatest volume of business •••• 
Both the Chairman of the Board and General Manager of the 
bank were Vice-Presidents of the Lagos branch of the 
Action Group an~ influential members of the party hier-
archy. Most.directors and leading shareholders of the 
National Bank were persons of Yoruba descent who supported 
the Action Group morally and materially.68 
After 1959 the main channel of funds to the AG was the Yoruba dominated 
National Investment and Properties Company Limited whose board of di-
rectors consisted entirely of national officers of the Action Group. 
Massive injections of public funds from such public institutions to fi-
nance party campaigns were tolerated as the parties considered the po-
tential loss of dominance in the region disastrous to the very survival 
f h d h . . . 69 o t e party--an t eir own economic interests. Very few tactics 
were circumscribed in assuring political control by the parties over 
their respective regions. In the game of zero-sum politics the 
67Post, Nigerian Federal Election, p. 65. 
68 Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 455-456. 
69Ibid., pp. 457-458. 
130 
exploitation of tribal attachments like the transfer of public funds to 
party coffers was considered not only legitimate but crucial. 
The second major social group which gave important support to the 
AG were the traditional authorities. It was the chief aim of the Ac-
tion Group founders to overcome the ingrained particularism of the 
Yoruba tribes and mobilize them behind the political party. In the 
rural areas and traditional towns of the West, chiefs were among the 
most influential leaders of opinion. No party in Nigeria conducted so 
systematic an effort as the AG to organize the peasantry or exert party 
control over the institution of chieftaincy. Party leaders accomplish-
ed this in several ways: (1) Egbe and AG leaders acquired honorary 
chieftaincy titles (Mr. Awolowo was retitled Chief Awolowo after be-
coming Premier of the Western Region in 1954), (2) Action Group ideals 
were propagated at all regional chiefs meetings and (3) Action Group 
control was assured by its ultimate legal sanction of appointment and 
d . . f h" f 70 epos1t1on o c ie s. 
Most Yoruba chiefs resigned themselves to an era of democratic 
government and hoped that in return for their support the dignity of 
the chieftaincy would be preserved in the new order. The alignment of 
the chiefs with the Yoruba-speaking intelligentsia at the local level 
endowed the AG with the aura of traditional legitimacy. This tradi-
tional support along with the financing by commercial interests per-
mitted the AG to mobilize mass support necessary to dominate Western 
70Ibid., pp. 234 and 444. Sklar further noted that by 1957 "rec-
ognized" or "honorary" chiefs numbering 1,500.had been appointed by 
the regional government and formed a very important pressure group in 
the region. This prompted the Oni of Ife to claim that, "In any 
gathering of party faithful every third or fourth man is a chief." 
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regional politics. For example, Chief c. D. Akram did not equivocate 
in 1958 about the necessity for Yoruba chiefs to be partisan supporters 
of the government party: 
Is it not our bounden duty to guard and guide our 
people? Have they made us chiefs in order that we may 
show complete indifference to the problems which confront 
them and us? •••• Chiefs vote in their different coun-
cils and can they escape being called politicians?. • • • 
Chiefs in particular must make it known to their people 
what political party they know can rule this country in 
the best interests of the people. • • • It is our clear 
duty if we love this great country and wish our people 
well to strain every nerve to see that the Action Group 
is voted into power in the Central Government. 71 
In contradistinction to the AG, Northern theocratic traditional-
ists dominated the upper echelons of party leadership. Clearly, how-
ever, the NPC could not have remained dominant if its support had re-
mained exclusively with the traditional elite in a coalition of 
minority interests. Thus, appeals of a communal and associational na-
ture were made by the emirs to the new educated elements and business 
interests to stress the basic integrative forces of the Northern com-
munity. In the North, Islam was such a force, and the NPC relentlessly 
portrayed party, faith, and community as one. Fidelity with Islam be-
72 
came synonomous with fidelity to the Northern People's Congress. 
In the South the AG could also not have achieved hemomony over the 
Western region without appealing to communal partisanship involving the 
cooperation of the chiefs. In the regional election of 1951, for in-
stance, political activity in Yorubaland was confined largely to the 
~ who bargained with each other to insure success of the candidates 
71 Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 242. 
72Ibid., p. 623. 
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from their town. The South, however, lacked an overarching inte-
grative mechanism similar to Islam in the North and a traditional 
leadership which dominated both religious and secular institutions. 
Thus, in the AG an "alliance" of convenience developed in which com-
munications between the traditional leader and modernizing agent (party 
official) was established with the chief translating the desires of the 
official to the people. In analyzing the requisite conditions for ef-
fective participation of chiefs in party affairs Miller noted that: 
(1) the traditional leaders' authority was bent to serve the ends of 
the modernizing agent, probably by persuasion, (2) articulation to the 
people was favorable and activating, and (3) the task, program, or cam-
. d k 74 paign was un erta en. Ironically, this alliance was analogous in 
many respects to the relationship of chiefs and the colonial admini-
stration under indirect rule. 
In terms of the dominance exerted by the Yoruba over every facet 
of its operation the Action Group was not an autonomous political par-
ty. Judged in a different light, however, the AG's initial inroads 
into other regions indicated a higher degree of party autonomy than was 
true of the NPC. Though most AG party leaders came mainly from a rela-
tively small elite of Yoruba business and professional elements, this 
was a broader based and more diversified group than the traditional 
autocracy which dominated the NPC. However, Southern "modernist" party 
leadership was by no means monolithic or unified in ideology or tactics • • 
NCNC and AG leaderships' degree of "modernity" was as double edged as 
73Peter S. Lloyd, "The Development of Political Parties in Western 
Nigeria," American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), p. 700. 
74Miller, "Political Survival," P• 185. 
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it was deceptive; factors of "modernity" contributed as much to basic 
cleavages and disunity within the elite leaderships as often the 
"modernizing" sector was hopelessly splintered. Too, the level of 
autonomy of all regional parties tended to be static in the sense that 
the initial dependence on both a core ethnic group for electoral sup-
port and on a particular party elite for leadership did not signifi-
cantly change. This was not true, however, in assessing party adapt-
ability and cohesiveness for there was a more marked and growing con-
trast in these areas among the parties during the course of electoral 
struggles. 
Until the Western Regional Election of 1956 it was difficult to 
gauge either the adaptability or coherence of the AG. In the 1951 
election 45 out of 80 members in the regional House of Assembly called 
6 7 5 The themselves AG with crossovers finally bringing the total to O. 
AG dominated regional government launched a very ambitious and costly 
legislative program based on increased personal taxes. Western NCNC 
candidates played upon this policy in capturing 23 of the 40 allotted 
Western seats in the Federal Election in 1954. 76 After this setback a 
massive party reorganization in the constituencies conducted by Chief 
Anthony Enahoro allowed the AG to grasp firm control over the Western 
Region by 1956. This control was gradually extended as pointed out 
75Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends," pp. 194-195. Mackintosh noted 
that at this formative date there was no method of determining which 
party commanded the votes of the majority as the concept of parties and 




in the following table. 77 
TABLE VII 
THREE ELECTIONS IN WESTERN NIGERIA 1956-1960 
May 1956 December 1959 August 1960 
% votes % seats % votes % seats % votes % seats 
AG 48.3 60 49.6 53.2 53.6 62.9 
NCNC 45.3 40 40.3 33.8 36.2 27.4 
Others 6.4 10.0 12.9 10.l 9.7 
The Action Group never achieved the intraparty regional coherence 
of the NPC. Lacking the integrative mechanisms of Islam or the native 
authorities, the political coalition of forces in the AG proved to be 
very brittle. The pockets of resistence to the AG within the West were 
more entrenched and the factional disputes much more rancorous and in-
tractable than in the North. Intraparty regional disputes exposed the 
cleavages within the AG and its incapacity to achieve party harmony, 
much less a sustained electoral following in the other regions. 
Bitter interparty struggle was focused in areas of historic tur-
moil, Ibadan and the minority areas of the West. Action Group elec-
toral superiority in both these regions was not accomplished until 
1961, a year before intraparty conflicts shattered the AG and triggered 
a national crisis. In Ibadan, ethnic competition and conflict had long 
been a source of tension. As the largest sub-Saharan black African 
city and capital of the West, Ibadan was a critical locus of party 
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struggle. In the center of this struggle was Adegoke Adelabu. A 
brilliant party tactician, Adelabu exerted firm control over Ibadan 
politics through his local party, the Mabolaje Grand Alliance (MGA). 
In electoral coalition with the NCNC, Adelabu was able to mold Ibadan 
pride (mainly directed at the Ijebu Yoruba of which Awolowo was the 
prominent member}, dislike of reforms (bringing the detested taxes), 
and fervent anti-British nationalism into a single very effective local 
78 
movement. The death of Adelabu in 1958 crippled the coalition 
strength of the MGA-NCNC. However, in terms of interparty struggle it 
was not until 1961 that the AG was able to exert its regional dominance 
79 
over local affairs in Ibadan. 
Historical rivalries and ethnocentrism among many Yoruba cities, 
along with growing class cleavages, were exploited by the NCNC and the 
NFC in dividing and eventually destroying the original Action Group. 
The political "Achilles heel" of the AG in the West lay in the so-called 
Midwest, an area containing several minority groups bordering on the 
Eastern Region. The Action Group's electoral record in the Midwest was 
initially poor: it lost all ten Midwestern seats in the Federal Elec-
tion of 1954, 16 out of 20 in the Regional Elections of 1956, and 14 
out of 15 in the Federal Election of 1959. 80 As noted in the following 
table, it was not until the election of 1960 that AG regional power 
78Mackintosh, Nigerian Government, p. 344. 
79George Jenkins, "Government and Politics in Ibadan," The City of 
Ibadan, eds. P. c. Lloyd and A. Mabogunje, pp. 228-229. 
80sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 245; Philip Whitaker, "The 
Western Region of Nigeria--May, 1957," Five Elections in Africa, eds. 
W. Jo M. Mackinzie and Kenneth Robinson (Oxford, 1960), pp. 86-90. 
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succeeded in equalling the NCNC in these minority areas: 
TABLE VIII 
THREE ELECTIONS IN THE MIDWEST 1956-1960 
May 1956 December 1959 August 1960 
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% votes % seats % votes % seats % votes % seats 
AG 31.1 20 39.1 20 46.6 50 
NCNC 63.5 80 54.8 80 50.9 50 
Others 5.3 6.1 2.5 
Ethnic cleavages and ideological diversity within the AG caused 
severe strains on the adaptability and cohesion of the party. Closely 
related and more contemporary threats to party cohesion were the rising 
political class conflicts within the parties of th~-South. As noted, 
both the AG and NCNC leadership was dominated by members of an emergent 
business-professional group--a "political class1182--whose members had 
strategic leadership positions in the dominant institutions of society. 
Within the AG and the NCNC, a growing rift developed between "haves" 
and "have nots." This polarization was revealed in regionalist and 
anti-regionalist factions developing within the party structure. These 
factors were spawned by what Sklar incisively described as a basic 
contradiction in the Nigerian political system: "The 'machinery of 
81Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends," pp. 196-197. 
82Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York, 1936). In terms of 
party autonomy Mosca's "political class" is an apt description of the 
core elite groups which developed vested interests in party leadership 
in all the regions, especially the South. 
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government'--the system of governmental power including the power of 
patronage--was largely regionalized, but the 'machinery of politics'--
the party system, i.e., the organization of the masses--continued to 
83 exhibit a strong trans-regional and anti-regional tendency." 
Cleavages between the regionalist and anti-regionalist wings of 
the AG crippled the efforts of this party to become institutionalized 
on a regional much less a national scale. By 1960, AG's control over 
patronage within the West created a class with vested regional inter-
ests which considered efforts to maintain a national image by campaign-
ing in the East and North expensive and fruitless. 84 Party incoherence 
tended to focus on the political power to be exercised by Awolowo; 
President of the party and leader of the Federal opposition, and the AG 
Western Region Premier, Chief s. L. Akintola. As Sklar inferred, this 
divided power base had enormous political consequences for AG party co-
herence and adaptability: 
The Action Group rapidly developed a flagrantly split 
personality. As the Federal Opposition, it tried to be the 
chief spokesman for opponents of the political class. As 
governing party in the Western Region, it was identified 
with indulgence toward the social and political status quo. 
The 'federal' faction led by Awolowo, wanted the Action 
Group to intensify its opposition to the regional power 
groups that controlled the Federal Government. The 're-
gional' faction, led by the Premier, S• L. Akintola favored 
a general settlement with the other regional power groups 
and the formation of a national government at the federal 
level that would include all the regionally dominant 
parties. This rupture was exposed at the Action Group 
83Richard Lo Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Politican Sys-
tem," Journal .2f Modern African Studies," 3 (1965), p. 205. 
84Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends, 11 p. 208. 
Congress of February, 1962. In his Presidential address 
Awolowo admitted 'openly for once' the existence of 'real 
and dangerous' contradictions within the party.85 
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Awolowo was forced to rely on a Western class-conscious regional 
power group headed by Samuel Akintola. Awo, on the other hand led the 
AG in opposition to the NCNC-NPC coalition at the center. Spreading 
its resources to cover multi-level activities led directly to the 
institutional decay and collapse of this political party. Akintola's 
regionalist faction was more interested in maintaining regional hegem-
ony than striving for national dominance and in reconciling rather than 
dislodging political classes in other regions. To the AG regionalists 
party efforts outside the Western Region were both undesirable and fu-
tile. To Akintola party coherence and control involved a firm grip on 
the West even at the expense of abandoning AG opposition in the North 
and East. Awolowo's democratic socialism was palatable to this faction 
but his adamant anti-regionalist determination to provide 'virulent 
opposition' to the NPC-NCNC federal coalition split the AG from top to 
bottom. 86 
At the Action Group National Congress in February, 1962, the 
Awolowo and Akintola factions of the AG struggled for ascendency. 
Awolowo set the stage for Akintola's ouster from office by revising the 
party constitution permitting the removal of any parliamentary leaders 
87 
who had lost the confidence of the party. Akintola retaliated by 
85 Sklar, "Contradictions," pp. 205-206. 
86Richard L. Sklar, "The Ordeal of Chief Awolowo," Politics in 
Africa, ed., Gwendolyn Carter (New York, 1966), pp. 130-133. 
87Ibid., p. 131. 
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threatening the removal of Western patronage officeholders who opposed 
him. On May 19-20, 1962, the Western and Federal AG Executive Councils 
demanded Akintola's resignation as Regional Premier. Akintola refused 
and called for dissolution of the Western House. 88 In rapid order 
Akintola was removed and in the ensuing Assembly vote of confidence for 
a new AG Premier, Akintola 1 s faction in collusion with NCNC members 
violently disrupted Assembly proceedings. On May 29, the Federal House 
operating under section 65 of the Federal Constitution and the Emergency 
Powers Act of 1961 took control of the Western Region ousting the en-
tire AG hierarchy--Governor, Premier, Ministers, and Superintendent-
General of the local Government Police.89 Under the emergency admini-
stration imposed by the NPC-NCNC dominated Federal House, the AG was 
eclipsed as a viable majority political party in the West. 
The intraparty split and Feder~l intervention in the Western Re-
gion exposed the deep ethnic-class cleavages in the AG and the Federal 
coalition's opportunism in taking advantage of them. This period of 
tension and violence upset the decade-old tenuous balance of party 
power at the Federal level. After 1962, the former AG leadership fac-
tions gravitated towards new coalition arrangements with either the 
NPC or the NCNC. The eventual collapse of the East-North coalition 
polarized and realigned party activity on a basically North-South axis. 
Thus, with the termination of the NPC-NCNC Federal coalition prior to 
the 1964 Federal Elections, the Awolowo faction joined in a new alli-
ance with the NCNC, their former Southern antagonists. This new 
88Mackintosh, Nigerian Politics, pp. 446-447. 
89Ibid., P• 450. 
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coalition was the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The UPGA 
was countered by the National Nigerian Alliance (NNA), made up of the 
Akintola faction of the AG, and the NPC. 
Thus, the AG was unable to exhibit functional adaptability in 
either shifting from opposition to government at the Federal level or 
in shifting its representation from one regional consistency to an-
other. The trend toward electoral isolation and encapsulation of each 
major party in its home region helped create incoherence in the bitter 
power struggle between the wings of AG party leadership. This struggle 
involved personalities, ideology, and more critically, the basic role 
of the party in Federation politics. In spite of the fact that the AG 
was more autonomous than the NPC, the lack of adaptability, and par-
ticularly, coherence within even its own region prevented the Action 
Group from becoming institutionalized on a national scale. Mounting 
pressures from competing on many fronts combined with the intense NPC-
NCNC cross-pressures at the center to hopelessly split the Action 
Group. Firmly entrenched throughout the North, the organization and 
electoral base of the NPC enabled it to face the more institutionalized 
wing of the new Southern coalition--the NCNC. 
National Council for Nigerian Citizens--Party Development 
and Sub-Ethnic Identities 
The evolution of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) 
closely paralleled the mobilization and modernization of the Ibo 
peoples within the heterogeneous Nigerian state. As noted previously, 
British imperial penetration of the Ibo areas came comparatively late 
and the application of indirect rule in the East was made with little 
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knowledge of the nature of Ibo authority patterns. The British found 
no monolithic kingdoms, no hierarchical administrative systems and no 
centralized political structures as in the Northern emirates or the 
Yoruba constitutional monarchies of the West. To many observers of Ibo 
culture, traditional Ibo society appeared to be acephalous, egalitarian, 
and individualistic, united more by culture than by power or 
h . 90 aut ority. Thus, the extreme political segmentation and absence of 
any dominant, overarching cultural mechanism within Ibo traditional 
culture are fundamental considerations in any analysis of Ibo moderni-
zation in the Nigerian state. It is contended that these same primor-
dial factors also had deep influence on the modern conduits of Ibo po-
litical mobilization--the ethnic unions and the NCNC. 
Most early descriptions contrasting the Ibo with other ethnic 
groups in Nigeria were based upon impressions rather than on system-
. h 91 atic researc • These descriptions of Ibo society created an image of 
a decentralized yet cohesive political culture which, despite its frag-
mentation, still exhibited a high degree of shared values. Since 
colonial contact the Ibos were widely noted for their mobility, re-
ceptivity to change and attraction to the nationalist cause. For in-
stance, Ottenberg stated flatly that the Ibo were probably the most 
receptive to cultural change and the most willing to accept Western 
90Paul Anber, "Modernisation and Political Disintegration: Ni-
geria and the Ibos, 11 The Journal of Modern African Studies, 5 (1967), 
p. 49. - -
9~ote for example Daryll Forde and G. I. Jones, ~ .122 and 
Ibibio Peoples of Southeastern Nigeria (London, 1950); M. Green,.!.££ 
Village Affairs; and V. Uchendu, ~ Igbo .2f Southeastern Nigeria. 
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f 1 . N. . 92 ways o any arge group in igeria. Robert LeVine in his study, 
Dreams ~Deeds, compared Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa schoolboys and con-
firmed the stereotype that the Ibo ranked highest in achievement moti-
vation. 93 Although few anthropological studies dealt explicitly with 
Ibo party participation, the conclusion from these studies was that the 
transformation of traditional Ibo culture into a more secularized po-
litical culture was an acconnnodation favorable to political develop-
ment. 
Recent micropolitical studies in the former Eastern Region indi-
cate that many early works tended to focus only on surf ace features of 
Ibo society while blurring the interstices and nuances of Ibo political 
organization or modernization. Many studies overlooked the high level 
of political competition prevalent among Ibo classes and sub-groups. 
In this regard, Barnard has claimed that students of political behavior 
in both '1established" and "emergent" nations must realize that purely 
formal or legalistic conceptual frameworks are inadequate to provide 
meaningful answers to such problems as persistence and change, sociali-
zati.on, political cohesion and the complex bases of political authority 
d 1 . . 94 an egitimacy. The application of such conceptual frameworks to 
narrow sectors of Ibo society was noted recently in a study of Eastern 
Region ethnicity by Audrey and David Smock. In this study the Smocks 
92Simon Ottenberg, "Ibo Receptivity to Change," Continuity and 
Change .!!1 African Cultures, eds., William R. Bascom and Melville Hers-
kouits (Chicago, 1959), p. 130. 
93Robert A. Levine with the assistance of Eugene and Leonard Unter-
barger, Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation .!!1 Nigeria (Chicago, 
1966), PP• 78-94. 
94F. Mo Barnard, "Culture and Political Development: Herder's Sug-
gestive Insights," American Political Science Review, LXIll (1969), p. 
379. 
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noted the irresistable urge of Africanists to generalize about the en-
tire Ibo linguistic group on the basis of detailed research on one 
village or clan. As a consequence, writing on the Ibo more often 
stressed general (and unverified) Ibo cultural characteristics rather 
95 
than systematically elucidating differences among sub-groups. The 
dynamics of the segmental Ibo political culture noted in the Smock 
study more clearly points up the problems encountered by the NCNC in 
achieving institutionalization at a regional or at the federal level of 
party competition. 
The level of autonomy achieved by the NCNC can be only super-
ficially observed in the party 1 s dependence on Ibo electoral support 
for its survival. More important than mere tribal-political block-
party linkage are the origins, background, and tactics of the political 
class associated with the NCNC. As with the NPC and the AG, autonomy 
as a factor in assessing NCNC institutionalization is closely associ-
ated with party coherence and adaptability. Moreover, the combined in-
fluence of both ethnicity and class, so fundamental to considerations 
of autonomy also permeated all levels of party struggle, prime indices 
of NCNC coherence and adaptability. Thus, the dual level of struggle 
for NCNC institutionalization was a microcosm of the wider, national 
problem of 11horizontal11 integration of conununal groups and the 11verti-
96 
cal11 assimilation of social and economic classes. 
One of the most provocative features of the emergence of the Ibo 
95Audrey C. Smock and David R. Smock, 11Ethnicity and Attitudes 
Toward Development in Eastern Nigeria, 11 The Journal Ef Developing Areas, 
3 (July, 1969), p. 511. 
96Huntington, Political Order, p. 397. 
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was their role in the nationalist movement and their domination of the 
leadership and mass membership of the NCNC. As noted previously, be-
tween 1945 and 1951 the NCNC justifiably claimed to be the only na-
tional political party. During this period Azikiwe tried to mobilize 
his party into a unified, cohesive, political force and at the same 
time assume the leadership of not only a pan-Nigerian but a pan-
African movement as well. This mobilization effort was remarkable in 
that it was carried out with only the most rudimentary organization. 
Nigerian nationalism and Ibo advancement were for Zik not conflicting 
goals but dual sources of inspiration in the fight against colonial-
ism. 97 With the strengthening of regional autonomy in the 1954 Lyttle-
ton constitution and the emergence of the other regional parties NCNC 1 s 
monopoly of Nigerian politics was terminated. The tri-polarization of 
Nigerian politics which resulted from these constitutional changes 
caused party government to evolve in the regions earlier than at the 
center. Thus, as political power devolved to the regions1 increasing 
98 
regional autonomy, both real and potential party autonomy decreased. 
Whatever possibility the NCNC had of establishing a truly autonomous 
broadly based national party dissipated in the decade prior to inde-
pendence. 
The politics of the Ibo, after organized political activity com-
menced on a national scale in Nigeria, was characterized by a pattern 
of steady detachment from national goals, a detachment which has been 
97 
Anber, "Modernisation and Political Disintegration," p. 173. 
98 
Donald Rothchild, "The Limits of Federalism: An Examination of 
Political Institutional Transfer in Africa," Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 4 (1966), p. 284; Odumosu, Nigerian Constitution, pp~ 218-219. 
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described as the "regionalization of nationalism." 99 Prior to inde-
pendence the radical and militant pan-Nigerian Ibo political posture was 
paralleled by the new requirement to grasp and maintain power in the 
Eastern Region which the Ibo dominated. Thus, upon independence the 
NCNC seemed electorally entrenched to defend its tribal-regional base. 
The political class in Enugu--as in Kaduna and Ibadan--had now to de-
fend its regional status quo and respond to the precarious Federal 
balance of power. Although the NCNC of all the three major parties ap-
parently had wide appeal, it had not developed effective machinery for 
interest representation even in its own region. As with the AG, 
Federation-wide politics pursued by the NCNC exposed a further dimen-
sion of party autonomy than mere dependence on the familiar tribal 
electoral support. The NCNC leadership was in fact highly elitist and 
dominated by a relatively small political class. This domination is 
perhaps most crucial to any analysis of national party autonomy or co-
hension as this elitism became more and more regionally oriented. 
In Nigeria, elite interests--political, economic, educationa, 
bureaucratic, and military--were dominantly aggregated and articulated 
. h' h f h . l"d . . lOO H 1 d h" 1 wit in t e context o et nic so 1 arities. ence, ea ers ip e e-
ments in the NCNC, as in the NPC and AG, in actuality were in positions 
to tribalize Nigerian polics. The nature of these elites or classes 
was noted in Himrnelstrand's contention that: 
99 
Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 319-331; Anber, Nigeria ~ ~ ~' p. 
1730 
lOOJames O'Connell, "Political Integration: The Nigerian Case," 
African Integration and Disintegration, ed., Arthur Hazlewood, (New 
York, 1967), p. 131. 
One can safely assert that social classes in Weber's 
sense ••• are fast emerging in Nigeria. Perhaps the first 
visible product of such class-formation is the post-
colonial 'political class'--visible not because of any 
outwardly manifested identification with well-defined 
class symbols but because of the accumulation of con-
spicious power, wealth, and, sometimes, intellectual 
resources in the same hands.101 
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In short, the party system of Nigeria was the focus of class interests 
and these interests influenced the party autonomy, adaptability and co-
herence. 
The political class within the NCNC was characterized by four ob-
jective criteria: high status occupation, superior education, high in-
d h h . 1 f b . . 102 come, an t e owners ip or contro o usiness enterprise. These 
criteria were manifest in the composition of the top executive bodies 
of the NCNC. Sklar noted that of the membership of National and Re-
gional Executive Committees and members of ministerial rank, fully 80 
per cent were in the professional, educational, entrepreneurial-
103 
managerial class. The importance of class interests to the NCNC was 
similar to equivalent groups in the AG and NPC. What was most crucial, 
however, was that the major institutions of Nigerian society, es-
pecially those institutions which were fundamental to the pattern of 
social stratification, were closely related to and substantially con-
trolled by the political parties. Southern parties in particular were 
part of rival business and financial structures which existed to make 
lOlUlf Himmelstand, "Tribalism, Nationalism, and Rank-
Equilibration and Social Structure--A Theoretical Interpretation of 
Some Socio-Political Processes in Southern Nigeria," Journal of Peace 
Research, 2 (1969), pp. 82-83. 
102sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 480-481. 
l03Ibid., pp. 482-483. 
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money for the individuals concerned and provide financial backing for 
., 
the parties. This party control was furthermore exerted by a class 
deeply dependent on core tribal support to maintain its position. This 
support is indicated in the following table: 104 
TABLE IX 
THREE ELECTIONS IN THE EASTERN REGION, 1957-1961 
March 1957 December 1959 November 1961 
46.8% polling 74.4% polling 57% polling 
% votes % seats % votes % seats % votes % seats 
NCNC 63.2 76.0 64.6 79.4 79.2 86.2 
(57.8)* (72.6)* 
AG (+UNIP) 17.0 21.4 23.0 19.1 15.5 10.2 
Others 19.6 2.3 12.3 1.4 5.0 3.4 
(26.4)** (17. O)** 
*This is the figure if the Independents are subtracted from the NCNC 
total. 
**This is the figure if the Independents are added to "Others." 
For purposes of determining NCNC autonomy it is necessary to focus 
on the interrelationships between ethnicity and class in the mobiliza-
tion of electoral support. As O'Connell has argued, tribalism can be 
defined in the contemporary setting as the competitive struggle for 
modernization between the elite members of different ethnic groups with 
dissent and conflict in society centered on the control of political 
authority which is seen as the main source of the allocation of rewards 
104John Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends and the Tendency of a One 
Party System," Nigerian Government and Politics, ed., John Mackintosh 
(Evanston, 1966), p. 527. 
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105 in the forms of status, roles, and wealth. Within the NCNC, party 
leadership was exercised largely by an Ibo class which had vested 
interests in seeing that the party exercised power in the East and 
other component parts of the Federation. Just as with the NPC and AG, 
elite group domination of the NCNC was a prime determinent of party 
autonomy. The dynamics of such class domination and its cultivation of 
tribal attachments for party purposes was noted by Hilllll1elstrand: 
The Nigerian tribalism in recent years is mainly a 
political tribalism stelllll1ing not from primordial ethnic 
loyalties as such but from politically exploited and re-
inforced reactions to strains in the emerging stratfica-
tion system of Nigeria.106 
Certainly, the NCNC was used to promote class interests in the ac-
quisition and retention of regional power in the East. 
All three parties were obviously dependent for regional power on 
core group support and; hence, none were ethnically autonomous in 
grasping regional power. For purposes of determining institutional ca-
pacity, it seems expedient to delve below an analysis of simple elec-
toral ethnic arithmetic. More fundamental are the contrasts in evolu-
tion, composition, ideology, and tactics which existed between and 
within Northern and Southern political classes. These factors, most 
observable in interparty and intraparty struggle, determined both the 
adaptability and coherence of the parties--perhaps cogent and more re-
liable indices in gauging party institutionalization. Only by such 
analyses can there be any explanation why the most traditional and 
least autonomous of the three parties--the NPC--had the greatest 
l05 James 0 'Connell, "Inevitability of Instability," Journal of 
Modern African Studies, V (1967), pp. 186-187. 
106H. 1 d II b 1 1 k 97 I.Illll1e stran , Tri a ism, Nationa ism, and Ran ," p. • 
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capacity for achieving regional institutionalization. 
Internal problems which plagued the coherence of the AG similarly 
affected the NCNC. In the period 1954-1955, the basic framework for 
future party disunity was exposed with the political developments ris-
ing from the Lyttleton Constitution. Under this Constitution fully re-
sponsible governments were established in the regions. In the Eastern 
and Western Regions all ministers were to be chosen from among the mem-
hers of the regional legislatures; the leader of the majority party in 
each legislature was designated Premier, and each regional government 
i d . h d. . h . . d f. d 107 rema ne in power on t e con ition t at it retaine con i ence. The 
regional governments were assured of full internal self-government 
within a few years and for the time being political powers would be 
primarily in the regions. The Federal Council of Ministers would in-
elude nine positions--three from,among the Federal legislators elected 
in each region. 
After the 1954 London Constitutional Conference the NCNC reversed 
its previous championing of a unitary government for Nigeria. Policy 
change came only after bitter disagreement between regionalist and 
unitarist wings of the party. The regionalists prevailed. This intra-
party discord was only the beginning but reflected party organizational 
evolution from 1944 to 1953. During this period Azikiwe led the NCNC 
from his political-commercial base in Lagos as General Secretary, then 
as National President. Over the entire period he made little effort to 
create a disciplined and cohesive organization comparable to Nkrumah's 
107sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 143. 
150 
108 Convention People's Party. Azikiwe periodically made speeches im-
ploring unity, usually in times of crises, but he never fully sub-
scribed to the party as an apparatus of organizational control. As 
Sklar noted: 
• • • this writer ventures to suggest that few of his con-
temporaries will object to the characterization of Azikiwe 
as a persuasive teacher, an effective propagandist, an able 
formulator of principles, an astute political tactician, a 
rugged antagonist, an aspiring personality, but a less than 
inspired organizer.109 
When Azikiwe became Eastern Premier in 1954, the results both of 
the regionalism and the NCNC 1 s malady of organizational particularism 
became endemic. As noted previously, Ibo political culture was unique 
among Nigerian nationalities. for the numbers of tribal sections and sub-
sections, each with its own customs and traditions which inspired local 
or sectional loyalties. For instance, the Nnewi, the Mbaise, the 
Ohafia, the Ngwa, the Ikwerri, all exemplified the remarkable strength 
Of Ibo Clan feeli'ng. 110 0 th lb · · h d · ver e years o communities a given over-
whelming bloc support to the NCNC. However, this support overshadowed 
other intratribal developments. With the rapid Ibo modernization there 
was reinforcement of a general ethnic identity but there was also a 
parallel growth of sub-ethnic, particularist sentiments. This par-
ticularism became most apparent after 1954 and was often translated 
within party councils into competition for amenities and eventually 
persistent intraparty conflict. The NCNC developed few organizational 
108 
G. o. Olusanya, "The Zikist Movement--A Study in Political 
Radicalism, 1946-1950," Journal~ Modern African Studies, IV, 3 (1966) 
pp. 323-328. 
109 
Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 149. 
110 Smock, "Ethnicity and Attitudes, 11 p. 501. 
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mechanisms or techniques to impose discipline or cope with conflict 
resolution. 
In attempting to compete on several different electoral fronts, 
the NCNC exhibited the inconsistency and disorganization of a unitary 
party attempting to operate in a federal state. Although party power 
was technically lodged in the National Executive Committee, party 
operations in other regions entailed regional command. In the absence 
of any coherent leadership or mechanisms to deal with the various 
levels of party operations, incoherence was implicit in Sklar's claim 
that by 1958: 
It seemed as though the formation of an anti-Azikiwe 
political cartel embracing ethnic associations and local 
factions had become a distinct possibility. In the West, 
opposition to Azikiwe was centered ••• in Lagos; in the 
East increasingly vehement criticisms of Azikiwe by in-
fluential leaders of the Ibo State Union was indicative 
of discontents of several local factions that were not 
unified on a regional basis.ill 
Internal conflict and factionalism within the NCNC grew despite 
the restructuring of the party to determine membership on a direct, 
individual basis. By 1959, the party had nearly 200 branches scattered 
throughout Nigeria with nearly half a million members. Membership re-
cruitment, however, could not camoflage serious organizational weak-
nesses in securing effective party action. As Post pointed out: 
It is ••• essential to ensure effective coordination 
of activity between the branches, which itself depends upon 
effective direction and supervision from the center. This 
again implies the existence of an effective apparatus of 
professional party organizers both at central headquarters 
111sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 207. 
and in the Regions. This was the first and great weakness 
of the NCNC as a political party; it never possessed such 
an apparatus.112 
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After 1951, when regional Working Committees were created, there was a 
tendency for the party to operate as a federation of three parties 
rather than as one unified body. As Post further noted, relations be-
tween NCNC National Headquarters and its regional leaders sometimes 
took on the appearance of foreign relations between sovereign entities, 
rather than the passing of messages between different levels of an es-
bli h d h . h 113 ta s e ierarc y. The organizational facade of the NCNC could 
not disguise the party's incoherence. Periodic disputes wracked the 
NCNC, undermining and eventually destroying its footholds in other re-
gionso 
Electoral challenges to the NCNC in its home region underscored 
the segmentation of the Ibo political culture and the party's own or-
ganizational deficiencies. The importance of the Ibo cultural matrix 
to party coherence was pointed up by Mackintosh: 
The NCNC ••• has always been a gathering of clan and 
town unions ••• and it included virtually all persons and 
organizations which exercised local influence in Ibo 
territory. As a result the NCNC has continually faced 
internal disputes as to which section, person, or group 
was to control the party machine and nominate candidates 
in a given area. And if one clan or cormnunity succeeded 
in capturing a branch or gaining nomination for its can-
didate, this was seen as a local dispute rather than as 
a threat to the NCNC and the losers might stand as inde-
pendents, expecting to rejoin the Party after they had 
11 2r<.. W. Post, "National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons--The 
Decision of 1959," Nigerian Government and Politics, ed., John Mackin-
tosh (Evanston, 1966), pp. 411-412. 
113Ibid., p. 413. 
won the election. So the NCNC has had to face an opposi-
tion trying to exploit local feelings in non-Ibo areas 
and the constant danger of divisions and independent 
candidates from within its own ranks.114 
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Within the segmented Ibo political system "government"· consisted 
of the collective rule of representatives of each segment and not in 
imposition of a central authority standing above the federated units. 
In this perspective it is not surprising that the Ibo political class 
was the main proponent of post-war radical, militant nationalism and a 
unitary state structure. However, as Wolpe has asserted no less note-
worthy was the parallel development of a highly cohesive and organiza-
tionally sophisticated pan-Ibo movement, the very success of which ul-
timately undermined· the pan-Nigerian aspirations of the Ibo-led NCNC 
and, subsequently, was one of several factors operating to impair the 
i 1 1 i . f lb 1 d . l" . 115 nat ona eg timacy o · an o- e mi itary regime. Further, as 
Wolpe contends, the stability of the Ibo political system lay in ad hoc 
ever shifting alignmen~s at different levels of the society rather than 
in hierarchical, continuously functioning structures and institu-
tions.116 In this perspective, in analyzing NCNC coherence and adapta-
bility, such "shifting alignments" were also destabilizing as obviously 
the party was only nomina11y "hierarchical" and seldom "continuously 
functioning." In effect, NCNC party structure was a mirror image of 
the segmented political culture in which it was spawned. 
Two recent studies exhibit the influence of micropolitical 
114Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends," p. 522. 
115 Howard Wolpe, "Port Harcourt: Ibo Politics in Microcosm," 
Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, 3 (1969), p. 469 
116Ibid., p. 474. 
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ethnicity on NCNC coherence and adaptability. Audrey Smock, in study-
ing Mbaise, the largest county-council area of the Eastern Region, ex-
plored the relationships between the party and the numerous ethnic 
unions in this area. As Smock argues: 
Conflict between central party directives and local 
loyalties haunted the NCNC from its inauguration. • •• 
The resilience of the primary ethnic groups resulted in 
part from the organizational deficiencies of the NCNC 
and also reflected the strength of the ethnic unions ••• 
and the greater relevance for their members than the po-
litical party. As a more particular and smaller unit, 
the ethnic group could provide a better framework than 
the inclusive NCNC through which to compete for scarce 
economic resources and political rewards.117 
The ironies involved in the resurgence of sub-ethnic loyalties and the 
consequences for party coherence emerge from such a micropolitical 
study. It would seem that any efforts to build a coherent, adaptable 
NCNC in the Eastern Region were victim of the very electoral success of 
the party among the Ibo. Too, concurrent with electoral successes in 
the 1950 1 s came stepped up economic development and distribution of 
amenities in the region. In this environment Smock contends: 
• • • while modernization diminished both the objective 
differences between the constituent ethnic units and 
their relevance, the exigencies of political participa-
tion reinforced more primary groups as units of identi-
fication. Political participation accenuated the 
significance of clans, since the clan was the most in-
clusive grouping ••• through which economic amenities 
and political nominations could be distributed.118 
In the absence of adequate structural mechanisms for conflict resolu-
tion, NCNC electoral success at the regional level had actually a 
detrimental influence on party coherence. Paradoxically, a regional 
117 
Audrey c. Smock, "The NCNC and Ethnic Unions in Biafra, 11 
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electoral defeat for the NCNC would have been disastrous in the game of 
zero-sum politics but victory brought only increased dissention at the 
local level. 
Similarly, in a study of ethnicity in Port Harcourt, Wolpe found 
that urbanization in the East often stimulated both intra-and inter-
ethnic competition: 
Connnunal identities comprised the most convenient 
categorisation in the new urban connnunity, and the pri-
mary points of social and political reference for the 
newly urban citizens. From this perspective, Port 
Harcourt politics were from the outset 'ethnic politics'; 
and Port Harcourt's non-Ibo patricians, no less than 
their Onitsha Ibo and Owerri Ibo successors, were 
'ethnic' political actors.119 
In this largely Ibo city narrow ethnic loyalties (rural home adminis-
trative units} generally determined social relationships and political 
affiliations. However, differences in connnunities of origin, religion, 
class, and occupation meant that politically salient identities were in 
120 
a state of constant flux. Party coherence in such an enyironment 
would have been extremely difficult to achieve. 
Urban Port Harcourt and rural Mbaise had no corps of active NCNC 
members and only a shoddy party structure which operated generally at 
election time. The resurgence of Ibo ethnic and sub-ethnic unions oc-
curred simultaneously with NCNC electoral sweeps. The organizational 
weakness of the party derived from its lack of a role in the local po-
litical system as political affiliation could not provide the basis 
for demand articulation as virtually everyone belonged to the NCNC. 
Thus, party organization and coherence were secondary to and 
119 Wolpe, "Port Harcourt," p. 480. 
120Ibido, 485 p. . • 
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overshadowed by the particularistic ethnic unions. That this phe-
nomenon took place in both rural and urban settings in the East lends 
credence to Wolpe's claim that his study: 
••• calls into question the widely held view that, as 
economic development accelerates, the creation of new, 
functionally specific social identities will eventually 
undermine the organizational bases upon which communal-
ism rests. Viewed over time, communal structures and 
sentiments in Port Harcourt not only have persisted but 
appear to have been diversified and politicized.121 
Thus, the weakness of NCNC party apparatus--endemic in other re-
gions--was clearly exposed in the East by the dynamics of Ibo sub-
ethnic loyalties. These loyalties were only a further dimension of the 
evolving ethnicity which fundamentally influenced party institutional-
ization in all regions. 
121Ibid., p. 489. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is not surprising that Nigeria should have come to mirror the 
full range of problems of nation-building in Africa. There is nothing 
natural about most of Africa's multitribal states, and building a sense 
of community is one of the main challenges that confronts Africa's new 
leadership. The basic integrative problems faced by Nigeria, analyzed 
through the prism of party politics in this study, tend to make the 
original estimates of Nigerian stability grossly overstated. 
During the first decade of independence Nigeria experienced five 
years of civilian rule characterized by steadily escalating political 
tension and violence. The seemingly entrenched multiparty political 
system was abruptly and violently overthrown in early 1966 by a small 
military force most analysts had considered politically unimportant if 
not impotent. A second military coup, preceded and followed by wide-
spread inter-ethnic bloodshed, led to near disintegration of the Ni-
gerian state with the secession of the Eastern Region as the indepen-
dent Republic of Biafra. This secession precipitated a thirty month 
civil war. Nostalgic illusions of the stability and unity of the First 
Republic were shattered. In retrospect, rather than being the African 
exemplar of a stable democratic system, Nigeria was more realistically 
a model of political dissension, contradiction, and conflict. There is 
ample evidence to show that Nigeria bought social modernization at the 
1 '17 
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price of palitical degeneration and decay. 
As the most populous state in Africa, Nigeria was characterized by 
its ethnic diversity and intense communal pluralism. The politics of 
Sub-Saharan Africa are typified by competition among ethnic blocs 
grouped within the confines of the numerous states. Nigeria forms a 
triple example of this phenomenon. For instance, contemporary Nigerian 
political evolution was dominated by the Fulani-Hausa, Ibo, and Yoruba 
groups. Although these three large ethnic clusters do not constitute a 
majority of the total Nigerian population, each singly is larger than 
many other nation states of Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact these three 
groups might quality for what Geertz considered as "possible, self-
standing maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood. 111 The 
jockeying for power among these three ethnic groups corresponds marked-
ly to that of a power struggle between nation and nation. The peculiar 
colonial policies and constitutional formulas cast each of these three 
groups as a core majority in a three-region arrangement which remained 
basically unchanged until after independence. These regional ethnic 
blocs were characterized not only by fundamentally dissimilar tra-
ditional orders but also by dysrhythmic tempos of modernization during 
the colonial period. 
Basic to this study is the assumption that political development 
in Africa must be viewed initially as the process of building an insti-
tutional framework within which the game of politics can be played. 
One of the primary institutions to have evolved in Africa has been the 
political party and the Nigerian political system to a large extent 
1Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," lli Societies and 
~States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York, 1963), p. 111. 
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reflects the evolution and operations of the three large parties. 
Fleming has claimed that the penultimate goal of political development 
is a self-sustaining accumulation and distribution of power and ulti-
2 
mately the values which power buys. This process implies an institu-
tional structure and, in the case of Nigeria, the prime institutional 
focus must necessarily include the political parties. This is not to 
say that these parties are important simply because they provide con-
venient and functional facsimilies of Western practice. Rather, an 
analysis of party evolution on the Nigerian scene provides some insight 
into the enormous diversity of Nigeria's ethnic groups, their tra-
ditional political orders, and the problems encountered by the tribal 
based parties in their quest for power and institutionalization. Thus, 
just as the Nigerian political order has been shaped by its parties, 
the parties have in turn reflected the cleavages within this order. 
In studying Nigerian political evolution one is struck by both the 
complexities and contrasts inherent in the ethnic matrix of this nation 
of sub-nations and the continued resiliency of primordial attachments 
in modern politics. Far from disappearing, these widely embracing 
ethnic attachments, though often disclaimed or ignored, have exhibited 
an amazing durability despite appeals to supra-tribal nationalism and 
despite efforts to achieve measures of political integration on a na-
tional scale. A study of Nigerian party politics is very much a study 
of evolving ethnicity. 
Nigerian interethnic politics involved questions of systemic 
change and culture far deeper than could be exhibited in formal 
2william G. Fleming, "Political Science and African Politics," 
Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, 3 (1959), p. 501. 
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structures of government or written constitutions. As noted, Nigeria 
did not evolve as an organic political entity. In spite of this fact, 
the British left Nigeria with full formal structures of government and 
administration, a national anthem and flag, political parties and all 
the trappings of sovereignty. However, it is all too apparent that the 
institutional apparatus and ritual symbols of statehood preceded the 
achievement of nationhood. Underlying these surface legacies of mo-
dernity there existed contradictions, cleavages, and centrifugal forces 
which prevented the growth of truly national political institutions and 
resulted in the disintegration of the Nigerian polity into civil war. 
It is asserted that tribal attachments and the traditional politi-
cal order have not been eroded but have actually been reinforced by 
modernization and the advent of modern political processes. In Nigeria 
it is obvious the parties not only reflected the persistence of such 
attachments but actually manipulated ethnic particularism and sectional 
loyalties to grasp and maintain power. Such manipulation often re-
sulted in stark interethnic confrontation which neither the parties nor 
the central or regional governments could control. The changes af-
fected by dysrhythmic modernization and steadily escalating interethnic 
tension occurred simultaneously, The incapacity of the parties or the 
governments to channel such change and resolve such conflict was noted 
by Rothchild: 
In theory governmental, party, and military authorities 
in third world countries exercise great control over politi-
cal, social, and economic matters within the state; in 
practice, this institutional authority is somewhat more 
apparent than real. By displaying the inability of these 
structural mechanisms to deal with the crises of political 
integration, interethnic conflict exposes the fragility 3 
and limited nature of the government's capacity for control. 
The colonial period was a critical era in the evolution of Ni-
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gerian constitutionalism, the growth of indiginous political organiza-
tions, and the reinforcement of regional insularity and ethnic attach-
ments. As this study claims, British policies of indirect rule and 
"unity through diversity" contributed substantially to the dominant 
role of traditional forces in the Nigerian political system. Integra-
tion of the various heterogeneous segments of Nigeria was not the 
'-------,~-·----"~''"-~•e••••--··~"'" >'«•-~· ~ •• ,._,' '""""~• ~·~---~" 
original intention of the architects of indirect rule. Imperial hegem-
---·~----~·---~· .. -·-~----~-----------~--·--..,,, ................ ~.,-··-·~-"'"'·····-- ...... ~--........ --· 
ony was maintained by superimposing a small cadre of British admini-
strators onto a preexisting traditional political structure. The 
British preserved and reinforced the centralized emirate system making 
it a static but inexpensive showpiece of rule by proxy. British 
colonial policy was predicated on upholding the "natural rulers and 
institutions" and this was accomplished by drawing a curtain of isola-
tion across the North effectively insulating this region from tha edu-
cational, political, social, and economic changes generated in the 
South. Because of the fundamental differences in Northern and Southern 
traditional orders, indirect rule ideally suited to the centralized, 
authoritarian emirate system was abortively applied elsewhere. 
The independence which the emirs lost in the colonial Pax Brit-
tanica was replaced by a far greater security in offic,e. The British 
retained the emirs at the apex of the traditional political pyramid and 
3Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution," World 
Politics, XXII, 4 (1970), PP• 597-598. 
162 
utilized the same traditional elite to lead the new native authority 
system. This system largely paralleled the old emirate structure but 
placed the emirs and their :retainers· in charge of a vast web of pa-
tronage and administrative services. Far from atrophying under colo-
nial overlordship, emirate theocratic rule, reactionary by some stan-
dards, proved adaptive and resilient in its demonstrable ability to 
accommodate its basic structure to modern realities without seriously 
shifting the nature or balance of power in its own ranks or the region. 
In their advisory role, the British acquiesced to an indiginous 
authoritarian system which allowed no basis for legitimate opposition 
and, on the face of it, was incompatible with the elective system of 
government. Further, in an insular and conservative Northern political 
system in which opposition was tantamount to treason, the British did 
not hesitate to collaborate with the emirate oligarchy in suppressing 
any opposition to a political structure which each sedulously sought 
to preserve. Thus, Anglo-Fulani accommodation in the mutually advan-
tageous policies of indirect rule perpetuated the role of a traditional 
elite whose adaptive potential extended even to the grafting of politi-
cal party activity onto the native authority structure. 
The evolution of political parties occurred during a period of 
colonial reforms which attempted to reconcile regional values--
accentuated by indirect rule--with the intention of laying the founda-
tions of federalism. The reforms of: .. J.922.-19_54 exhibited the enormous 
, •..... 
problems and contradictions inherent in building a natiot:ial .. U.D:~-~X .. while 
-------"--. ···---· .~-·- . , ......... ---- ------~~-- ... ~. 
allowing for regional diversity. In the twenty-five year period be-
tween the Clifford Constitution of 1922 and the Richards Constitution 
of 1947 nationalist activity was isolated to the South, and the North 
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remained insulated from agitational politics. The Richards Constitu-
tion laid the foundations of a federal system by providing regional 
deliberative bodies whose composition was derived mainly from local 
native authorities. By 1958 regional governments had become key 
centers of power and the composition of the Federal House of Represen-
tatives henceforth was to be based on total population which favored 
the North in a ratio of 54:46. Herein lay a crucial factor for party 
development: Nigeria was to become an i~~~p~~?:~e~.~ federation of semi-
autonomous regions in which one region--the North--was larger than the 
other regions combined. In a classically distorted and unbalanced 
federal arrangement the three ethnic-regional parties vied for power 
and institutionalization. 
Primordial ethnic loyalties in Nigeria were politicized in the 
arena of competitive electoral democracy. Most critically, the ethnic 
based parties were prime catalytic agents in cultivating a new politi-
cal tribalism. A corollary hypothesis of this study asserted that the 
strength of regional political organizations based on tribal forces and 
loyalties prevented the development of national political parties. A 
summary of the criteria used to analyze the party system point out the 
composite effects of evolving regional-tribal forces and attachments on 
the Nigerian polity. 
Autonomy 
None of the major parties examined in this study could be con-
sidered autonomous. Each depended on core ethnic group support while 
the bulk of party leadership came also from these same groups. In 
examining Nigerian party autonomy within the context of growing 
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regionalism and tribal nationalism, i~ seems more apro~to classify 
Nigeria as three one-party systems rather than one three-party system. 
Admittedly, the commercial-professional political class which dominated 
the parties of the South was much less clearly delineated than the 
narrow theocratic elite which dominated the North. Each class, how-
ever, deliberately manipulated tribal attaclunents and cleavages to 
grasp and maintain regional power. In this regard the concepts of tra-
ditionality and modernity were not dichotomous but mutually reinforc-
ing for the so called traditionalists were "modernizing" while the 
modernists were 11traditionalizing. 11 · Furthermore, it is obvious that 
traditional authoritarianism successfully permeated leadership and be-
havior patterns of party politics in Northern Nigeria. The NPC, though 
labeled a political party, was in essence more an aggregation of fac-
tional, emirate interests operating as an evolved electoral arm of the 
native authorities. Most Southern politicians grossly underestimated 
the adaptive potential of this monolithic structure in the arena of 
party politics. Thus, autonomy provides a basic though incomplete 
picture of party institutionalization. 
Adaptability 
Party adaptability points out the divergence of the part_y' s aims 
in attempting to establish electoral footholds outside their·respective 
regions. By 1960 it was apparent that de facto one-party rule had come 
in.to existence in the regions and that the parties would use any means 
at their disposal to maintain these regional· power bases. The NCNC and 
AG each attempted to establish electoral footholds in the minority re-
gions of the other--the Delta region of the East and the Midwestern 
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region of the West. Neither party succeeded. The two Southern parties 
also attempted to build sustained support in minority areas of the 
lower North. Again, both parties failed. Though neither Southern party 
ever successfully shifted or extended its electoral appeal, both 
achieved the dubious distinction of manipulating tribal nationalism in 
desperate and increasingly violent electoral clashes. NPC tactics were 
no exception. For all the parties, tribal chauvinism and paranoia made 
excellent politics. In contrast to the NCNC and AG, the NPG never at-
tempted to become a national party in the sense of extending its elec-
toral base beyond the minority areas of its own region. Through the 
vast local leverage of the native authority structure and outright in-
timidation the NPC consolidated power throughout the North. From its 
regional electoral base alone the emir dominated NPC swept to absolute 
power in Kaduna and Kaduna was the key to Lagos. Thus, none of the 
parties were adaptable on a national scale and the capacity of the NPC 
to monopolize the North made efforts to escape regional encapsulation 
by the NCNC and AG exercises in electoral futility. 
Coherence 
Interparty and intraparty struggle among the regionally based 
groups exposed varying degrees of incoherence. Disunity, which plagued 
early nationalist and NYM efforts, remained a constant divisive factor 
affecting particularly the Southern parties. For instance, the Western 
AG based in the most modernized regi.on of the Federation, developed 
deep divisions in its multiple roles as opposition party at the center 
and North and government leader in Ibadan. The AG internal 
regionalist-unitarist power struggle, exploited by the NPC-NCNC 
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coalition at the center, split the AG and set the stage for party re-
alignment and an even more violent confrontation on a North-South axis. 
The NCNC, as the oldest of the three parties, suffered from lack of or-
ganizational apparatus to be government leader in Enugu, coalition 
partner in Lagos, and opposition party in the West. In the East, 
ethnic politics and NCNC electoral victories stimulated latent sub-
ethnic attaclunents. The number and strength of ethnic unions revealed 
both the structural weakness of the NCNC and also the fact that NCNC 
electoral domination actually contributed to the strength of Ibo sub-
ethnic unions at the expense of a strong party organization. In the 
North, with the entrenched native authority structure, the overarching 
mechanism of Islam, a disproportionately larger demographic base, the 
NPC achieved a degree of coherence lacking in the South. These factors 
in part explain the seeming paradox of the insular, conservative North-
ern region being able to dominate the technologically advanced and 
modernized South. Thus, none of the parties were coherent national or-
ganizations and only the NPG with its narrow elite and exclusively 
Northern orientation could claim to have achieved substantial regional 
unity. 
If there were any pervasive ideology in Nigerian party politics it 
was that of regionalism. In spite of attempted electoral thrusts by 
the NCNC and AG outside their home regions, regionalism which fed on 
, 
tril:lal attaclunents became the modus operandi for party survival. The 
rival regional political classes in seizing power retribalized politics 
and condoned methods which erupted periodically into public violence. 
The peculiar effects of zero-sum party politics was that by often mak-
ing legitimate opposition impossible violent confrontation became 
167 
inevitable. Rather than to moderate or prevent such ethnic based 
violence the parties more often manipulated and provoked it. In retro-
spect it would seem that both the constitutional and party systems in 
Nigeria were as much the victims of political and social fragmentation 
as its causes. It is the conclusion of this study that pre-1966 con-
stitutional formulas and competitive party politics were dysfunctional 
for national integration in Nigeria. The failure of the Nigerian party 
system to be institutionalized on a national scale represents an Afri-
can dimension to the study of political development and political de-
cey. 
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